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SUMMARY
Many complex and interdependent systems engineering challenges involve more
than one stakeholder or decision maker. These challenges, such as the definition
and acquisition of future air mobility systems, are often found in situations where
resources are finite, objectives are conflicting, constraints are restricting, and uncer-
tainty in future outcomes prevail. Air mobility operational models which simulate
fleet wide behavior effects over time, in various mission scenarios, and potentially
over the entire design life-cycle, are always multi-dimensional, cover a large decision
space, and require significant time to generate sufficient solutions to adequately de-
scribe the design space. This challenge is coupled with the fact that, in these highly
integrated solutions or acquisitions, multiple stakeholders or decision makers are re-
quired to cooperate and reach agreement in selecting or defining the requirements for
the design or solution and in its costly and lengthy implementation. However, since
values, attitudes and experiences are different for each decision maker, reaching con-
sensus across the multiple criteria with different preferences and objectives is often
a slow and highly convoluted process. In order to reach consensus on the solution
requirements, their preferences must be in agreement.
Not only do the decision makers have different preferences or importance weight-
ings for the multiple operational or logistical dimensions, they also have influence
over each other in terms of persuading one to change their preferences. This con-
sensus reaching process is traditionally performed through compromises, trades and
other negotiation steps, all which are influenced by the relationships between deci-
sion makers. Each decision maker in the group must be willing to accept a set of
xxiv
requirements all can agree upon in place of one that may benefit the decision maker
directly but would not have sufficient support from all decision makers. Thus, an
expensive, lengthy and ad hoc decision process is often employed where stakeholders
slowly coalesce around a final solution after significant resistance and/or sacrifice of
their individual preferences and self-interested objectives.
In response to these common deficiencies and provide quantitative data, this re-
search investigates and proposes solutions to two challenges: 1) increase the speed at
which operational solutions and associated requirements are generated and explored,
and 2) systematize the group decision-making process, to both accelerate and improve
decision making in these large operational problems requiring cooperation.
The development of the Air Mobility Operations Design (AirMOD) model is pro-
posed to address the first challenge by implementing and leveraging surrogate models
of airlift capability across a wide scenario space. In addressing the second major
challenge, the proposed Multi-Agent Consensus Reaching on the Objective Space
(MACRO) methodology introduces a process to reduce the feasible decision space, by
identifying regions and requirements of high probability of reaching consensus. These
consensus subregions of the entire design space are found by simulating multi-agent
decision-making processes using game-theoretic techniques while applying the prefer-
ences of, and influence relationships between, the decision makers. The preferences
of the decision makers are quantified through discrete choice experiments and inverse
design filtering techniques to acquire distributions of the importance weightings for
each of the objectives. Similarly, the relationships of influence between decision mak-
ers is computed with separate discrete choice experiments quantifying affinities to
form coalitions with other decision makers.
The resultant decision space characterization can assist decision makers to take
action more quickly and confidently from the responses to the two challenges by in-
creasing the knowledge of the solution space through increased alternative generation
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and identifying regions with high probability of reaching consensus within the group
of stakeholders. The MACRO methodology is tested on a proof of concept involv-
ing the future acquisition decision of the fleet size and solution requirements for a
heavy-cargo transport aircraft system, simulated by the AirMOD model.
AirMOD was found to perform remarkably well by being able to generate 1 mil-
lion simulations in less than 50 minutes to cover the entire decision space. The vis-
ible trades and additional analysis only possible by this larger data set significantly
increase the capability to explore air mobility solutions and potentially increase con-
fidence and quality of decision making for requirements definition phases in system
engineering problems. When the AirMOD data set was tested in a 5-agent group de-
cision making scenario, the application of MACRO methodology was able to isolate
a consensus region with less than 1% of the initial full set of operational solutions.
Further analysis identified three solutions as most likely to be accepted in a consensus
reaching exercise. These three solutions form the initial set of requirements that all
stakeholders should initially consider to save time and resources, by removing unnec-
essary decision-making iterations. If one solution is found acceptable by all parties
from this initial consensus region subset, then considerable resources will no longer be
expended and time delays from lengthy negotiations will have been avoided. Simula-
tion and experiments confirmed that influence relationships play a significant role in
group decision-making activities and that discrete choice experiments offer an addi-
tional technique to extract not only preference distributions but power relationships.
Cooperative game theoretic techniques also offer benefits when desiring to facilitate
consensus reaching expeditiously by incentivizing cooperation through rewards of in-
creased group influence and utility. Implementing the AirMOD model and MACRO
methodology is found to potentially facilitate the requirements definition phase for




1.1 Design and Decision Making
Engineering is about design and design is about making decisions.
Regardless of where one starts in the cycle of analyzing, decomposing or solving
a problem, it invariably will end up at some point characterized as a decision which
must be made. Even at the highest level of decomposition, answering the general
question, “What is the problem?” requires a decision. Is the problem to meet the
customer needs or stay employed? Is it to design something new or use an old design
in a new way? Is to cut costs or improve performance? Is it both? Is it neither? Rittel
and Webber take this notion once step further stating that “... designing systems [and
therefore decision making] today is difficult because there is no consensus on what
the problems are, let alone how to resolve them” [133].
Decision making is universal for almost every task and every step inside or out-
side of engineering activities. Although, traditionally, engineering might have been
considered an activity after the decision is made and once a design is selected, the
delineating line has become so blurred that now it has become almost a part of the
decision making itself.
Today as decision making becomes an integral part of engineering, technical anal-
yses, physics-based models, and statistics, to name a few, are brought earlier into
the design or decision phases [103]. Systems engineers must now account for, under-
stand, and design solutions with a larger set of dimensions, objectives and constraints.
The additional dimensions, beyond the classical technical and performance based ob-
jectives, include financial constraints, operational logistics, and even political and
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societal implications.
This more recent requirement for engineers to design while maintaining a “bigger
picture” of the world and the context in which a design will be implemented into
a system, provided impetus to create a relatively new discipline designated system
engineering, the development of which was accelerated through various organizations
such as the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) founded in the
early 1990’s [78]. Further expansion of this notion, where independently function-
ing systems are applied or implemented across geopolitical boundaries, are physically
separated, and exhibit emergent behavior providing capability that no one system
can perform in isolation, requires system-of-systems (SoS) engineering. Examples of
these problems for SoS engineering often include: power and energy production, trade
and consumption, air, sea and ground transportation and the World Wide Web. The
US World News has recently noted that universities themselves have moved to better
educate the future problem solvers: “Engineering is at the core of so many complex
global challenges—in healthcare, medicine, energy, food safety, manufacturing, com-
munications, the environment—that grad programs have realized cross-disciplinary,
even multi-disciplinary programs, are essential now to train new engineers” [65].
As these SoS engineering solutions become more complex, interdependent and
sophisticated, the decision-making processes and algorithms themselves require con-
current development. Thus, the decision making that complement systems and SoS
engineering must be equally multi-dimensional, adaptable and powerful. Borrow-
ing the phraseology from a classical quote attributed to Einstein1, one could state
that “we cannot perform decision making in the same way we have for these more
integrated and complicated problems.”
Furthermore, these highly integrated and complicated problems are no longer
1“We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”
- Albert Einstein
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solved by any one person or entity. They impact multiple people and they are solved
by multiple people. Moreover, the funding for such solutions would likewise come
from an even wider set of stakeholders: “In fact, it is much more likely that individual
systems will be funded by a diverse group of organizations, and the goals of the funding
sources for individual elements may not align with the goals of the SoS stakeholders”
[72]. Likewise, the expertise in different dimensions of the solution is found in different
individuals or entities and thus the decision making is similarly performed collectively
as a group. Collaboration and cooperation become more than good ideas, they become
essential. The final decisions may still slowly evolve over time such as standards for
Internet protocols or be implemented relatively quickly such as in recent economic
bailouts, but regardless, multiple stakeholders are involved and each can influence the
final decision whatever it may be.
This multi-agent, or group decision making, in the context of systems engineering,
and an approach to improving this often overlooked but highly crucial activity from
an engineering perspective, is the general topic of this research.
1.2 Engineers as Decision Makers
Former Congressman Vern Ehlers once declared that “What the country desperately
needs is more scientists and engineers in the public office at all levels” [147]. Cur-
rent President Barack Obama has written “I wish the country had fewer lawyers
and more engineers” [118]. Despite various backgrounds, educations and experiences,
these public officers share the same perspective that what may be missing from pub-
lic institutions and from the decision and policy making processes are not necessarily
“engineers” in form but the engineering ideals and people possessing the desperately
needed skills of analytical reasoning, objectivity and mathematical rigor that engi-
neers commonly possess.
Many more have argued that government officials do not, but should, apply more
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of the scientific method in their leadership and decision-making activities, perhaps
sharing the thought that “[s]ome quantitative researchers believe that systematic sta-
tistical analysis is the only road to truth in the social sciences” [89]. Some have
suggested that policy makers do not take time to sift through data or use informa-
tion pertinent to the current issues, resulting in significantly less effective decisions.
Other individuals have wondered if engineering practices and scientific methods can
and should be applied more often to social or economic challenges. At least one
organization, Scientists and Engineers for America, have made it their mission “to
promote evidence-based decision making at all levels of our government” [147].
But why are engineers, or more precisely the engineering principles, often turned
to as a potential source for answers to difficult challenges? The responses may vary
but a key element to the answer could be found in a statement by Hilberry: “All
solutions in engineering are compromises” (quoted in [194]). Thus, any solution or
engineering design comes as the result of testing and evaluating trades between op-
tions or variables, balancing the pros and cons, and comparing the candidate solutions
across output metrics (e.g. time, cost, risk) in order to meet specified or implied re-
quirements. These “compromises” are inherently a part of any engineering exercise
where the resources are limited, arguably a necessary condition for any real chal-
lenge. The trade-offs and compromises a skillful engineer must grapple with in design
are similar in kind to the challenges government leaders, business executives, and
other professionals face continually. These challenges are always, to a certain extent,
multidimensional, complex, interdependent, multidisciplinary and non-trivial.
Furthermore, they are always found in situations where resources are finite, objec-
tives are conflicting, constraints are restricting, and uncertainty in future outcomes
prevails. Blanchard and Fabrycky opined that “there is usually little assurance that
predicted futures will coincide with actual futures. The physical and economic el-
ements on which a course of action depends may vary from their estimated values
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because of chance causes...[T]his lack of certainty about the future makes decision
making one of the most challenging tasks faced by individuals, industry, and govern-
ment” [22]. However, decisions are and will be continually made at varying degrees
of success for these important and multi-faceted problems.
Since the systems engineering field has experience in these types of problems and
have developed tools to understand, decompose and analyze the relationships and
characteristics of large complex problems, it should be of no surprise that govern-
ment officials, including the President of the United States, are interested in applying
these skills to decision making for current societal concerns as well. Although there
may be areas and challenges where the scientific method and engineering skill sets
are helpful, the over extension of these tools into so called “wicked” problems also de-
serves a warning from Rittel: “The kinds of problems that planners deal with-societal
problems-are inherently different from the problems that scientists and perhaps some
classes of engineers deal with” [133]. However, modeling and simulation, theory and
experimentation, and computer and technological advancements have not only im-
proved but accelerated in the four decades since this warning was given. True, there
are problems which are ill-defined and ones that do not have a solution, or if they
do, have a temporary solution, but limiting one’s options for solving a problem, or at
least, improving the current state would be unwise.
Therefore, a key caveat in this research is that the ideas presented herein are
not a panacea for all problems. At the highest level, this research seeks to take a
few steps to more fully involve and apply engineering principles into decision-making
processes and push the state-of-the-art in group decision-making activities for multi-
dimensional problems.
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1.3 The Era of Big Data
One of the ways that computer technology has aided in quantifying or, at a minimum,
understanding these highly complex problems is through both more data and better
data. Improved statistical models and methods have allowed the analyst an ever
increasing suite of tools with which to investigate the multi-dimensional solution
spaces. Coupled with accelerated computational speeds and memory availability, the
number of options, alternatives and candidate solutions to various problems have
grown exponentially. Surrogate models and other advanced design methods have
further enabled this explosion of multi-dimensional data [47]. The former challenge
of “insufficient data” has become a challenge to find the “needle in the haystack” or
piece of information among the gigabytes to terabytes of data stored and available.
The relatively new multidisciplinary field of visual analytics has become increasingly
important as the data to analyze and interpret becomes ever larger [104].
In terms of decision making, a larger set of alternatives can be offered and a literal
uncountable set of solutions can be modeled and potentially implemented. The trend
is likely to occur as decision makers seek greater levels of confidence that the best
solution is available and can be found, tested and analyzed. The flip side to this “big
data” revolution is the need for more sophisticated methods to explore and analyze,
not one at a time, but in bulk or parametrically. Having a larger number of designs
might be a good thing as it potentially increases the chances that the one ideal
solution has been modeled, but it may require increased time to find the “needle in
the haystack” and make the design selection. These two initially contradictory goals:
1) increase definition and resolution of the design space with more data points, and 2)
accelerate decision times without sacrificing quality, are in fact possible, but require
methodological advancements and improvements to modeling efforts such that better
and faster decisions can be made.
In order to grapple with these goals and the ever increasing amounts of data, the
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analyst and/or decision maker need improved tools and decision making environments
to play games and perform more in depth sensitivity analyses and exploration activi-
ties. Since the problems faced by these decision making groups are highly integrated
and complex, the assumptions and objectives of all, or any one decision maker, may
be initially unknown. Furthermore, their preferences can change, especially as each
learns or gains more information about the problem from exploring the “big data”
associated with better defined solution spaces. Similarly, no static analysis tool is
sufficient and can adequately account for an expected evolving preference or group
objective function over time. Tools must be quick, dynamic, and able to process large
amounts of data to properly account for the multi-dimensional design spaces. The
decision making in these types of problems will not be a simple, linear sequence of
steps and thus the associated tools that facilitate group decision with big data must
be made equal to the task.
1.4 Decision Making for Requirements Definition
In no place are decisions more significant than in the early phases of the acquisition
process, before the pre-conceptual or requirement definition phases. The decisions
made at these points in the process can drive a disproportionately larger percentage
of the ultimate cost and designs of any future system. In essence, the desires and
preferences of those individuals or organizations forming the requirements drive what
eventually is generated as solution alternatives, and thus the design selection at later
phases.
Efforts to better facilitate parts of this overall process has been recently revised
from the Requirements Generation System (RGS) into the Joint Capabilities Integra-
tion and Development System (JCIDS). However, limitations still exists, and research
addressing the various challenges of the JCIDS acquisition process has provided a
7
number of potential improvements [72]. Two of those improvement areas involve ac-
celerating the time at which parts of the process are implemented and increasing the
traceability of decisions. Advancing the way in which groups of decision makers reach
consensus for the requirements definition phase for major acquisition programs could
potentially shorten the total time for system development and later assist with keep-
ing system development programs from straying by resisting “requirements creep”
from enhanced traceability. This, in turn, could save costs and increase the future
success rate for acquisition programs.
1.4.1 Requirements Issues with the VH-71A U.S. Presidential Helicopter
A recent and very public example of one such failure, in part due to requirements
issues, is the US presidential helicopter, the VH-71A. As winners of the 2002 VXX
competition, the VH-71A was initially awarded to Lockheed Martin and AgustaWest-
land in 2005, to design and produce 23 helicopters which would replace the aging fleet
of VH-3D and VH-60N helicopters. The initial contract was for $1.7 billion dollars
[176] for the system development and demonstration phase.
However, very soon after the award, cost overruns and schedule slips were al-
ready projected due to changes or misinformation as understood between the various
parties. A statement by Lockheed Martin encapsulated the major issue: “Immedi-
ately following contract award, Lockheed Martin and Navair [US Naval Air Systems
Command] realized there was a difference in understanding about operational and
technical requirements and how to develop and test the subsystems and the aircraft”
and also that “additional required aircraft modifications, enhanced safety, additional
testing and enhanced supportability” [184] were also part of the requirements creep
that was observed. Much later these failures were described as “runaway require-
ments, program delays, and soaring costs” [90].
Some have suggested that the result of such requirements creep was that the “US
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Figure 1: Conceptual Drawing of the VH-71A U.S. Presidential Helicopter which was
canceled in 2009 (From [109])
Navy source-selection team was kept separate from the rest of Navair during the VXX
competition” [184]. In other words, transparency between groups was not enforced
and thus requirements came a surprise as the new group of decisions makers who held
influence in later increments or stages had different preferences.
These changes of the decision makers and other unforeseen factors, which could
have been mitigated, were not considered or accounted for in the overall program. The
final outcome was a cancellation of the VH-71A program by Department of Defense
(DOD) in 2009 after a doubling of the expected costs from 2005 to 2009. One of
the identified reasons was again related to requirements: “Stringent performance
requirements (some with no flexibility) were laid out for the system prior to the start
of development and did not appear to involve significant consideration of trade-offs of
cost, performance, and schedule negotiated between the customer and the developer”
[179]. Analysis revealed the final cost was expected to total $13 billion, up from $6.5
billion estimated in 2005, for the 23 helicopters (or close to $600 million per vehicle).
The U.S. Governmental Accounting Office reported total program expenditures up
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to the cancellation date summed to near $3 billion [179].
The requirements definition phase can be a severe stumbling block, if not per-
formed adequately, to the success of a program. Furthermore, since so many decision
makers have much at stake in the decision, the process can be held up much longer
than desirable by the final user. After all, decisions makers are prone to change and
may expect flexibility in others while ironically not recognizing it in themselves. Not
only are the decision makers themselves replaced with others over time but their pref-
erences can shift, reverse, or “move” based on experience, information and external
pressures. This can have negative impacts on the overall process (e.g. cancellation) if
these probable events are not considered. Therefore, a real need exists to explore ways
to improve the group decision making process applied to this requirements definition
phase of the acquisition process.
1.5 Motivating Problem: Requirements Definition for Fu-
ture Air Mobility Systems
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has
slowly moved away from traditional acquisition policies dominating the Cold War, into
a policy where capability and affordability reign as the governing principles for making
decisions about asset procurement. This paradigm shift most recently redefined in the
2012 Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) [32], focuses on
the process to obtain a more agile and flexible force to meet the needs of the modern
war fighter.
Furthermore, under an environment of increased scrutiny and projected decreasing
budgets into the next decade [44], the most recent DoD plan to cut costs “incorporates
all areas from potential savings, to force structure enhancements, modifications, and
adjustments” [120]. Some of these have already been initiated, most dramatically in
the reduced procurements of F-35s (1591 to 365 from 2002 through 2017 [180]) and
F-22s (750 to 195 [186]) in the last few years.
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Other aircraft programs have been cut or reduced, and less expensive strategies
such as service life extension programs (SLEP) have become more common to modify
or upgrade aging, but existing, aircraft. One of these aircraft systems is the C-5
Galaxy.
1.5.1 The C-5 Galaxy
The C-5 Galaxy is the largest heavy-lift transport aircraft in the US military. It is the
only cargo aircraft capable of transporting some of the heaviest combat equipment
including two combat ready Abrams tanks, six Apache attack helicopters or the 74-
ton mobile scissors bridge, up to a maximum payload of 270,000 pounds [175]. With
cargo space for 36 standard pallets or 10 light armored vehicles coupled with both
a rear and nose door with full width drive-on ramps allows for expedited loading of
only 2 hours [46]. These and other features make the C-5’s high carrying capacity a
very attractive capability to maintain. This “astounding capability” of the C-5, as
described by General John W. Handy, former commander of the US Transportation
Command and Air Mobility Command, is why “[w]e certainly need to keep [it] at
our fingertips for as far as I can see into the future.” The C-5 was also described by
Handy as an aircraft “whose value is dramatically underappreciated” [167].
However, the C-5 has suffered from low mission capable rates due to reliability
and maintainability issues for years. For example, one estimate for the maintenance
man hours per flight hour reached as high as 46 for the C-5A variant [71].
Strategic reviews found that C-5 platform met a key requirement for the US mil-
itary and two programs were initiated to upgrade and modify the C-5 in response to
the poor operational and sustainment metrics observed. The first of these two pro-
grams, the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), seeks to “replace the existing
flight and engine instrument system and the flight control system with integrated,
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state-of-the-art, cost-effective, highly reliable and capable systems ” [45]. The sec-
ond program, the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP), will
improve the logistics and sustainment metrics of the C-5 “by replacing the propul-
sion system and modifying the mechanical, hydraulic, avionics, fuel, and landing gear
systems as well as other structural modifications” [177]. C-5 aircraft which have suc-
cessfully completed both programs are designated C-5M Super Galaxy aircraft. As
of December 2012, only 6 production C-5M’s have been delivered out of 9 current
C-5M’s overall [101]. From the initial estimate of fully modernizing 112 C-5s, the
number was reduced to only 52 in February 2008 [174] with the potential for even
more reductions. As recent as October 2011, proposals to reduce the fleet by an-
other 15 aircraft was offered as potential ways to save additional funds in an “Age of
Austerity” [12].
Figure 2: The C5-M Super Galaxy During its First Flight in 2006 (From [175])
1.5.2 Strategic Airlift Comparison Tool (SACT)
In 2010, efforts to model the capability of the C-5M over the C-5A platform was
conducted resulting in a tool called the Strategic Airlift Comparison Tool (SACT)
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Figure 3: Screen Shot of the Strategic Airlift Comparison Tool (SACT) [142]
[142] to demonstrate and analyze the benefits from an operations and logistics per-
spective of the C-5M aircraft (see Figure 3). A user of the SACT tool was able to
define various mission scenarios including mission payload, payload types, locations,
maximum on ground (MOG) and other input scenario parameters. The logistic out-
puts included the mission time to close, fuel consumption flight hours, utilization,
etc. Various trades with fleet sizes and refueling en route across platforms against
the output metrics of interest were also available. SACT was developed to provide
a modeling and simulations environment which could rapidly evaluate and compare
scenarios with various enablers such as surrogate modeling techniques, to allow for
increased and faster trade space analysis and improved decision making.
The tool has since been updated and enhanced internally at Lockheed Martin,
with additional data integrated into the analysis framework.
1.5.3 Requirement for Future Military Transport Aircraft
Today the C-5 RERP program is still under careful scrutiny and the future uncertain
with the continual looming possibility of further reductions. In fact, the most recent
FY 2012 annual report from the Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
reported a less than ideal observation that “C-5 Program Office continues to address
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deficiencies identified during the C-5M initial operational tests in 2010” [166].
Whether or not drastic reductions occur, the problem remains about how to main-
tain the carrying capacity of the current C-5 fleet into the future but at reduced cost.
If upgrades and modifications become so expensive per unit, is it more reasonable to
consider an all new design? Could the new design be a derivative of the C-5? Are
schedule slips for modernization tolerable with an ever aging fleet? Could a smaller
but more reliable fleet maintain the same capability as the current one? Would it be
cheaper in the long term? Is it cheaper in the short term? Is the cost per flying hour
still too high for the modified C-5? Can the military get by with a fleet with mostly
C-17s?
These and other questions quickly cover the design or solution space for this
multi-dimensional problem. Defining the requirements for a future fleet of heavy lift
transport aircraft is a multi-agent, highly convoluted problem. The various stakehold-
ers may have differing views on the future threats or locations in need for transport.
Regarding the differences of these perspectives Ostrosi et al. conclude that “[d]ifferent
disciplines, with the subjective nature of the opinions of actors, often reflect latent
conflicts in actors’ commitments” [124]. Thus, they may have conflicting opinions
about funds available for such a fleet or diverging estimates on the actual needed
carrying capacity. Lastly, they will likely differ in the importance they place on per-
formance, cost, availability and maintainability described succinctly by Jemison and
Sitkin: “Acquisitions are strategic, complex, occur sporadically (for most firms), and
affect varied stakeholder groups and multiple actors whose involvement is temporally
and functionally divided. These factors, in combination, result in an acquisitions
process that is both discontinuous and fractionated” [82].
The two conflicting goals are again exemplified in this aforementioned challenge,
namely, 1) generating alternatives or solutions, and 2) evaluating and selecting the
design.
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Firstly, the design space must be sufficiently defined and enough alternatives gen-
erated so as to adequately cover all possible combinations of solutions. This, in turn,
requires a model fast enough to populate the entire design space with data such that
all possibilities are considered and analyzed. A slow, non-parametric model will be
ineffective in providing this capability. Surrogate models with Monte Carlo simula-
tions in sufficiently wide ranges are needed to account for the various perspectives
and preferences of all stakeholders and decision makers. If the model leaves spaces
unexplored, the potential for one, many or all stakeholders to reject the data based on
its biased or uneven exploration of the space is possible. Developing and generating
the required data for these particular operational space decision-making activities is
the first major objective of this research.
Secondly, the solution for such a problem will clearly involve more than one stake-
holder or decision maker. The necessary decision-making process can be slow, ineffi-
cient and wasteful, or the process can facilitate clarity in determining preferences of
all the stakeholders quickly and in identifying solutions that all can potentially agree
upon as quickly as possible. Multiple decision makers will each seek to maximize
their own objective or utility function. At the same time, the solution space requires
the cooperation of all stakeholders and thus suggesting or guiding the group to the
ultimate solution or at least to the region of the space at which cooperation will be
most likely to occur is needed. This covers the second major objective of this research.
1.6 Other Group Decision-Making Challenges in Aerospace
Systems
The following examples point out additional ramifications of group or multi-agent
decision making for challenges involving aerospace systems. These examples should
not be considered a complete discussion of all of the aspects of the challenge but
a short summary to illustrate a particular point observed in multi-agent decision
making. These examples, selected for their aerospace related elements, have been
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heavily publicized in both the domestic and global arenas.
1.6.1 The International Space Station
The International Space Station (ISS) is a multi-national endeavor to have a perma-
nent human presence in space. The ISS, stationed in a low-earth orbit, is considered a
research facility that provides an environment for space-related experimentation such
as testing for future space exploration and other objectives.
Four countries, the United States, Russia, Japan, and Canada, as well as several
European Union member countries, with their respective space agencies, are con-
sidered partners in the ISS program. Each has their own agenda and reasons for
cooperating with the other countries to make the ISS successful. Each country has
similarly contributed different parts to the station and have benefited in different
ways. Currently, discussions are underway to decide the fate of the ISS in the next
few decades. Although orbiting since 1998, criticisms of high cost in connection with
little scientific contributions from the meager experiments conducted, has resulted
in debates about funding continuation. Furthermore, other countries have expressed
interest in joining the ISS program, including China, India and South Korea. Brazil
was also part of the program before but has since departed from participating [88].
With the changing number of decision makers or countries with changing amounts
of interest or ways to contribute, a constant decision-making process is in continual
flux and with various support levels from different countries. How best can the partner
nations meet the needs of the current and future stakeholders? Who has a say on the
design, schedule and staffing of the ISS? How much will each country contribute and
control in terms of life-cycle or utilization?
1.6.2 The Joint Strike Fighter
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) illustrates a similar agreement and partnership be-
tween nation states. However, the structure of partnerships establishes three levels
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within the JSF program. The United Kingdom is a level one partner, Italy and the
Netherlands are level two, and Turkey, Australia, Norway, Denmark, and Canada are
all level three [173]. Since partners at level two contributed more financially to the
program, would they expect more influence over the design decisions than level three
partners? How do non-financial contributions influence the design? Does the type of
relationship with the United States (i.e. geographically, ideologically, or fiscally) give
one nation more or less influence? Or do partner nations have almost no influence
in the design and are simply “first customers” of the platform? How is Lockheed
Martin, the prime contractor, influenced by partner nations or how do they influence
others to increase or maintain current order levels?
1.6.3 USAF KC-X Competition
The USAF’s KC-X air refueling tanker competition, which was rife with scandal,
political maneuvering, and problems, required almost a decade to “decide” the winner.
Multiple stakeholders including the USAF, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, EADS and
others spent many years and millions of dollars to influence others and the key decision
makers in various ways.
Many of the strategic maneuvers such as protesting evaluation methods or threat-
ening to withdraw from the competition, were perhaps calculated, yet they still drove
how the decision makers responded, underlying the fact that decisions perhaps are
not entirely based on the engineering design and on, at least in part, subjective fac-
tors [150]. How can this type of group decision making be avoided? Or at least how
can it be accelerated so as to decrease the time required?
1.6.4 Observations from Contemporary Examples
The above examples illustrate some common issues with multi-agent or group decision
making. Often the set of decision makers is unspecified or at best changing. These
same decision makers do not always recognize, or want to use the power or influence
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they have on other agents, especially if it does not further their own agenda or ob-
jectives. Similarly, they might not even know their agenda or at least the outcomes
of any one decision since they, understandably, don’t know how other agents will
act. Lastly, the decision on how to act or what solution to implement can affect the
relationship of the decision makers into the future, yet another dimension to consider
when exploring the entire solution space.
For multi-agent decision making the attributes of, and relationships between, deci-
sion makers is as important or more important to the eventual outcome of an decision-
making activity. Since engineering design and, in particular, systems engineering is so
heavily composed of decision-making activities, in complex problems involving more
than one decision maker, there exists a need to better understand and quantify how
decisions are made in multi-agents systems. The interactions between decision mak-
ers and the changes to the individual preferences can potentially drive the decisions
more than the actual objective data.
1.7 Focus of this Research
The main focus of this research is to 1) better define and characterize the design space
by being enabled to generate greater number of alternative solutions quickly, and 2)
develop a systematic methodology when dealing with problems where the engineering
design or solution is dependent on the preferences of more than one decision maker
and each decision maker must be in agreement or reach consensus on the final design
point. Providing insight as to how one should act within a multi-agent decision-
making environment can significantly improve how agents make decisions and reduce
the time necessary for agents to take action. Furthermore, with an understanding of
the general characteristics of the eventual agreed upon design point, decision makers
can begin to hedge their design or contribution to the solution by investing early.
In other words, if one knows with some level of confidence where all the decision
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makers will eventually “end up” in terms of an agreed upon decision point, they can
take actions sooner, reducing costs and improve performance. For example, if an
engine manufacturing company can ascertain with some degree of confidence that
the eventually selected design point will have a certain thrust or other requirement,
they can take steps to prepare in advance instead of waiting for the decision to be
made. Thus, their actions can be robust against the possible decision outcomes of
the multi-agent environment. Similarly, an agent can perform analysis to identify if
entering into a negotiation or discussion with another agent is feasible by evaluating
the likely output decision points based upon the preferences and political clout of the
various agents.
The methodology developed throughout this research should not be considered a
technique for ranking alternatives or selecting the best solution by combining agents’
preferences, which have been shown to have significant limitations [5]. Instead, it
should be viewed as a probabilistic or heuristic approach to identify areas of the
design space where decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus. Potentially,
this strategy will be independent of the type of decision-making technique ultimately
used, since the focus will be on how the preferences of decision makers become aligned
over the events (e.g. trading importance weightings or criteria preferences, forming
alliances, etc.) usually held static within a decision-making technique.
Clearly, different preferences among the decision makers would make different
points or solutions more attractive. In the general case, therefore, decision makers
will prefer different solutions, at least initially. When the underlying assumption that
decision makers are incentivized to cooperate and reach a consensus, or, that reaching
a decision is more favorable for all decision makers than not reaching agreement, com-
promises are expected, trades will be performed and adjustments to one’s preferences
will occur.
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How these compromises, trades and preference adjustments factor into the de-
cision of a multi-agent system is not always analyzed from a systems engineering
perspective. Applying engineering principles and techniques to the decision process
directly can facilitate this consensus reaching thereby reducing the decision time and
making preferences more transparent and tractable.
1.8 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation has been divided into six chapters. The next chapter, Chapter 2,
reviews some of the observations about the motivating problems and other contempo-
rary challenges summarized in this introductory chapter, followed by a formalization
of the research objective, research questions and hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes
some of the background information and technical foundation for the methodology.
Chapter 4 presents an overview of the methodology with its constituent elements,
AirMOD and MACRO. Chapter 5 describes the development and implementation
of the first element, the AirMOD model. In Chapter 6, the second element, the
MACRO methodology, is further tested and developed by stepping through a canon-
ical problem while discussing the various assumptions with a variety of examples and
experiments. Chapter 7 discusses the application of the MACRO methodology to the
AirMOD data set and air mobility problem introduced in the current chapter and an-
alyzes the results and findings. The final chapter concludes this research dissertation




RESEARCH OBJECTIVE, QUESTIONS AND
HYPOTHESES
2.1 Review of Observations
The following list of observations is made regarding the air mobility challenge from
the previous chapter and the other related aerospace examples with their attendant
decision-making attributes.
Observation: Utility functions, such as an overall evaluation criterion, can be
interdependent between decision makers. The various individuals in a group decision-
making process such as selecting the fleet size and design of the future airlift capability
are interdependent. Their preferences may be dependent on each other’s perspectives
and expertise, especially in highly integrated and complex problems.
Observation: Preferences or weightings on the dimensions or objectives are sub-
ject to change with different information or external influences. People are prone to
change and can be persuaded to alter their opinion and preferences by others or by
additional information.
Observation: Ultimate decisions are often influenced by external dimensions,
constraints or factors which are not part of the classic decision-making process. Ad-
ditional unaccounted dimensions to the problems, non-quantifiable constraints and
other hidden objectives can often drive the underlying decision process. Group deci-
sion making with completely rational and objective stakeholders is at best rare and
more likely non-existent.
Observation: The initial design point from which decision makers begin their
deliberations has a strong impact or influence on the eventual final decision. The
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initially preferred design point for each individual, can and does affect how a group of
decision makers negotiate, apply trade-offs and reach consensus, through anchoring
and expected compromises.
Observation: For large scale, multi-agent multi-criteria challenges, the time lost
to make a better or “best decision” can potentially be used for incremental improve-
ments of an “early and good decision.” The large amount of time necessary to make a
decision for some acquisition involving large and highly integrated systems, could be
displaced to improving the system once a faster but good enough decision has been
make.
Observation: The number and attributes of decision makers can change over
time. Decision makers can enter and leave a group decision-making process at increas-
ing occurrences when the total time period to reach consensus is longer. Reducing
the time at which decision makers need to reach consensus in group decisions, can
avoid some of the negative problems of continual group restructuring.
Observation: Influence or power between decision makers is a real element to any
group decision and can fluctuate based on various factors. Position, experience and
expertise are just some of the intangible sources which play a role in group decision
making. More transparent power is evident through group members’ roles such as
buyer/seller roles or investment willingness of the various agents, but many others
are more private and elusive such as interpersonal abilities or negotiation skill-sets.
2.2 Research Objective
In a number of the aforementioned observations, the relationships between decision
makers play a significant role in the final decision. As systems engineers seek to solve
real challenges where:
• more than one agent has influence on the decision,
• the number of agents can vary over time,
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• the agents are uncertain of their own preferences,
• the agents are influenced by subjective factors, and,
• the agents can change their preferences with more information,
the decision-making aspects of engineering design will need to account for these
added complexities with greater skill in the future to minimize the bad decisions re-
sulting in wasted time and/or money. Furthermore, a proper understanding of the
dynamics between decision makers can allow designers, or decision makers them-
selves, to be more confident in taking robust action against the uncertainty in the
multi-agent, decision-making process. Lastly, the decision space itself must be suffi-
ciently defined and populated for confidence that enough solutions are on the table for
selection. Within operational systems characterized by numerous entities with mul-
tiple dimensions and outputs metrics tracked, the models generating the alternative
solutions is both slow and potentially burdensome.
Therefore, in connection with these observations and the need for more expedi-
tious alternative generation, there exists a need to develop a systematic approach
or methodology to address the concerns of multi-agent decision making concurrently
with improved operational design space definition for ultimately enhanced require-
ment definition for future air mobility solutions. The objective of this proposed
research is expressed as follows:
Research Objective: Improve group decision making for requirements definition
in cooperative air mobility operational solutions, by 1) generating greater numbers
of operational design solutions, and 2) identifying the subset of feasible designs by
accounting for preference uncertainty and the decision makers’ influence relationships.
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2.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
The research objective of this proposal leads to a number of research questions which
will guide the formulation of the hypotheses and eventual development of the method-
ology.
2.3.1 Research Question #1 and Hypothesis #1
The first need as established in the objective is to increase the available designs which
populate sufficiently the entire design space. With operational models often requiring
large times to execute, most decisions are made with far fewer operation solutions than
desired. The associated research question for the first half of the research objective
is thus:
Research Question #1: How can the number of operational design solutions
originally considered increase to include a greater portion of the potential design
space?
At once, the answer to such a question hints at accelerating the speed at which the
operational model is executed. Since most useful operational models are complicated
discrete event simulation models, the possibility to regress a sufficient number of
output simulations, and recast them as surrogate models can allow one to then quickly
query or calculate any design point within the region for which the surrogate model
is valid. Formalizing this hypothesis becomes:
Hypothesis #1: Monte Carlo simulations of surrogate models developed around
time-consuming operational models will provide capability to more rapidly define the
design space by generating greater numbers of candidate solutions in the same time
period.
2.3.2 Research Question #2 and Hypothesis #2
One can assume that all agents seek individually to make better decisions and any
additional information in assisting what the eventual outcome would be under various
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circumstances is desirable. If information was available providing some confidence
about which designs or solutions would be ultimately selected as a group, then this
would predictably help and guide the actions of the particular decision maker, either
by causing them to act more quickly, or at least raising the confidence of future
actions.
Even if the exact solution which the set of agents may agree upon cannot be pre-
dicted accurately, identifying the region of the decision space that may be most likely
to include an area of agreement can benefit the decision makers, both individually
and as a group. Therefore, the following research question formalizes this inquiry:
Research Question #2: How can the feasible decision space be reduced to
facilitate decision makers in reaching consensus?
Individually, a decision maker who has confidence the dynamics of the group will
reach agreement, for example, in region A of Figure 4, can investigate the character-
istics of the nearby solutions and begin research, investment, etc. which will benefit
them under these types of solutions. In this sense, they can hedge their efforts, time
or resources to preparing for some design or solution in that area while the group is
still reaching agreement, likely to be in that region. Although, the final decision may
not be exactly in the “middle” of region A, the individual agent likely has had time
to create a robust response and maximize the payoff of, or at a minimum begin de-
velopment on some solution from within that region. Thus, one agent can strategize
and take action sooner if information about common design characteristics, types or
attributes of the solutions will be reached.
As a group, if decision makers can collectively accept that after days, weeks,
months or some other time period, they are likely to be converging on region B (in
Figure 4), for example, then their time should be devoted to analyzing solutions
within or near that region; effectively shrinking down the total decision space from








Figure 4: Potential Expected Regions Where Decision Makers may Reach Consensus
solution set or region) is one of “satisficing,” in that the decision makers are willing
to accept a solution which is sufficiently “better” for all agents at the cost of not
exploring in detail the total decision space which may be prohibitively large. Since
no real “optimal” solution exists without a known objective function, collectively
accepting a satisficing solution earlier is also desirable as it can save both time and
resources for many decision makers.
Modeling and simulating these actions with appropriate game theoretic techniques
and data, in particular information about the individual preferences and power inter-
relationships, the related hypothesis can be stated as:
Hypothesis #2: Simulating the multi-agent decision-making process with an
iterated ultimatum game across all objectives, with the application of the preference
distributions of, and power relationships between, agents, will significantly reduce the
decision space and identify regions with high probabilities of reaching consensus.
The metric to evaluate if Hypothesis #2 is valid or “not rejected” is the ratio
between the number of designs at which the group decision could reach consensus
and the full set of candidate points from the initial data. Ideally, this ratio is as small
as possible (approaching one over the total number of initial designs at deterministic
preferences) but can remain high with inputs such as the low numbers of discrete
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choices to which individual decisions makers chose to respond or a low number of
iterations of other steps in the methodology. In this sense, Hypothesis #2 will be at
least supported (marginally) if this ratio is less than 0.5, with a target value of less
than 0.1 to show high utility.
2.3.3 Research Question #3 and Hypothesis #3
One of the essential pieces of information for testing Hypothesis #2 was the prefer-
ence distribution information from each decision maker. Ideally preferences are rigid,
non-changing and perhaps even deterministic, but the observations indicate a large
propensity for decisions makers to potentially change their “minds” and thus their
preferences, based on additional information or even in the company of others with
influence. Acquiring these data more quickly without increasing the work load of any
decision maker is a desirable goal. Formulating this into a research question, provides
the following:
Research Question #3: How can a decision maker’s preference information,
including the potential for changing preferences, across all objectives be acquired more
quickly and accurately?
This question addresses the need to quantify how a decision maker values each
of the criteria or objectives. Any value system is based on the beliefs, experiences
and information available to a decision maker. These three factors can result in an
agent changing the importance of any particular dimension over time. For example,
during times of economic prosperity, reducing negative environmental effects such as
emissions from aircraft becomes more important. In times of slow economic growth,
environmental concerns often take a secondary role to more short terms problems.
But how quickly is one willing to change preferences between criteria and to what
extent?
A weighting distribution can provide clues as to the range of weights a decision
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maker might be willing to apply under different circumstances. If a particular weight-
ing distribution has zero probability of being less than 0.5, for example, it would mean
that over many different circumstances that particular criterion is of most importance.
Similarly, if the weight can cover a range from low importance (i.e. 0) to a high im-
portance (i.e. 0.9), the decision maker may be either willing to trade this criteria for
something else, or its importance is only valid in some situations. Extracting what
reasonable combinations of weights could be acceptable by a decision maker shows
insights into the value system and preferences for various dimensions; not only what
is likely to be important, relative to each other, but how likely an agent is to change
their mind about the importance of the criteria.
In fact, studies suggest that having an exact numerical value for importance
weightings is not necessary, and that “elicitation procedures that are more natural
for the user are likely to be more accurate” [121]. This “more natural” way could be
using the design space more directly through pairwise or discrete choices comparisons
to extract preferences.
This research hypothesizes that eliminating those combinations of weightings that
do not satisfy a decision maker’s preferences can be filtered down to a distribution (i.e.
histogram of feasible weightings) that reflect the possible weightings that a decision
maker may be willing to accept to reach consensus, or more formally:
Hypothesis #3: Infeasible design or preference filtering on the range of possible
weightings combinations, from a set of discrete choices employing candidate solutions,
will identify a decision maker’s preferences by providing feasible weighting distribu-
tions for each criterion or objective.
Hypothesis #3’s metric of interest is the difference between an assumed preference
structure or truth model compared to the predicted weighting distributions by the
methodology. If the implementation of the appropriate step cannot adequately predict
this truth preference model within a reasonable level of error, then this difference
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metric is large and Hypothesis #3 can be rejected.
2.3.4 Research Question #4 and Hypothesis #4
The other information referred to in Hypothesis #2 was the power or influence re-
lationships that exist between decision makers. These relationships can potentially
drive the decisions and therefore the region of consensus by biasing those preferences
of decision makers with greater influence over others. Any group decision-making
technique requires a process to analyze these relationships and how one can extract
or obtain those interactions is a relevant research question.
Research Question #4: How can the influence relationships between decision
makers be identified and quantified?
Agents are susceptible to influence by other decision makers, and similarly deci-
sions can be heavily impacted by the relationship between agents. For example, if one
agent seeks to establish an agreeable relationship with another agent for a different
or future reason (e.g. an upcoming opportunity to partner with them for a proposal),
they may be willing to side with that other agent more quickly. In a particular case,
one of their objectives would be the “satisfaction of the other agent” or pleasing the
other agent. On the other hand, with cooperation required for many decisions, de-
cision makers also want to have the others move “closer” or more aligned with their
own importance weightings of the criteria. This may come as an expense by conced-
ing the importance on one dimension (not as important to another agent) in order
to acquire more of another preferred criteria. Lastly, two agents may be willing to
“move nearer” each other in terms of preferences, but how much should each of them
“move”; meeting half-way in the middle? The answer would be dependent on the
power or influence exhibited on each other and the willingness of each agent to value
cooperation versus sacrificing their own objective function.
Requiring each agent to select where (in terms of preferences) and with whom
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they would agree and form a coalition, can provide insight into how, if, and with
whom they are likely to form coalitions. This hypothesis is structured below:
Hypothesis #4: Discrete choice experiments between designs, and with whom
an agent will form a coalition in the decision space, will identify relationships of
influence, under the power constraints equations, between decision makers.
Similar to Hypothesis #3, the metric to evaluate Hypothesis #4 is the difference
between an assumed perceived influence truth model and the one predicted by the
methodology. Close agreement would suggest that Hypothesis #4 should not be
rejected.
2.4 Summary of Research Question and Hypotheses
For reference purposes, the following table summarizes the research questions and
hypotheses introduced in the previous sections.
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Table 1: Summary of Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
Research Question Hypothesis
1.0 How can the number of
operational design solutions
originally considered in-
crease to include a greater
portion of the potential
design space?
Monte Carlo simulations of surro-
gate models developed around time-
consuming operational models will pro-
vide capability to more rapidly define
the design space by generating greater
numbers of candidate solutions in the
same time period.
2.0 How can the feasible deci-
sion space be reduced to fa-
cilitate decision makers in
reaching consensus?
Simulating the multi-agent decision-
making process with an iterated ulti-
matum game across all objectives, with
the application of the preference distri-
butions of, and power relationships be-
tween, agents, will significantly reduce
the decision space and identify regions
with high probabilities of reaching con-
sensus.
3.0 How can a decision maker’s
preference information, in-
cluding the potential for
changing preferences, across
all objectives be acquired
more quickly and accu-
rately?
Infeasible design or preference filter-
ing on the range of possible weightings
combinations, from a set of discrete
choices employing candidate solutions,
will identify a decision maker’s prefer-
ences by providing feasible weighting
distributions for each criterion or ob-
jective.
4.0 How can the influence re-
lationships between decision
makers be identified and
quantified?
Discrete choice experiments between
designs, and with whom an agent will
form a coalition in the decision space,
will identify relationships of influence,




TECHNICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
The following sections will review and discuss some basic and foundational material
contained in associated literature relevant to group decision making. Some of this
information will serve as the building blocks upon which the methodology discussed
in later chapters will be based. Other sections within this chapter serve as background
information and will summarize the work previously performed by other researchers
in related fields.
3.1 Decision Theory
Decision Theory is the broad and diverse field of study predominantly focused on
investigating how decisions are made (descriptive), should be made (prescriptive),
how they can be improved (or even optimized), and what factors drive the ultimate
decisions in different environments and situations [14]. Like other major fields, the
taxonomy for decision theory has differing perspectives but major categories would
likely include:
• single-criteria vs. multi-criteria decision making
• single-agent vs. multi-agent (individual vs. group decision making)
• time-dependent vs. time-independent decisions
• deterministic vs. probabilistic (fuzzy or stochastic)
• certainty vs. uncertainty
• rational vs. irrational
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These and other classifications and subcategories suggest an extensive discipline
which is even further expanded when the various subfields are applied to different
problems. Although numerous texts have been written defining large portions of
this discipline such as [83], [63], and [128] to name a few, it continues to expand
as evident from numerous contributions to new journals including the Journals of
Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, Decision Analysis, Decision Sciences and
Decision Support Systems, which focus on human factors, theory and implementation,
respectively, in terms of decision making.
With such a broad scope in decision theory, applications, and analysis, subfields
have been introduced to further refine the areas and contributions of decision scien-
tists. A few more specific subfields within the overarching umbrella of decision theory
include:
• Expected Utility Theory (EUT)
• Game Theory
• Decision Field Theory (DFT)
• Prospect Theory
These subfields are further expanded with applications to various domains in eco-
nomics, social behavior, cognitive psychology, and, of course, systems engineering.
Many of these areas can be considered to have large overlap in fundamental princi-
ples and axioms, and some may suggest that they are more generalized theories of
each other, under certain assumptions.
For example, Expected Utility Theory is often associated with the work of von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s [182] and pertains to how a rational or even ideal de-
cision maker seeks to maximize the payout or utility for a decision situation. It is
closely related to Game Theory, where similar goals exist to accept strategies or make
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decisions which maximize one’s payout, but with additional factors involved such as
the interdependence of players where payouts are dependent on the decisions of others
for cooperative and competitive situations [66].
In Decision Field Theory (DFT), researchers are most interested in studying the
dynamics of decisions, how they develop over time and how decision makers change
preferences. Furthermore, DFT examines the mechanisms of how decisions makers
analyze data, deliberate (sometimes at length), vacillate during conflict resolution or
how the preference relation changes with time [29].
Lastly, Prospect Theory attempts to describe how decisions are made in reality,
under uncertainty and risk, and with other human or cognitive limitations. In this
respect, it is often considered at the other end of the spectrum away from the rational,
ideal or optimal decision-making theories such as EUT [85].
Since the current research concerns group decision making with multiple agents,
the principles of game theory apply and in particular cooperative games as discussed
in later sections of this chapter. However, since another objective of the methodology
discussed in this research seeks to facilitate and even accelerate decision making,
ideas will also be drawn from DFT and Prospect theory in which it is acknowledged
decision makers will change preferences and may be persuaded from non-rational
factors. Lastly, essential evaluation functions, such as utility curves and formulations,
will touch on some of the contributions of EUT.
Decision theory is also inextricably linked to optimization. In decision theory, one
is concerned with identifying the “best” choice or alternative given a decision maker’s
preferences. Similarly, optimization seeks to find the optimal point which maximizes
the utility function or minimize the objective function of the decision maker. In
essence, all decisions require some form of optimization strategy or technique to find
the best alternative (with or without mathematical tools and techniques). Likewise,
all optimization processes require the application of a decision maker’s preference and
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objective function with which to optimize.
3.2 History of Decision Theory
Although a detailed discussion or presentation about the history of the development
of modern day decision making is beyond the scope of this research, a brief summary
may be useful in introducing some of the topics discussed later and why they arose
in the evolution of decision theory. In particular the ideas of bounded rationality
and satisficing, and the need for improved methods for group decision making for
the increasingly more common interdisciplinary problems and solutions, are placed in
context of the overall research objectives.
Decision making is as early as self-awareness. Maximizing one’s own chances
of survival is manifestly good decision making required for intellectual evolutionary
progression. However, as opined in the Harvard Business Review, up before the
17th century, analysis of risk were relegated to “priests and oracles” [28]. From the
Renaissance onward, numbers became increasingly more useful and models, tools
and theories were developed to support or refute the popular heuristics passed from
generation to generation in the various trades and profession. In the 20th century,
the mathematical foundation had reached sufficient sophistication to initiate advanced
decision making methods, in particular as ideas about rationally such as that assumed
in Expected Utility Theory were further developed in the works of Von Neumann and
Morgenstern [182]. Empirical research quickly followed testing these rational theories,
and differences were identified between the normative and descriptive theories of
decision making. This check on the “unalloyed progress toward perfect rationalism”
[28] resulted in various other principles and theories which matched more closely how
humans made decisions in real-life. Generally described as “bounded rationality”
[68], these principles are based on the limitations of the human mind, the return
to heuristics allowing “fast and frugal” decision making, and even social or external
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pressures.
Today a compromised approach to decision making from both the rational choice
and bounded rationality parts of the spectrum may be most promising and this re-
search seeks to utilize both of these aspects from decision theory in the proposed
methodology contained herein.
3.3 Aircraft Design and Decision Making in Practice
In terms of aircraft design, Raymer strongly suggests that one must “...let the numbers
(not opinion, prejudice, or preconceived notions) make the final selection” within
the conceptual design phase [132]. Realistically, however, there are a number of
dimensions which are outside the control of the aircraft designer and these are not
always governed by numbers, in the traditional sense. Just as propulsion engineers do
not directly concern themselves with all variables of the other aerospace engineering
disciplines, aircraft system engineers or designers do not always include trades across
dimensions about which they do not have sufficient knowledge. For example, the
aircraft designer can offer the best design to minimize cost, emissions and empty
weight, but if agreements or contracts have already been made regarding material
type, location of fabrication, or other constraints, a revisit to what is “best” under
previously unknown dimensions is essential. The design itself will undergo an iterative
process applying more information about more dimensions and added constraints, but
the decision making itself will also undergo iteration.
It is well established that decision makers under different circumstances will weight
different dimensions differently. For example, minimizing fuel consumption is more
important if the price of fuel is likely to go up in the future. Similarly, reducing noise
for a particular aircraft design may be a bigger driver than other dimensions if the
aircraft will be used in a highly populous area. Clearly, changes to the weightings
will occur as the number of dimensions used in the decision-making process increases
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or decreases. A dimension or factor previously considered not important can become
increasingly important or even dominant in later stages of the decision making, as
more information about the problem or design is established.
To complicate the decision-making process even more, decision makers will alter
their preferences after familiarizing themselves with the process or are sometimes re-
placed with a different decision maker in the middle of the process. This is often the
case in public office where the individuals filling many elected or appointed govern-
ment positions change every two, four, or six years. If major acquisition programs
take on average longer than six years, the likelihood that the solution, design or de-
cision will be opposed, reevaluated or require buy-in from the next decision maker is
almost guaranteed. Similarly, for the full aircraft research, design testing and evalu-
ation RDT&E phases, which take many years to complete, the decision making can
be dynamic and convoluted.
Finally, decisions are made in environments which are ever changing and in which
rational decision theories are less likely to predict accurately. This makes “it hard to
ignore the distinction between the objective environment in which the ... actor ‘really’
lives and the subjective environment that he perceives and to which he responds”
[158].
3.4 Multi-Criteria Decision Making
Since all engineering problems are effectively trades within and across different dimen-
sions, almost every decision is fundamentally multi-dimensional (i.e. multi-criteria or
multi-objective). Practically speaking, one can argue that if only one dimension exists
the decision-making process is trivial. Maximizing one’s utility function is a straight
forward process by identifying the minimum or maximum value along that dimension
or at a certain value if a particular target is sought. Generally, only multi-objective
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decisions require some sort of external preference that will assist in weighing the im-
portance of conflicting or negatively correlated dimensions. That is, the value in one
dimension can be increased but perhaps at a reduction in another dimension, or vice
versa. The decision making for these situations becomes much more challenging since
the “right” solution depends heavily on an individual or group ascribing weightings or
importance values to the various dimensions. This mapping of customer preferences
to engineering characteristics is often done using qualitative techniques such as the
Quality Function Deployment (QFD) [165] or HUDDLE [64].
Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) at its core is really just decision making,
where the adjective “multi-criteria” can, in one sense, be considered redundant since
almost every decision would be between conflicting choices or objectives. Even simple,
mundane choices of what to eat or where to go has, to a certain degree, conflicting
choices. A Dean from the Columbia Business School is recorded saying that “As
for conflicting objectives - quality vs. lower cost, better product vs. cheaper raw
materials, for example - just about any idiot can maximize a single function. Anybody
can increase sales. After all, if nothing else matters, you can decrease the price to
zero. In fact, you don’t have to stop there. If they won’t take it at zero, you pay
them to take it” (quoted in [194]).
Thus, some could quickly argue that “Single Criterion Decision Making” does not
exist. Or if it does, the answer is often trivial and the sole remaining challenge in
this case would be to identify that single criterion. The decisions that face engi-
neers, business leaders and politicians are always multi-criteria. No one dimension
can be completely optimized without some cost or detriment to another criteria or
dimensions.
As illustrated in Figure 5, each of the aerospace engineering disciplines depicted
may seek to optimize their particular field. However, a structurally rigid aircraft may
not be sufficiently aerodynamic, a noiseless aircraft may not be very fast, and a light
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Figure 5: Aircraft Design from the Perspective of Each of the Disciplines (from [115])
aircraft may have little carrying capacity. Aircraft design is a multi-criteria or multi-
objective decision-making activity where the various individuals or disciplines must
reach agreement on many design variables to achieve success. Compromises must
be made, iterations must be performed, and group decision making will be required
continually throughout the design process.
3.5 Decision-Making Techniques
A relatively recent attempt [134] to enumerate the number of decision-making tech-
niques in existence found more than 70 available multi-criteria decision-making tech-
niques. Many of these techniques are, as could be expected, proposed to respond to
the different types, domains, and scope of problems. However, they also each contain
inherent limitations, different assumptions and shortcomings making them invalid if
applied incorrectly to the wrong type of problem and even undesirable if incorrect
results are obtained.
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A comprehensive discussion of these techniques is beyond the scope of this re-
search but some of the common features or characteristics of these techniques will be
mentioned in various sections with three contrasted in the appendix of this disserta-
tion. However, a summary and comparison of some of the popular techniques often
applied to operations research is found in [169]. Furthermore, efforts to assist the
decision maker in selecting the “right” or “best” technique based on the attributes of
the decision problem itself have been made previously [96].
It is possible that any technique for a single decision maker, with appropriate
characteristics, could be adapted for a group decision-making problem, which is the
focus of this current research. However, the focus will be directed toward the steps in
the overall methodology for multi-agent consensus reaching and not on the limitations
or weaknesses of the candidate technique. In fact, throughout later discussions and
examples in this research the application of a simple technique, a weighted additive
utility function, will be preferable over more convoluted techniques to deemphasize the
particular technique and underscore the properties of the group consensus reaching
approach. Therefore, the attempt will be made to isolate many of the steps of the
methodology to the valuation function of candidate designs.
Research has shown that formal processes or selection methods are not often
employed in industry settings, with one survey suggesting that less than one in four
companies use such techniques [143]. Therefore, a simple additive utility function
could already improve decision making in a variety of organization without any need
to apply any more sophisticated techniques. However, more sophisticated options
are available if needed; for instance, 24 different types of additive utilities alone have
been analyzed and compared in previous studies [59]. If these techniques are not
used, human decision making can result in inconsistencies or sub-optimal choices, as
a result of the human biases or irrationality often exhibited in multi-objective decision
making discussed later [84].
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3.5.1 A Common Preference Structure
A large portion of decision-making techniques make use of preference information.
This is most readily described as importance values or weights w on each of the
attributes, objectives or criteria on a set of alternatives or designs. Often these








n : Total number of objectives
subject to:
∑n
k=1wk = 1, for all k = 1, . . . , n
which can satisfy the requirements of a generalized barycentric coordinate system
[55].
This preference structure is the most commonly used, perhaps for its simplicity
and transparency, but the suggested techniques, process, and methods to acquire such
a structure involve a variety of principles such as Shannon’s entropy [188] or Shapley
values [187].
Evaluation of the alternatives themselves with different techniques take multiple
forms (e.g. weighted product model, weighted sum model, The Technique for Order
of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution - TOPSIS [77]) but many of them will
make use of this simple preference structure from equation (1). (See Appendix B
which compares three common decision-making techniques and their similarity to a
simple additive weighting model).
There are other structures which can also be implemented with simple objective
rank ordering which of course is possible if the objectives are also attached to weights
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directly. Thus, weightings can provide rank orders, but rank orders cannot provide
weightings.
3.5.2 Preference or Weight Extraction
A variety of techniques have been proposed and implemented to obtain the actual
preferences for each of the dimensions or objectives of a decision maker. Many make
use of pairwise comparisons, with one of the most well known called the Analytical
Hierarchy Process (AHP) [141]. In the traditional AHP implementation, the decision
maker is given two objectives at a time and asked to provide the ratio that they
prefer one to the other. For example, after being given the objectives of range and
payload of a notional aircraft design, the decision maker may respond that payload is
twice as important as range. Later, comparing the payload and cost objectives may
result in cost being three times more important than payload. These ratios are then
used to extract the weightings for the various objectives [49]. Assuming the decision
maker is consistent one might conclude that cost would be six times more important
than range. Consistency checks are of course possible but in decision problems with
many objectives, the decision maker may not want to go through every pairwise
comparison of two objectives. Recent efforts to account for these inconsistencies
using optimization methods show some advantages [20]. However, the objectives and
the important ratio between any two of them may depend on the values of other
objectives. Just because the decision maker prefers a lower cost than increasing
payload in the above example, their opinion may change if the range was excessively
small. Pairwise comparisons usually assume that everything else is known or at least
held constant within a particular context or situation. If that context is not known
or fuzzy, AHP can provide considerably inaccurate preferences. Lastly, AHP suffers
from rank reversals from the addition of irrelevant alternatives suggesting it can often
be misused in decision-making activities [16].
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The alternative is to compare the actual designs. Instead of pairwise comparison
of objectives, the decision maker is given two or more designs and asked to rank
them in some fashion. With two designs, they respond with which one is better or
even how much more one is better than the other. With three or more designs, they
can rank them ordinally or cardinally (if so desired). Although this may required
additional effort and time to assess designs instead of objectives the results can be
more reflective of reality since parts of the whole are not considered in isolation, which
in the aggregate are not that significant. For example, two objectives may not be
important overall, but comparing them side by side may unnecessarily exaggerate the
one or the other.
This idea of ranking on the design space was recently shown to be effective in de-
termining the preferences of experts regarding nanotechnology-enabled food products
[60]. In the study, 26 hypothetical designs each with 10 objectives were analyzed and
the experts were asked to select and rank the five best options and five worst options.
The criteria weights were then calculated in various models and compared.
This shows a potential process in extracting the weights for other spaces with mul-
tiple dimensions or objectives. Requesting the decision makers to rank or designate
a preferred design among a few designs, may be much more realistic (and reflects
the actual decision-making process more accurately) than making decisions simply
between objectives directly.
Furthermore, there is the potential to obtain uncertainty in the weights themselves
as well. The equivalent in the AHP method might be to request the highest and lowest
ratio between two objectives. However, the highest and lowest might be complete
reversals of each other. That is, for some decision makers, objective 1 might be twice
as important as objective 2, but objective 2 might be twice as important as objective
1 in some situations. Although initially this sounds less useful, it at least bounds the
relationship the decision maker considers these two objectives can assume, but even
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this only provides the bounds on one objective pair. In reality, there is a range of
values which all the objectives may possess in pairwise comparisons. Since preferences
will be highly interdependent and context based, it is thus more useful to obtain them
all together under the assumption that a decision maker can change opinions and will
not hold their preferences so rigid. The results of such a process would allow a
distribution of possible weights that the decision maker could potentially accept as
reflective of their true preference structure.
3.6 Human Decision Making
Since the optimization or the decision-making process is so heavily dependent on the
preferences of individuals (or a group) through the objective function, any change in
the preferences of that individual or group will likely result in different solutions. In
this sense, there is no global optimal solution. The optimum depends on a changing
set of factors both internal and external to the decision makers, individually or as a
group. “We all make decisions based on the information we have and the objectives
we’re pursuing, and these things vary from position to position” [127].
Only the single decision maker applying his or her current preferences can an
optimum solution be selected, but this would be, at best, a temporary solution amid
the dynamics of a large SoS engineering problem. Any change in the environment
and the solution is less optimal. Similarly, any change in preferences, and the solution
is likely to no longer be ideal. Flexibility and robustness can be designed into the
system but often these design decisions assume the decision maker is true to their
preferences. If the preferences and thus objective function itself changes, robustness
is a much more difficult proposition.
This notion of preferences being “contrary to one’s own real interests” due to
“incorrect or on incomplete information” is considered in detail by Harsanyi [74]. He
proposes that utility functions should be defined in terms of “hypothetical informed
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preferences rather than in terms of his actual preferences because the later will often
contain some mistake preferences contrary to his real interests” [74]. The difference
between these is accounted by how informed a decision maker may be. When in-
creased information is available, one is likely to change their opinion according to
new “informed preferences.”
Since humans will “change their mind,” and thus their preferences or importance
weightings on the various criteria, based upon beliefs, knowledge, external conditions,
etc., assuming a temporally static preference landscape for any decision should be
questioned. In addition, for many decisions which are evolutionary and are made over
time, the decision maker(s) will change. This is evident in many political positions
where the decisions can take years to be implemented and require the support of
many decision makers sequentially. If these political decision makers are replaced
every few years, the preferences will likely change from person to person in addition
to the change that any one individual will experiences over time after new information
or experiences. This process is not only seen in government agencies. In business,
CEOs or other management personnel can change just as quickly, making temporary
decisions based on their own preferences, only to be replaced a few months or years
later resulting in a new leader taking a new direction with new preferences.
It is with these types of ideas where Zeleny asks “What is so precious about as-
suming unchanging and continuous preferences, judgmental consistency, transitivity,
inflexibility, utility maximization, and an inability to learn?” [194]. Although this
rigidity in the normative approach of how human decision makers act is often de-
scribed as rational, a much more fluid, uncertain and unpredictable algorithm, often
referred to as irrationality, governs real-world decision making and warrants an equal,
or perhaps greater amount, of attention.
This irrationality and its effect on decisions is most at play when the scenarios are
evolving over time. Changing preferences is a challenging reality to manage in any
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decision environment. But with changing scenarios and changing preferences concur-
rently, the irrationality within human decision makers can be an even more substantial
factor in the outcomes. When the scenarios change, the decision makers are likely to
respond and alter the particular objective function or decision process implemented
up to that point. Scenarios drive the objective function and any methodology must
account for the specific situation, people and external environment in which both
decisions and the solutions are made and implemented, respectively. This is an-
other reason why tools and environments must be developed to account for scenario
changes, which in turn cause modifications or corrections to the objective function
and ultimately results in potential irrational behavior in humans, such as a change
to one’s preferences into something biased or even counter-intuitive.
3.6.1 Limitations of Human Decision Makers
The human mind is fraught with limitations. It is terrible at calculating probabilities
of single events [39], its capacity to remember or transmit information is low [108],
and falls victim to distraction [94], illusion and bias. Experimentalists have identified
other more specific limitations, for example, the human mind can fall prey to a belief
in a “hot hand” in events (e.g. “streak shooting” in basketball) [70], an expression of
the gambler’s fallacy [171]. Similarly, multiple dimensions become increasing difficult
for humans to process and evaluate, summarized by a conclusion observed by Miller
“people are less accurate if they must judge more than one attribute simultaneously”
[108].
Some of these limitations are actually accounted for in some of the conclusions
reached in the theory of evolution: “natural selection will favor strategies that make
many incorrect causal associations in order to establish those that are essential for
survival and reproduction.”[62]. In other words, these so called limitations in human
minds were (and potentially still are) advantageous in many environments where
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making the right decision, even a minority of the time, is crucial. Shermer provides a
visual example of this phenomenon, where the cost associated with believing a rustle
in the wind is actually one’s predator is small, compared to the cost when believing
a real predator is only the wind [153].
However, when applied to decision-making processes, recognizing and overcoming
some of these “naturally selected” strategies could be in the decision maker’s best
interest especially when the decision environment is considerably different than the
one for which the strategy was originally acquired.
The following sections discuss some of the more evident limitations of human
decision makers which must be recognized for any attempt in improving the decision-
making process in groups.
3.6.2 Manipulation of Decision Makers’ Preferences
The fact that humans change their mind readily is universally accepted. Research in
advertising is dedicated to studying how the human mind can be influenced to buy or
support a particular product or issue, respectively. Many advertising techniques will
take advantage of the innate limitations of the human mind to objectively evaluate
candidates. One of the simplest techniques makes use of message repetition, working
under the assumption that one’s attitude will be, or can become, more positive when
receiving stimuli that are more familiar [193]. Although some research suggests that
too much repetition can incite attitudes of irrelevance or even negative responses
[13, 30], the obvious goals remains the same to persuade, convince, and manipulate
others or customers into making a decision that maximize their own objective function
of increased profit, votes or prestige.
Preference reversal has been empirically shown in notable experiments by Tversky
and Kahneman testing how framing decisions can have drastic impacts on the results.
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In one experiment, respondents would reverse the preference between two hypothet-
ical diseasing treating programs, depending on the focus of the question being on
the expected number of lives saved or on the expected number of deaths. In other
experiments, decision makers would choose the worse of two prospects and “exhibit
patterns of preference which appear incompatible with expected utility theory” [172]1.
Thus, even the way in which data is presented to decision makers must be analyzed
to avoid potential errors from not-objective judgments, qualitative comparisons, and
biases.
Time pressure has also been shown to explain preference changes or reversal from
a DFT theory perspective [48] and, more expectedly, identified as a crucial effect on
decision accuracy and quality [125].
In a seminal study by Solomon Asch, the manipulation that was observed was
more pronounced and caused directly by the “apparent” preferences or decisions of
the group members. In the experiments, each member in a group was to state which
line in a set of three was identical in length to a separate reference line a short distance
away. When the group was composed of 11 confederates (responding to the task in
the same wrong way) and one participant, the participant would conform to and
agree with the majority’s wrong decision one third of the time on average [6]. The
results indicate that social pressures with a group setting can alter opinions. Since
the true answer was obvious in the experiments, the willingness to join the group may
be found to be even more exaggerated when uncertainty is greater or the differences
in the data less clear or ambiguous. More recently, experiments testing conforming
to the group or the majority was reproduced but without confederates [111].
Manipulation of decision makers has also been shown to exists under risk and
uncertainty. Experiments illustrated how an “attraction factor” caused respondents
1Many years later, Daniel Kahneman would be awarded the Nobel prize in Economic Science “for
having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning
human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty” [116]
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to reverse their opinions about which prospect was better even if the two options
were identical in terms of utility [192]. The same study found the expected result
that an additional method of manipulation (i.e. to change one’s preference) is by
allowing decision makers to gain information or consult with other agents. This has
been shown for when information is gained from another decision maker [33] and
when information is gained from independent experiences [92].
3.6.3 Biases in Decision Making
Biases can arise in a variety of ways in decisions making processes.
Decision makers will sometimes seek for data that confirms their preconceived
notions about the problems and how it should be solved. At the same time, they may
disregard data suggesting their decision made a priori is incorrect or less desirable.
This confirmation bias can have negative effects as the final decision which may
eventually be considered as poor, undesirable or even wrong [170].
In fact, some decision support tools can offer variable weightings on the metrics of
interest (such as common slider bars for importance parameters). When the decision
maker “plays” with those settings until their predetermined design is ranked or listed
as the best, a confirmation bias has occurred if the decision maker uses the tool to
support what they had already intended to select. In this case, the decision support
system serves no purpose other than to support one’s a priori decision (a not entirely
useless endeavor) but there can exist a disconnect with what the decision maker wants
as an outcome (an expression of their true preferences) and what they believe that
answer should be.
A similarly related bias comes when decision makers are more likely to trust their
own research, team or company over that of another when the question of credibility
arises. Often one trusts their own model or results more than another’s, even if no
compelling evidence suggests this reflects reality. This authority bias can also exist
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when an individual or team claims an expertise either from formal education or expe-
rience and demands or at least persuades others to accept their conclusions as truth.
In group decision-making activities, especially in cooperative multi-agent decisions,
when a decision maker possesses a certain skill, position or knowledge necessary for the
potential solution, others may unnecessarily or unconsciously believe their knowledge
can be applied to other areas of the problem overextending the authority’s influence
in the group. In discussing process in group settings, Yalom describes that “... indi-
viduals high on the pyramid not only are more technically informed but also possess
organizational information that permits them to influence and manipulate: that is,
they not only have skills that have allowed them to obtain a position of power but,
once there, have such a central place in the flow of information that they are able
to reinforce their position” [189]. This bias thus comes to play a role in persuading
others in group decision-making activities and should be accounted for in decision
models.
An overconfidence bias can develop if historical trends have been favorable in
some way, and the unfounded trend is expected to continue. This is most evident in
quantification of risk where decision makers can become overconfident that a partic-
ular risky design can still meet the requirements because a design has performed well
in the past. As a result, decisions can be selected which are riskier then what the
data or models suggest is prudent. This is closely related to what Schwenk calls a
prior hypothesis bias [146] where decision makers inappropriately maintain beliefs or
attitudes despite additional evidence that strongly opposes their assumed views.
Relying to an inappropriate amount on one or a few pieces of information can
result in an anchoring bias. In other words, the starting point can have a dispro-
portionate amount of influence on the final decision. This is well known among
professional salesman and negotiators and is exploited to further their own interests.
Campell et al. [31] analyzed group consensus forecasts in finance and found “sizable
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predictable forecast errors” from this bias. However, the same phenomenon can exist
in decision making regarding engineering solutions, which often make assumptions
about future conditions, and thus attention should be given to avoiding unnecessarily
emphasizing some designs over others prematurely or placing too much weight on
previous performance.
These biases, and many other ones [171], can contribute significantly to some
highly undesirable decisions. Good decision-making practices will always seek to
remove these biases as much as possible or at least account for them in the decisions
making process as various types of uncertainty.
3.6.4 Irrationality in Decision Makers
With so many limitations with which to grapple, the decision theorists have broadly
classified the actions which go against one’s sincere and objective beliefs and reasons
as irrational. Similarly, when decisions are made with little or no reasoning and effort,
or made under emotional stress, the term irrational is used to describe these types of
decisions. For example, it might be considered irrational to forgo an operation now,
if greater pain could be avoided in the future (assuming avoiding the most possible
pain is desired) for the same cost.
Thus, although one would understandably seek to avoid making decisions irra-
tionality, the time constraints, resources available, psychological biases present or
even subjective and external factors can cause one to act irrational. This irrational
behavior is shown in various experiments where individuals will punish others at the
expense to themselves in order to establish fairness and encourage cooperation [56].
One of the best mathematical examples of irrationality can be illustrated in a game
theoretic construct called the prisoner’s dilemma (which is more formally defined in a
later section). In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two prisoners are found to act (by testifying
against the other) irrationally as a group because of the uncertainty in what the other
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prisoner will do. This uncertainty causes them to act in such a way that would be
counter to their objective (i.e. freedom). If they had a chance to contemplate the
entire situation and knew what the other prisoner was considering they might have
both acted more rationally.
More formally, the ‘rational man’ is defined as “a man whose thought processes
consist exclusively of logical propositions, or a man without prejudices, or a man
whose emotions are inoperative” such that the term rational is efficient or, “maximiz-
ing the output for a given input, or minimizing input for a given output” [52].
Likewise, rationality in decision making typically refers to a decision maker acting
in accordance with their beliefs or reasons. These reasons are usually a result of some
combination of the information or data available to the decision maker. Often, a
rational decision is one which maximizes the benefit and minimizes the cost. In other
words, the action taken by a rational decision maker is one that maximizes their own
utility so that “[r]ational individuals choose the alternative that is likely to give them
the greatest satisfaction” [148]. Since the ability to choose the best option is required,
a necessary condition is that the rational decision maker can evaluate or predict the
outcome of different actions.
In many different fields, assumptions or knowledge about the information available
to the decision maker and about their preferences for the various criteria are modeled
to provide insight into how individuals will act. Under the assumption that decision
makers act as rational agents, choice models can be developed to make predictions of
how combinations of decision makers or groups will respond collectively. These are
clearly simplifying assumptions in order to model, analyze and predict how individuals
will or rather should make decisions but often humans are much less predictable and
so modifications to these models have quickly emerged.
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3.6.5 Bounded Rationality
When the predictive capability of the models of rational choice theory began to de-
viate from empirical data and experiments, the notion of bounded rationality was
established and first proposed by Herbert Simon in 1957. He states that the “capac-
ity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively
rational behavior in the real world—or even for a reasonable approximation to such
objective rationality” [157]. The basic tenet of bounded rationality is that the deci-
sion maker will not always choose or select the alternative that maximizing their own
utility or satisfaction. Simon’s description of bounded rationality is that it is “intend-
edly rational, but only limitedly so” [157]. Elsewhere, Radner describes it with at
least three essential aspects, namely, 1) existence of goals, 2) searching for improve-
ment, and 3) long-run success [129]. A number of ideas have been proposed as to
why bounded rationality2 may be a more accurate principle to guide decision-making
analyses.
Firstly, humans, although perhaps considered rational in their ability to anticipate
the outcomes of various situations, will likely not have the mental capacity to evaluate
all outcomes or even be able to cognitively analyze varied and non-commensurate
criteria. These “simple mental models” constructed by decision makers will be used
even if there are inherent “ambiguities or contradictions” [160]. A non-quantitative
and simplifying exercise may be employed and no attempt to quantify and evaluate
every contingency or make every comparison between criteria is necessary or even
possible.
2Even before the term had been coined, Benjamin Franklin had admitted to using a type of
bounded rationality in a letter to Joseph Priestly. He writes: “...tho’ the Weight of Reasons cannot
be taken with the Precision of Algebraic Quantities... I have found great Advantage from this kind
of Equation [in negating pros and cons of equal weight], in what may be called Moral or Prudential
Algebra” [15]
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Furthermore, time or other constraints will preclude any one from considering all
possibilities which means the optimal solution may never have been actually consid-
ered. Gigerenzer and Goldstein share an example of bounded rationality: “...[A]n
organism would choose the first object (a mate, perhaps) that satisfies its aspiration
level–instead of the intractable sequence of taking the time to survey all possible al-
ternatives, estimating probabilities and utilities for the possible outcomes associated
with each alternative, calculating expected utilities, and choosing the alternative that
scores highest” [69]. Not only would one fail in calculating all the scores or utilities
of the numerous alternatives, but the fact that uncertainty as expressed as proba-
bilities means that imperfect knowledge about some or all of the outcomes is likely,
resulting in limitations to the rational processes described previously. Related to this
issue is simply the capacity to process information, and keep sufficient information
in working memory to make decisions. In [108], evidence suggests only around seven
pieces of information can be properly kept in short-term memory for judgment and
thus decision making. Computer aides and visual analytics can of course extend that
capability but ultimately the decision maker can only process a small amount.
As an effect of Simon’s and other’s efforts in promoting a bounded rationality
approach to decision making, a variety of subfields have been defined and adjust-
ments to the traditional rational theories have been applied resulting in some new
designations, including “behavioral economics”, “behavioral game theory,” and even
“behavioral finance” [19].
3.6.6 Satisficing
In response to the inherent issues and limitations suggested by bounded rationality,
the idea of “satisficing,” a combination of the words or ideas of sufficing and satisfy-
ing, was proposed to account for the fact that very often decision makers will accept
and choose an alternative that simply satisfies its own needs [156]. For example, an
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engineer can always run more experiments to increase the accuracy of a regression or
for other analyses, but very often executing a sufficient number of cases is all that is
needed for making certain decisions at the conceptual level. Obviously, considering
all alternatives and evaluating their scores would be desirable but very often com-
putational resources, time or both are limited and a subset of all the design points
is enough. This idea is closely related to design of experiments and surrogate model
creation, in that a small amount of evaluated points or designs can often provide
insight into the other points or regions not directly sampled.
In this sense, satisficing does not seek the optimal solution as a decision-making
process. Satisficing seeks to find a solution or solutions which are sufficient or ade-
quate. The time, cost or effort required to gather all the information and perform an
exhaustive evaluation on all the possibilities would be too large or impossible for one
endorsing the principle of satisficing. Thus, one selecting a satisficing strategy for
decision making could be considered one who applies as part of the decision process
a preference or importance in saving time or money (the cost) in place of finding
the optimal solution. This trade is evident between using up more time (or other
resources) to find the optimal solution or accepting the first (or an early) design,
solution or point that is “good enough” and still meets the requirements or needs as
aspiration levels.
3.6.7 Evidence of Satisficing
One particularly evidential study of the feasibility of satisficing algorithms was per-
formed by Gigerenzer and Goldstein [69]. They created a competition between a sat-
isficing algorithm, called “Take the Best” (TTB), and other integration algorithms,
such as Regression, Weighted and Unit-weighted linear models.
The TTB algorithm compares each factor or attribute (a “cue” in the experiment),
one at a time, and will select the appropriate option when the two currently pertinent
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cue values sufficiently discriminate between the two candidates. If the two values do
not discriminate between candidates, the algorithm continues to the next cue, ordered
in terms of a ”ecological validity” or a measure of how often that cue would correctly
predict the “best” decision. Therefore, in the TTB algorithm, the decision can be
made after only one cue thus ignoring all the other information available for each
particular comparison. This results in a satisficing strategy where limited knowledge
and/or time leads to a decision deemed adequate.
On the other hand, the integration algorithms would make use of all information
available with models inclusive of each of the factors, variables, or dimensions (i.e.
“cue”) and even given additional information not explicitly used by the relatively
simple TTB.
The competition in [69] evaluated how often a simulated decision maker correctly
picked the larger, in terms of population, of two cities presented with different infor-
mation (i.e. cues). Figure 6 summarizes the surprising result that the TTB algorithm
performs just as good as some of the integration algorithms (e.g. tallying) and supe-
rior to some of them (e.g. Weighted Linear Model) for certain. Of note is that with
no information about the candidates (or cities) the performance of all algorithms are
equal at 50% accuracy (i.e. guessing) and at the other extreme with all informa-
tion, the algorithms are also comparatively and equally good (≈74%). However, the
most interesting is that with some but limited knowledge, the certain algorithms per-
form better than algorithms which implement features hailed as elements of classical
rationality, such as “consider as much data as possible.”
In essence, in some situations decision makers can make just as good (or even
better) decisions with limited knowledge. Furthermore, these better decisions can be
made more quickly and with simpler heuristics if appropriate.
The conclusion drawn from this experiment is telling:
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Figure 6: Comparing predictive accuracy for “Take the Best” against integration
algorithms across different levels of tacit knowledge (i.e. Objects Recognized) (Re-
produced from [69])
The single most important result ... is that simple psychological mecha-
nisms can yield about as many (or more) correct inferences in less time
than standard statistical linear models that embody classical properties
of rational inference. The demonstration that a fast and frugal satisfic-
ing algorithm won the competition defeats the widespread view that only
“rational” algorithms can be accurate. Models of inference do not have
to forsake accuracy for simplicity. [69]
This is understandably a useful finding, appropriate for the current research objec-
tive in trying to accelerate decision making without necessarily decreasing the quality
of decisions. In the proposed methodology, the decision maker will be presented a
relatively simple task of choosing the most preferred of two designs. The assumption
that these decisions will be “good enough” and potentially faster without sacrificing
accuracy is considered a key enabler.
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3.7 Group Decision Making
Careful analysis reveals that we “often give our greatest responsibility to groups”
including groups such as board of directors, board of regents, juries, the Supreme
Court, Congress, and surgical teams [95]. Groups also dominate the workplace with
a majority of large companies establishing work groups or work teams as the core
unit. As problems grow in scope and breadth, increasingly collaboration between
individuals with different skills or expertise will be needed. This collaboration is a
key attribute of well-functioning groups even if co-location is not a defining feature.
In engineering design, teams or groups, composed of experts from various disciplines,
work together with the individuals taking on different roles. Decisions can impact
many or all of the disciplines and thus decision making is an essential element to
explore and facilitate within these groups or Integrated Product Teams (IPT) [144].
Group decision making is clearly when more than one individual or entity has some
influence or “say” on the ultimate or final decision made. A dictatorship may be the
best counter example of group decision making and yet even a dictator will likely have
aides, counselors, etc. who influence their decisions. In the widest or all-inclusive def-
inition of group decision making, one could argue that most of our seemingly personal
or independent decisions are influenced by our backgrounds, culture or environment.
So, although each individual is responsible for one’s actions a realization that truly
autonomous decisions are rarer than perhaps typically considered is warranted.
Forsyth [61] discusses four common approaches to making decisions in groups.
The first is delegating or choosing an individual to make the decisions on behalf of
the group. This can, of course, no longer be classified as “group” decision making, but
if the appointed decision maker listens, is willing to try and discern the group’s wishes
and attempts to reflect the interests of the group (i.e. a kind of “benevolent dictator”
[1]), the group still has a way to collectively express their preferences through their
leader’s decision. The second is averaging or combining the individual perspectives,
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decisions or preferences of the group members. Initially this can be done in private so
as to not unnecessarily influence each other (i.e. Asch experiment) and then a method
can be selected for averaging the individual decisions. The third is through voting,
where the majority rules, and the minority are expected to accept the group’s decision.
(This and the previous approach can suffer from various limitations underscored by
a discussion of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem in a later section.) The last approach
is through group consensus where discussion, analysis, compromise, negotiation, etc.
continue until all members are in agreement and a unanimous decision is supported
by all. Understandably, this last approach is most desirable but not always the most
efficient. Encouraging this approach by more quickly aligning preferences to each
other is one of the main goals in satisfying the second objective of this research.
The approach taken, however, is only a part of the challenges to group decision
making. Not only is group multi-objective decision making further complicated when
more than one person has control over the weights of the objective function, but
difficulties can arise even about what the criteria should be within the decision rule.
Similarly, group decision making has to consider not only the conflicting nature of the
various objectives but the conflict between individual preferences within the group.
Each individual comes to the decision-making process with different values regarding
the objectives or criteria. Some individuals may not consider some of the objectives
established as even relevant and will base their preferences on a subset of the ob-
jectives, effectively weighting some criteria as zero or of no importance: “[D]ifferent
importance may be assigned to [criteria] from design to design and from designer to
designer” [194].
Furthermore, with engineering solutions to the large scale problems typically in-
volving greater numbers of individuals, all with different expertise and preferences
accounting for the various perspectives of the problem and solution, there exists a
real need to study and understand influences between the players and, in general, the
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group dynamics in decision-making activities.
A number of different ideas or philosophies have arisen to try and reconcile the
differences or at least forecast how a group will reach a decision. Some of these
areas include Principal-Agent Theory [57], Strategic or Standard Groupthink [81],
Evolutionary Theory [38] or Sociological Determinism [51]. These areas of research
cover both rational and non-rational group action as well as different perspectives on
society, including both individualistic and holistic views [3].
For engineering applications, group decision making is common in the design pro-
cess such as in making trades between engineering groups, incorporating unquantifi-
able performance objectives and conflict resolution between disciplines [149]. In this
sense, group decision making could be viewed as essentially an activity involving ne-
gotiation across preferences and objectives. Very often these negotiations can involve
mean or additive weighting functions, voting methods or some combination of them,
such as the Delphi method, to create knowledge-based systems to assist with decision
making in a variety of situations [35].
In general, a group’s objective function or utility function ug(x) will take the form:
ug(x) = f(u1(x), u2(x), ...uN(x)), (2)
where ui(x) is the individual utility function of the ith decision maker (i = 1, ..., N)
of an alternative, described by x, where x = [x1, x2, ....xn], a set of attributes or
objectives defining the specific alternative.
Combining individual utility functions in the literature is sometimes referred to as
the “social welfare function”, and is heavily influence by the work of Kenneth Arrow
[5].
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3.7.1 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
In 1950, Kenneth Arrow published what is now known as Arrow’s Impossibility The-
orem [5]. This theorem proves that no aggregation method of ordinal or ranking
preferences can be created or implemented such that it satisfies five generally accept-
able criteria or conditions of fairness, namely:
• Unrestricted domain - A social function which rank orders the alternatives is
complete and repeatable for any set of individual voters and their preferences.
• Positive association of social and individual values - Any individual in the group
adjusting preferences for an alternative cannot allow an opposite change in the
group’s ranking. For example, an individual increasing the rank of one option
cannot result in the group reducing its rank over all.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives - The preferences of the group should
not change for the winning alternative if an additional alternative which is
inferior to all others is added into, or removed from, the pool of candidate
alternatives.
• Citizen sovereignty - All possible rankings for the alternatives must be possible
by some set of the individual preferences.
• Non-dictatorship - No one individual’s preference can decide for the remainder
of the group or population.
Since any attempt at combining ordinal preferences (i.e. rankings) in any partic-
ular decision-making technique could allow for the breaking of, at least, one of the
above fairness criteria, dealing with paradoxes (e.g. in some voting methods), and
how one will reconcile the proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem with any proposed
solution, must be addressed.
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3.7.2 Cardinal Utility Functions
In [87], Keeney responds to the apparent limitations of Arrow’s Impossibility The-
orem in using any aggregation method by proving that for some problems a group
utility function holds to similar conditions when using cardinality utility functions.
For situations when the alternatives are certain (i.e. deterministic), Keeny states
that: “...given five assumptions analogous to Arrow’s, using cardinal utilities rather
than rankings, it is always possible to define consistent aggregation rules for a group
cardinal utility function” [87].
Admittedly, this requires the individual decision makers to create their own von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and thus not only define the rank or order of
their preference but also the strength of preference between each alternative. However,
this does provide a way to aggregate utilities while maintaining the acceptability
conditions described previously.
More specifically, group cardinal utility functions over uncertain alternatives do
not break the above assumptions, if




where, k ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N and ki > 0 for at least two ki’s [87].
3.7.3 Group Decision-Making Techniques and Consensus Reaching
In response to the added complications of group decision making, a plethora of
decision-making techniques have been created to account for the different domains,
various stakeholders and diverse types of problems.
Many of the individual techniques for decision making have been proposed and
analyzed with the various adjustments to account for the multiple stakeholders. For
example, TOPSIS has been extended for groups [154], for groups with preference
aggregation within the procedure [155], and for groups in fuzzy environments [34].
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Likewise, AHP has been extended to group decision making with goal programming
in fuzzy environments [190].
Traditional multi-attribute or multi-objective group decision-making techniques
are similarly enhanced or adjusted to account for the weights of different multiple
decision makers, the aggregation processes, and the normalization operation. For
example, one particular group decision-making techniques make use of Monte Carlo
simulations for aggregating decision maker preferences [102]. It also incorporates
incomplete information about the weights and the utility functions across the differ-
ent decision makers which are then made more precise through a negotiation pro-
cesses. The result is hopefully a consensus alternative for the entire group. Another
study compared experimentally the effectiveness of three group decision-making tech-
niques using multi-objective linear programming (MOLP), namely 1) the Group Naive
Search (GNS) implementing a weighted-sums approach, 2) the Group Step Method,
and 3) the Group Goal Programming Method [79]. GNS was found to take longer on
average for the group to reach compromised solutions and resulted in lower quality
solutions compared to the other two.
Furthermore, the VIKOR method [122], which is similar to TOPSIS but imple-
ments a slightly altered aggregation process as a function only of the distance from
the ideal point, proposes a compromise solution, and uses linear normalization. TOP-
SIS, on the other hand uses both the distance from the ideal and detailed comparison
between TOPSIS and VIKOR methods is presented in [123].
Yet another technique, extending the VIKOR method, has also been applied
to multi-attribute group decision-making problems, where the attribute weights are
given as generalized interval-valued trapezoidal fuzzy numbers [98]. This is similar to
having a distribution on the weights themselves, although four points must be defined
for each objective’s “trapezoidal fuzzy number” which may become excessive for high
dimensional spaces.
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Of course, voting methods themselves can be applied to group decision making and
often are [21]. Popular methods or techniques include the Borda Count [42], Plurality
Voting [37], Condorcet Method [140], Instant Runoff [162] to name a few. Similarly,
they also contain their own unique modifications to account for different problems
or decision situations such as multi-stage voting or binary voting trees [126]. How-
ever, many of these suffer from limitations (described in an example presented in the
appendix), and thus do not meet the requirements defined by Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem summarized previously when there are three or more alternatives.
Regardless of the exact group decision-making technique implemented, at some
level, the process must address the influence or power of each one of the stakeholders
or decision makers within the group. Furthermore, sufficient distribution of power is
expected among the decision makers or else one may approach breaking the ‘Non-
dictatorship’ requirement for reasonable aggregation methods, resulting in a problem
appropriate for a single decision maker.
3.7.4 The Delphi Technique
A similar technique to the overall methodology presented in this research is called
the Delphi technique, originally proposed by Olaf Helmer-Hirschberg [75]. In general,
the Delphi technique seeks to facilitate group decision making by iteratively collecting
information from, and presenting results to, a set of experts which will reach consensus
on a particular problem, typically focused on forecasting future states or planning. It
has been successfully implemented in a variety of ways and in a variety of domains
including medical care, government planning, and business [97].
Although this research and the Delphi method have generally similar goals in fa-
cilitating consensus reaching for multiple decisions making the domains of application
are quite different as well as a number of other details. Still, some of the ideas and
process involved in a Delphi-based decision making activity form the inspiration and
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foundation for parts of the steps in the methodology described herein. Some of the
similarities and differences are discussed below.
First of all, the Delphi technique was designed initially to be used as a forecasting
tool by aggregating expert knowledge, opinion, or, in particular, “informed intuitive
judgment” about future states of technology and science. In some respects, the Delphi
technique is designed to assist with prediction-making or planning. In other words,
an agreement or consensus on the likely futures and the associated probabilities of
these futures are desired outcomes of such an activity.
In contrast, the methodology presented in this dissertation is more focused on
requirements definition (or concept selection from a different perspective). At these
decision points, a future is assumed (perhaps as a result of some completed Delphi
technique implementation) and the response to the this future is now under consider-
ation. The future needs or scenario may already be created or exit (i.e. humanitarian
needs after a natural disaster) but the solution to the future problem or needs requires
cooperation amongst stakeholders. Simply worded, Delphi concerns itself more with
consensus on the future scenario necessary for planning while the methodology herein
focuses on the solution set or response to those futures.
Similarly, while the Delphi technique primarily attempts to use “experts,” (how-
ever they may be defined), in isolation, the methodology presented here assumes no
correlation with “expert” and “decision maker” and assumes that interaction is a key
part of the process. The decision makers themselves are not necessarily experts in
the fundamental sense but are evidently in positions of decisional power and exert
influence over others and on the selected solution or requirements.
Furthermore, since many of the solutions which will meet the requirements for
a particular problem demand cooperation between the various players, decisions in
isolation are likely not acceptable as trades and compromises will be almost always
required. This is one limitation of the Delphi technique which can end with two (or
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more) polarized groups quite confident about their respective opinions about the given
situation. Since all stakeholders must be in agreement with one set of requirements
or design, this is also unacceptable for the given motivating problem for air mobility
requirements definition. For example, an RFP with two sets of design requirements
because the decision makers could not agree would clearly be a disaster. The iterations
of the Delphi technique, of course, can be repeated many more times but no guarantee
on full group consensus is given.
On the other hand, the similarities between the proposed methodology and the
Delphi technique also exist in a variety of ways. There is an initial information elici-
tation step in both processes which reveals the preferences of each of the individuals.
In both methods, the opportunity to keep responses to the various questions can
be made anonymous such that a truer opinion is extracted from the questionnaire
(or discrete choices) due to increased confidence by the participants that no one else
will see their answers. Yet, the reasons for such opinions are available to others for
additional persuasion. Thus, both methods also account for changes in the decision
makers preferences albeit in different ways. The Delphi technique requires updating
each players opinion in each iteration while the proposed methodology accounts for
this with a distribution of possible preferences. Lastly, the opportunity to weight the
opinions of experts in the Delphi technique is matched by the power or influence rela-
tionships in the proposed methodology. The assumption that not all decision maker
or expert is equal (in the sense of their ability to persuade others to view things
their way) is an available option in both processes. Thus, in the Delphi technique,
each expert may be assigned a weight, whereas in the methodology presented in this
research, an influence relationships is obtained for each decision maker in the group.
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3.8 Power and Influence in Groups
The research into power and influence, what they comprise, their difference and/or
similarities, and their impacts on decision making is abundant. The studies, data and
interpretations of various experiments span a wide range of fields.
A study by Raven, Schwarzwald and Koslowksy starts with the statement: “Social
power can be conceived as the resources one person has available so that he or she can
influence another person to do what that person would not have done otherwise” [131].
In a decision making context, this can equate to persuading someone else to change
their preference to become more aligned with another decision maker. Although
independently the first would not normally change their preference, expressions of
power or influence would cause them to concede and compromise fully or at least
partially in cooperative group decisions. In particular, one of 11 identified sources of
power may stem from legitimate reciprocity, where one is obligated to respond to an
agent’s request if in the past (or in the future), positive action has been (or will be)
granted to the target [131]. This is often the impetus of mutually beneficial contracts,
the result of which often encourage partnering repetitively for other projects. The
other power sources, such as power derived from expert knowledge, position, or ability
to reward or punish, are also feasible ways that influence can be exerted over others
in cooperative group decision making [131].
Although clearly inequitable from some perspectives, it may be desirable to have
some differing levels of power or influence spread across the group if the problem is
broad enough to cover a variety of perspectives, points of view or objectives. After all,
these problems will likely require a variety of experts, each with experience, knowledge
or competency in one a particular area of the problem.
This is almost guaranteed with large SoS engineering problems, which, by defi-
nition, incorporate multiple views, interfaces and functions, and employ remote, yet
highly integrated, physical systems. Therefore, recognizing these perspectives and
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that some of them can be more accurate, pertinent or important than others is a
crucial step in properly implementing useful acceptable group decision-making pro-
cesses.
The weights attached to the decision maker’s is sometimes referred to as a scaling
constant, to distinguish the use of the term “weight” traditionally used to define the
importance value for a particular dimension or attribute. However, the weight of a
decision maker is still used in many references but is in essence an indication of that
member’s power or influence in the group, scaled or normalized appropriately.
3.8.1 Evaluating the Power or Influence of a Decision Makers
Just like the various attributes or objectives can be assigned a weight or importance
value, the decision makers themselves can assume values indicative of the power or
influence they have over the group. As the number of decision makers reach very large
numbers (e.g. the population of a country) in some decision problems (e.g. political
elections) the individual weight or power of just one decision maker is very small,
but pools of similarly minded individuals, coalitions or subgroups can and do have
significant clout in these situations (e.g. political parties, petitions, etc.).
According to [130] there are two basic ways of assigning the weight or influence
to the decision makers: the supra decision maker approach and the participatory
approach. If a supra decision maker is available to assign weights (i.e. scaling factors)
to the others then this particular step precipitates to a single-agent decision-making
problem, and the classical preference evaluation techniques can be used, not on the
attributes or the objective, but on the importance of decision makers themselves.
However, often in group decisions, there is no one decision maker which defines the
power structure or importance of the others. In such situations, a participatory
approach is required.
The following sections summarize a few of the ways that influence and power have
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been evaluated for group decision-making activities.
3.8.2 Shapley Values
Shapley values, named after Lloyd Shapley, provide a context to analyze coalitions in
n-person decisions involving cooperation [152]. Each member in a group will have a
Shapley value for a particular group decision. The value is conceptualized as the payoff
to a particular member for joining the coalition or a group with similar preferences.
The difference in payoffs between the coalition before and after some player joined is
“claimed” by that same player as their compensation in joining the coalition. As each
player calculates their marginal payoff of the coalition, a marginal vector is created,
and a certain player’s Shapley value will be the average of marginal vectors across all
the possible orders of the players [10]. The summation of the Shapley values for all
decision makers in a group must equal to 1.
3.8.3 Shapley-Shubik power index
A related value to the Shapley value called the Shapley-Shubik (SS) power index
can also be used in situations where coalitions can be formed in some multi-agent
decision-making processes [151]. This power index quantifies the power an individual
decision maker may have in expressing and achieving their preferences, based on the
full set of permutations of the votes for all players in the election or decision-making
process.






(|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!(v(S)− v(S\{i})) (4)
where, n is the number of players, and v(S) represents the payoff of coalition S
[10]. This value represents the contribution or payoff to the game of the difference
with player i (v(S)) and without player i (v(S\i)). When averaged over all the
possible n! permutations, the ith player has the contribution value or power index
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Figure 7: Example of Various Levels or Degrees (arrow thickness) of Influence Between
Agents (Taken from [110])
of φi [10]. When each player is given a power index, a prediction on how any one
agent will be influenced by another can be modeled, by assuming that one decision
maker with more “power” will be able to persuade another agent to agree to their
preferences more readily.
Figure 7 illustrates how multiple agents can have different levels of influence, if
at all, on other entities. This example demonstrates potential relationships where
voters have less influence on the central banks than financial experts or government
agencies, considered a more likely scenario [110].
Assuming a dynamic number of decision makers at any one time, the value would
require reevaluation since during negotiations or trades across different objectives,
the power of any one player or agent is likely to change or shift.
3.8.4 Other Methods to Extract Decision Maker Weights
AHP, although used often to apply weights to objectives or attributes directly, has
been used to extract the power between decision makers as well [130]. This approach
has the decision makers define the ratio between their strength, weight or power
directly with each other decision makers. An eigenvector method is then implemented
to obtain the power or scaling factor for each stakeholder. Similarly, in [181], a
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discussion of calculating the decisional power of the members in a group environment
is discussed using the REMBRANDT software suite implementing multiplicative AHP
and SMART (Single Multi-Attribute Ranking Technique). In parallel with research
implementing AHP, applications of TOPSIS have also been extended to determine
the strength or power of each member in a group [191].
Likewise, game theory applications have been recast to also provide power indices
of decision makers in groups [43]. Lastly, Banzhaf [11] and Coleman [36] power indices
are two other options for calculating and describing the power or influence between
members for collective groups.
3.9 Game Theory
Two individuals often considered the founders of game theory, von Neumann and
Morgenstern [182] have provided the mathematical foundation upon which a con-
siderable amount of research has been performed on how decisions are made amidst
uncertainty. This uncertainty is typically found in how one’s payoff, or some other
metric of success, is dependent upon someone else’s decisions. Since a decision-maker
cannot know for certain what alternative or strategy others may choose, their ex-
pected payoff is uncertain. On the other hand, whichever alternative they choose
can impact the payoff of other decision makers. Understanding, analyzing and eval-
uating this interdependency of decisions and payoffs among all the decision makers
is at the heart of game theoretic research. Much of the effort focuses on identifying
strategies considered “equilibria” from which a decision maker will select and apply
continuously to the particular situation, since any other strategy will result in a less
favorable outcome.
The analysis of these “games” has been useful for making decisions in many dif-
ferent fields from economics [53] to ecology [53] to engineering [26]. Although these
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games are essentially simplified models of real-world problems or challenges they pro-
vide a framework from which insight can be gained about how other decision makers
will react or respond to one’s own decisions; a useful tool in today’s ever more net-
worked and interdependent society.
3.9.1 Types of Games
As the number of areas grows for applying game theory, more precise and definitive
characterizations of the types of games have resulted. These categories, described
in the following sections, have allowed game theorists to understand and model the
more complex assumptions that occur in real-life situations.
3.9.2 Symmetric and Asymmetric games
In symmetric games the payoff for a particular strategy regardless of the player is the
same. If the payoffs are dependent on the player the game can be called asymmetric.
For example, if in a particular game, the payoff is an apple or an orange for each player,
and both players find both food items equally satisficing, the game is symmetric.
Whereas if one player is allergic to oranges, the game payoffs would be asymmetric,
with a negative payoff if receiving an orange and a positive payoff with an apple. The
other player’s payoffs remain the same as in the symmetric case.
In general, no two decision makers are identical. Each has his or her own beliefs,
experiences and values. In most cases, asymmetric games are more reflective of reality
as a result. The value of a good or service, for example, is often viewed differently
between the buyer and seller. Still, the significant use and applicability of symmetric
games is evident such as analyzing nuclear deterrence theory [80].
3.9.3 Perfect and Imperfect games
Perfect and Imperfect games refer to the information that each of the decision makers
or players has regarding the history of the game. Since this type of categorization
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requires previous moves, a sequential game or one that has a number of choices over
time is most commonly associated with a game of perfect information. Most one
move games will be classified as games of imperfect information since knowledge of
how the other player or players will act in the game is unknown.
3.9.4 Zero-sum and Non-zero-sum games
As the name suggests, zero-sum games refer to the inverse relationship of the players’
payoffs. That is, for a two player game, if one player receives a negative payoff (i.e.
-100) the other player will receive an equal in magnitude positive payoff (i.e. +100)
and similarly for an n-player games, one player’s payoff increase will be counted by an
equivalent decrease for one or more of the other n− 1 players’ payoffs. On the other
hand, the non-zero-sum game removes the restriction that one player’s lost is another
player’s gain. For example, if one player can change their strategy and increase their
own payoff without negatively impacting the payoff of the other players, the game is
non-zero-sum.
3.9.5 Cooperative or Competitive Games
Another categorization that can be applied to game theory is cooperative or com-
petitive games. Competitive, or non-cooperative, games are often used to model
situations where coalitions cannot exist to increase the payoff of the group or coali-
tion [73]. Very often non-zero-sum games are competitive games in the sense that one
player’s loss is another player’s gain and thus both compete for the limited resources.
Cooperative games are models of situations where the players can form alliances or
coalitions to increase the groups’, and potentially each individual’s, payoff. Many
games involving voting can be considered cooperative games in that a group of indi-
viduals can pool their votes together to reach a majority or some other threshold to
guarantee their particular agenda across all the players both within and without the
coalition. Since all players in a coalition seek a common result, before their “vote”
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Figure 8: Example Payoff Matrix for the Classical Prisoner’s Dilemma
is cast together, members within the coalition may have to make compromises, but
these are considered acceptable concessions if the ultimate decision is more closely
aligned with their own individual preference.
3.9.6 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a 2-player game in which two prisoners, having been
recently arrested for committing a crime, are each individually and separately offered
a choice by the police: the prisoner can either provide evidence or testimony against
the other prisoner or remain silent. If both prisoners remain silent (i.e. both cooperate
with each other), there will not be enough evidence to convict either of the prisoners
and they will both remain in prison on a smaller charge for a short sentence of one
year. If one prisoner provides evidence (i.e. defects) and the other remains silent
(i.e. cooperates), the first prisoner will go free and the second will go to prison for
five years. If both prisoners testify against the other (i.e. both defect) they will both
serve a sentence for three years.
A chart, called a payoff matrix, describing the dilemma with payoffs and strategies
for both prisoners, is summarized in Figure 8.
The first prisoner, Prisoner 1, has their strategies down the rows, where “Coop-
erate” indicates cooperating or helping the other prisoner (i.e. staying silent) and
74
“Defect” indicates defecting or testifying against Prisoner 2. Prisoner 1’s payoffs are
the first number in each quadrant. Prisoner 2 has the same two strategies and their
payoffs are given as the second number in each quadrant. The payoffs are repre-
sented in Figure 8 by how many years in prison each will avoid for each combination
of strategies. This is to keep all numbers positive such that each prisoner wants to
maximize the number of years avoided for their individual sentence.
If Prisoner 1 cooperates and remains silent, Prisoner 2 would want to defect and
go free as indicated in the top right quadrant. If Prisoner 1 defects and testifies,
Prisoner 2 would want to defect as well, and have their sentence reduced since if they
remained silent (bottom left quadrant) they would spend the maximum amount of
time in prison. Regardless of what Prisoner 1 does, Prisoner 2’s best strategy is to
defect. But the exact same process and logic can be applied to Prisoner 1 in that
their best strategy is also to defect regardless of what Prisoner 2 does. As a result,
both prisoners will defect and both will serve the maximum sentence (and avoid
only 1 year). In this particular game, a Nash equilibrium is found in the bottom
right quadrant (both defect), where neither prisoner can improve their payoff by
switching to the cooperate strategy. However, there is a more Pareto-optimal point
(both cooperate), where both prisoners can improve their payoffs. Interestingly, the
selfish rationality of both prisoners seeking to minimize their sentence (maximize
their payoff) resulted in an equilibrium which was sub-Pareto-optimal. Thus, the
individual rationality resulted in group irrationality by both selecting a less optimal
strategy, even though a strategy exists where both could improve their payoff.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game can be generalize with the payoff matrix presented
in Figure 9, where R is the reward for mutual cooperation, S is the Sucker’s payoff,
T is the Temptation to defect and P is the Punishment for mutual defection, and
T > R > P > S with R > (S + T )2 for the game to be defined as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [8]. Comparing this generalized form to Figure 8, these equations hold true
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Figure 9: General Payoff Matrix for the Classical Prisoner’s Dilemma
when considering that a higher payoff is less time in prison. For example, the inverse
payoff matrix could have T=0, R=-1, P=-3, and S=-10, where the payoff represent
years lost in prison and one would still want to maximize their payoffs (i.e. make less
negative) as in Figure 9.
The game of Chicken, or sometimes known as Hawk-Dove, can take on the same
general form but with different equations, namely, S > P > T > R [105], and
replacing “Cooperate” with “Continue Straight” (Hawk) and “Defect” with “Swerve”
(Dove), under the assumption that the game is conceptually interpreted as two cars
driving straight toward each other and it is a test of driver bravado. An equilibrium
can be found where both players will swerve and receive payoffs equal to P. However,
in this game, the dynamics are slightly different in that if one player changes their
strategy to “Continue Straight”, it does make sense for the other player to accept
a lower payoff by also switching to “Continue Straight”, although, they will have
to accept a lower payoff by continuing with the “swerve” strategy. The concept of
“brinkmanship” is one way to bring the other player back to the original “Swerve”
strategy as discussed in more detail in [145].
In both these games, the actions of each decision maker are dependent on the
actions of the other. If player 1 decides on a certain strategy and player 2 knew it,
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player 2 could maximize their own payoff, but if player 1 knew that player 2 knew what
player 1 was going to do, player 1 could change their strategy also, and so on with
this pattern continuing ad infinitum. To avoid this never ending circular logic, the
equilibrium point(s) aforementioned were shown to be point(s) at which neither player
is willing to change their position or strategy without external pressures or additional
information. Thus, applying strategies to find the equilibrium, game theory can be
effective in allowing one to identify what strategy they should implement which will
best maximize their individual payoff, or meet their particular objectives.
3.9.7 Limitations to the Classic Prisoner’s Dilemma
The classic Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game has a number of useful attributes and is
used in a variety of problems where more than one player has an influence on what
all the players receive as payoffs. However, a number of limitations have been found
and alternative games or different modifications to the classical prisoner’s dilemma
game have been investigated, with one candidate being the Snowdrift Game [50].
Some of the limitations with short descriptions of the PD are listed below:
• The classical PD involves only 2-players. Although 2-player models cover a
large amount of real-world decisions, often more than two agents are involved
in any decision. This is typical in any voting activity such as a company’s board
of directors or shareholders, and in elections.
• The payoffs are deterministic in a classical PD game. Although a number of
different values for T,R, P, and S in Figure 9 satisfy the requirements for a PD
game, those values are often probabilistic in nature, in that the actual payoff
may be higher or lower than the expected payoff. In other words, the payoff is
also uncertain regardless of the combination of strategies employed by the two
agents. For example, the payoff if both players defect may be an actual time in
prison above what was expected if the judge so decrees.
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• The classical PD also assumes that there is no real knowledge about how the
other player(s) will act. In reality, there is some history or available knowledge
which will provide insight into the value system or expected choices of the
opposite player. Most real-world multi-agent decisions are not made between
two or more individuals with no knowledge of the other’s background.
• Assuming only one PD game is played the players expected behavior is well
predicted. However, very often players come in contact and reach multiple
decision points with the same individual(s). This can be quickly accounted for
with the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, where a number of sequential PD games
are played and behaviors are much more varied especially when the number of
iterated PD games is unknown.
• Some forms of the PD game include no real investment or cost. That is, the
players don’t necessarily put any additional effort into their strategies. Real
decisions and strategies required different amounts of investment or cost to the
player. Furthermore, if one player has already invested heavily into one strategy
they are more likely to select it.
As a result of these limitations, additional games are considered which are sum-
marized in the next few sections, namely the snowdrift game and the ultimatum
game.
3.9.8 The Snowdrift Game
The Snowdrift (SD) game is one answer to some of the limitations of the PD in
describing real-world interactions between human decision makers. Researchers have
explained that “the PD does not represent the frequent situation where individuals
obtain immediate direct benefits from the cooperative acts they perform and costs of
cooperation are shared between cooperators” [91].
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The SD game is generally described as a snow drift blocking the road which two
drivers (or players or actors) on either side of the snowdrift desire to travel through.
They can let the other player clear the road and remove the snow while they wait or
they can decide to help remove some or all of the snow [164].
Staying in the car and letting the other driver clear all the snow is the ideal
strategy. However, it is also the best option for the other driver as well. The social
dilemma, similar to the PD, is evident in that defecting or refusing to help remove
the snow is best when the other driver is cooperating and is clearing the snow [41].
However, since the ultimate goal for both drivers is to pass to the other side, there
is an incentive to not wait and begin to remove snow. Regardless of what the other
driver does, eventually the one who removes the snow will gain passage. Thus, there
is a cost or investment associated with removing the snow but a road clear of snow
enabling passage is clearly a benefit and can be acquired regardless of what the other
driver chose as their strategy.
The SD game has been shown to be a better model for high cooperation as shown
in Figure 10 [91]. In Figure 10, the data show the results of how often cooperating
acts were observed in the two games (PD and SD) between players who were both
female (FF), both male (MM) or one of each gender (FM). The numbers below the
bars represent the sample size in each of the six categories.
The SD game is a useful tool for analyzing decision making when there is an ad-
ditional incentive to cooperate. In many business deals, the cooperation or consensus
point is reached after each player or actor is willing to make a compromise (i.e. a
cost or investment) to obtain the item. In such cases, it must be assumed that the
cost expended by any one agent or player is less than the benefit. An agent will not
trade or sell a product or position for one that is of lesser value.
In terms of decision making, reaching consensus is usually more favorable than
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Figure 10: Comparing the Iterated PD and Iterated SD (from [91])
never reaching an agreement, since time can quickly become a cost if indecision nega-
tively affects both or all parties. It also can be used to show that free-loaders can be
modeled as a common occurrence in many group decision-making activities. Lastly,
SD can potentially be used to account for the higher levels of cooperation observed
in experimental tests compared to PD models and predictions [50].
3.9.9 The Ultimatum Game
Another game which improves upon PD in some areas is the Ultimatum game. Tra-
ditionally set up as a 2 player game, one player (the proposer) will propose how much
(or a percentage) of some money, or other desirable resource, the proposer will re-
ceive and how much the other player (the responder) will receive. The responder can
accept or reject the proposal. If he or she rejects the proposal, neither player receives
any money [117]. A Nash equilibrium is found with a proposal that is just slightly
greater than zero. This equilibrium is found since the responder, assuming he or she
is rational, will take any proposal greater than zero [137]. However, experimental
results indicate that this equilibrium does not predict actual human behavior very
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well, especially over time [119], [113].
Thus, in reality, experimental results have suggested that individuals are willing to
penalize themselves in order to punish unfairness in others. The responder is willing
to accept a loss to punish the proposer. As a result, over time if the ultimatum game
is played multiple times, with sequential bargaining, proposals may tend to the 50-50
split, but other splits may be equally likely with asymmetric information or external
influences [163]. For example, consider two companies where both have different
requirements for return on investment or other economic metrics, and both desire to
combine expertise to add value to a particular product line. The profit share of each
of these companies will likely not be 50-50, based on their contribution to the design
of the product. Thus, “fairness” can only be defined in the particular context when
both parties agree to the split. Clearly, if one company invests significant more capital
in a development program, they will understandably expect a higher return. On the
other hand, if the smaller company does not contribute financially but possesses a
skill or expertise, they may be also able to claim a larger percentage than what the
capital investment input would suggest. Therefore, the “fair” value is dependent on
each of the agents (i.e. companies) perceived deserved level of compensation. Still,
as in previous examples, agreement is preferred over no agreement and thus attempts
to propose and counter propose until a point is reached which is mutually acceptable
will likely occur. However, the point at which that occurs, is again dependent on the
relationship between the decision makers, the individual preferences or weightings for
the particular criteria involved, and the knowledge about the design point.
3.10 Discrete Choice Modeling
Choice modeling is one name for the general principle of creating models representing
(usually) preferences between attributes or about criteria, from data created from
comparing two or more designs or concepts. Other names describing this research area
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include: “discrete choice”, “stated preference” or “choice experiments” [138]. Since
the choice is often between two options, the term “binary choice” is also commonly
used [158]. The resultant model can effectively predict how a human will make
decisions and their individual behavior when given a choice between options.
Much of the recent theory on choice modeling is based on the work of Daniel
McFadden who received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2000 for his work
on discrete choice [99]. Although McFadden’s work is expectedly founded in both
empirical and theoretical economic models, choice modeling has been applied to other
fields where choice and human behavior is an essential factor such as in occupational
positions, recreational activities or transportation mode choices [107].
Figure 11: The Choice Process (from [107])
A recent model representing the choice process is shown in Figure 11. In this
model, more inputs and outputs are evident than usually considered. Not surprisingly,
data or information (shown entering the model at the top) is a requirement in any
choice or decision-making process. Experience, on the other hand, is also a key
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input which is often couched in phrases such as “the art of design”, “subject matter
experts” or “tacit knowledge.” Time, training or experience with previous decisions
drive both preferences and perceptions through memory of previous choices. Whether
this “memory” is actual historical trends, previous designs or established precedence,
it influences how the data is perceived and what attributes or criteria are preferable.
The process itself will result in a choice, where the data (and beliefs about the data)
in combination with the preferences of the data or criteria are applied under the
constraints of time, money or other limitations. A number of outputs in addition to
the ultimate choice can be extracted from this process, namely attitude scales, stated
perceptions, stated preferences and revealed preferences.
Attitudes (i.e. attitude scales) are “stable psychological tendencies” to view or
consider an outcome approvingly or not, whereas perceptions are how one interprets a
particular stimulus cognitively [18]. Preferences, similar to attitudes, are a perspective
or measure of how one relates to a particular entity or criterion in terms of “like” or
“dislike.” Preferences can be rank ordered qualitatively or measured quantitatively
usually with utility, a level of satisfaction as viewed by the decision maker often
“correlative to Desire or Want” [100]. The preference for one attribute over another
attribute can be revealed in the utility or score of each attribute. For example, if a
decision maker receives more “utils” (i.e. general unit of pleasure or satisfaction) for
a low risk design than a low cost design, their stated preference would be for lowering
risk over lowering cost. However, since these two dimensions may not be independent
(i.e. low risk designs do not necessarily mean low cost designs), and furthermore
the utility could be a function of the magnitude of both of the measures, multi-
dimensional utility functions are required to evaluate the utility of any particular
design. For these multi-dimensional preferences, a utility function can be composed
of the summation (or other mathematical combination) of the individual utilities of
the various dimensions or objectives.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT
In order to satisfy the research objectives and to perform experiments that can answer
the various research questions and lend support to the related hypotheses, an overall
methodology has been developed which allows one to test the pertinent variables in
response to the motivating problem. The overall methodology with its two constituent
parts is described in the following sections. A brief description of each of the two main
parts is presented and then again in more detail of the specific steps.
4.1 Research Methodology Overview
The overall methodology discussed in this research is broken down into two major
elements, 1) the Air Mobility Operations-based Design Model (AirMOD), and, 2) the
Methodology for Multi-Agent Consensus Reaching on the Objective Space (MACRO).
Together these two components offer a unique solution in addressing the motivating
problem discussed in Chapter 1 to define the requirements of the fleet for a new
heavy-lift cargo air transportation system.
Figure 12 illustrates where these two components fall within the classic systems
engineering paradigm. After the need has been establish and the problem defined
(i.e. requirements definition for air mobility systems) with the associated value, the
set of possible solutions or alternatives, comprising a set of requirements, must be
generated as potential candidates answering the problem. These solutions are design
requirements or parameters which will drive future decisions within the acquisitions
process.
The evaluation of these designs is then performed using utility scores across the
operational metrics of interest. After a sufficiently large set of candidate solutions has
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Figure 12: Methodology Application Areas to the Generalized Decision-Making Pro-
cess
been generated and evaluated by AirMOD, the designs are passed onto the MACRO
methodology in which the multiple stakeholders or decision makers reach a consensus
on the design space in selecting a set of requirements for further investigation, testing
and analysis.
The following two sections briefly describes these two elements followed by addi-
tional descriptions and details of the steps in the MACRO methodology.
4.2 AirMOD Model Overview
The Air Mobility Operations-based Design Model (AirMOD) is in direct response
for the need of faster simulations to generate many more candidate solutions. With
increase computational power and advanced modeling techniques, decision makers
demand a better defined and characterized decision space. No longer are small data
sets with just a few potential solutions adequate for the ever-changing and uncertain
environments in which decision need to be made. Solutions which consider a variety of
input scenarios, parameters, initial conditions and constraints all must be simulated
and analyzed. Confidence in decision making can only come from a design or decision
space which is well defined and explored. Only then can a decision maker make a
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decision.
AirMOD provides an operational and logistical perspective to system engineer-
ing solutions by calculating mission success in terms of the time to close or deliver
certain total amounts of payload to various location throughout the world under dif-
ferent scenarios (discussed in more detail in later sections). For these operational
models, with multiple objectives and potentially many more input variables, many
simulations must be executed across the input space to increase the design space
characterization. AirMOD leverages advanced design methods and techniques in-
cluding surrogate models to execute each case much more rapidly compared to the
full simulation model.
With the implementation of surrogate modeling techniques, AirMOD can generate
a new solution every ≈3 ms, equivalent to about 1 million executions in less than 50
minutes. This in turn allows the identification of essential logistical and operational
trades that are impossible with classical tools. Only with enough design points or
solution can these trades and the associated Pareto fronts be explored and utilized in
more advanced decision making processes.
Finally, these trades provide key levers on the decision space in which decision
makers can utilize for making compromises and reaching consensus in group decision-
making processes. Without the capabilities of AirMOD, group decision making on
this air mobility operational design space would be severely limited with a higher
probability of decisions made with greater uncertainty and with less confidence.
4.2.1 AirMOD Process Flow
The AirMOD model leverages the process flow, shown in Figure 13, from the Strategic
Airlift Comparison Tool (described in more detail in the next chapter).
The discrete event simulation, written in SimPy [159], begins with all aircraft
within the predefined fleet at the Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) and ends when
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Figure 13: AirMOD Simulation Flow Block Diagram [From [142]
no more missions (i.e. no more cargo remains undelivered at the APOE) are required
and the last delivery has been completed.
The aircraft in turn are assigned a route type by the user, which defines the flight
path and the en route refueling locations if any. After the mission is flown, a delay is
applied to account for scheduled maintenance such that the utilization never exceeds
16 hours. The unscheduled maintenance is randomly applied through the break rates
parameter entered by the user and discussed in a later chapter.
During each mission (see the middle column of Figure 13), the sequence of events
will occur, updating each aircraft status, such as loading, waiting, repair, or other
operations, which are tracked and recorded for total up-time, down-time, flight hours,
etc. on a per aircraft basis and then summed for the fleet wide statistics. Additional
base operations occur within its subblock as indicated on the far right column of
Figure 13. These events include additional wait times for limited resources (e.g.
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depot or fueling stations, cleared runway), ground operations (e.g. time to refuel),
and repair times if a failure is identified and requires maintenance.
The output metrics include the times associated for these various categories and
ultimately rolled up to the metrics of interest including the total time to close the
mission, fuel consumption, flight hours, and actual fleet wide utilization values.
Since the model is stochastic in nature, multiple runs for each scenario is repeated
to obtain a distribution on the time to close, which then allows for appropriate statis-
tics on these same distributions. A design of experiments with 50000 cases covered
the design space was then executed with 1000 repetitions for each case. Neural net-
works were then employed to created the surrogate models which enable even faster
computation of the output space. These surrogate models are then applied by the
AirMOD model (with additional enhancements discussed later) to create candidate
C-X designs very rapidly. Each design, in turn, represents a potential set of require-
ments that meets the stated problem of multiple decision makers agreeing upon the
needs and requirements of a future air mobility system described in Chapter 1.
4.3 MACRO Methodology Overview
The Methodology for Multi-Agent Consensus Reaching on the Objective Space (MACRO)
responds to the other half of the problem to improve decision making within an op-
erational design space to increase transparency and quality of group decisions.
The MACRO methodology in the current research is broken down into three main
steps, namely:
• Step 1: Calculating Weighting Distributions
• Step 2: Extracting Power Relationships
• Step 3: Reaching Preference Consensus
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In Step 1, the focus is to obtain the preferences or importance weightings for
all criteria or objectives from each decision maker. The uncertainty in the decision
maker’s preferences are expressed as weighting distributions and are calculated from
the answers provided from discrete choices of pairwise comparisons of designs or
solutions. This step is directly in response to exploring and testing the Research
Question #3 and its complementary hypothesis, respectively.
Step 2 extracts the power or influence relationships between the decision makers.
Discrete choice experiments are again invoked to quantify the willingness of each de-
cision maker to form a coalition with others while potentially selecting a less desirable
design such that a trade between utility and partnership is realized. Research Ques-
tion #4 and Hypothesis #4 drive the creation of this step to obtain this data such
that later consensus reaching processes can be possible.
Lastly, Step 3 evaluates, through simulation, the expected region, both in the
preference space and later mapped to the design space, at which the set of deci-
sion makers are most likely to reach consensus. This model incentivizes cooperation
between decision makers, under the assumption that coalitions can be formed and
can exert greater power or influence over agents not part of a coalition. The second
research question and hypothesis will be addressed with this step in the methodol-
ogy, showcasing the overall feasibility of reducing the design space using weighting
distributions, power relationships and game-theoretic applications.
This overall process is called the methodology for Multi-Agent Consensus Reach-
ing on the Objective Space (MACRO). These three steps of the MACRO methodology
are visualized in Figure 14 with the set of candidate designs as the major input and
the subset or region of designs at which consensus is likely as the output, with the



















Figure 14: Overview of the MACRO Methodology
A preliminary step, sometimes referred to as “Step 0” in later chapters of this
document, refer to the necessary processing steps of data or design points to create
a feasible sets of candidates upon which the methodology acts. Although it is not
a formal step in the methodology, it is addressed by the first half of the research
objective and fulfills a crucial prerequisite assumed to have occurred before Step
1. Its importance and requirements are addressed in the canonical and case study
problems in later chapters of this research.
The following three sections further expand upon and described in more detail the
aforementioned methodology step summaries.
4.3.1 Step 1: Calculating Weighting Distributions
The first major step is to calculate the importance weightings or preferences of each
decision maker on the various objectives as much as possible. Since there is un-
certainty in the level of importance each decision maker places on the objectives,
especially in group settings where changing opinions, or persuasion to differing view-
points can exist, the preferences are expressed as “weighting distributions” reflecting
the range of importance values or coefficients that the decision maker might apply
under a variety of conditions.
In the previous chapter, a discussion of some of the alternatives for extracting
this information (such as AHP or user-defined values) was discussed with some of












































Step 1: Calculating Weighting Distributions
Figure 15: Flow Block Diagram of Step 1: Calculating Weighting Distributions
consistency issues. User-defined methods such as slider bars or other direct methods
might not produce a distributions from which preference changes are accounted. Also,
these methods are often scenario independent such that the decision maker is required
to assume some general or average scenario and assign weightings to it. Furthermore,
he or she will typically only look at small subsets of the multi-dimensional space and
never consider the global perspective with all dimensions in mind. To remedy these
concerns, a discrete choice experiment is implemented which does provide context
and allows the decision maker to interact with “designs” and not “partial designs”,
in the sense of only a subset of the design parameters.
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As shown in the block diagram of Figure 15, Step 1 begins by preprocessing
the candidate designs among which decision makers seek to cooperate in choosing
one design or set of requirements. This preprocessing, referred to above as Step 0,
prepares the designs such that it meets the necessary requirements for later phases
of the methodology. If necessary, quantifying the objectives that originally contain
qualitative data would be performed within this sub-step. For example, a “low-
medium-high” scale would necessarily need to be converted to numerical values (e.g.
1-3-5) if this dimension was to be included in some utility or valuation function for
later steps. However, the discrete choice experiments themselves could still make use
of the qualitative data, but numerically comparing various designs, a requirement for
the methodology, is still needed.
Once the full design space is prepared and available, the number of objectives to
include throughout the remainder of the methodology is defined. Ideally, the mini-
mum amount of objectives will simplify and accelerate the analysis, but guaranteeing
sufficient coverage in terms of the complete trade space of all essential objectives is
required. Various guidelines and processes have been suggested to either expand or
prune the list of necessary objectives [86].
With the dimensional size of the design space now defined, a set of all possible
weights for each objective or the set of all weighting vectors in n-dimensions can be
created at a particular resolution or discretization level. When n is large, the number
of discretization levels should be lower to reduce data memory requirements, but
higher resolved weighting vector can results in more precise weighting distributions.
Once the set of weighting vectors is defined, the one loop in Step 1 is entered
(shown in Figure 15) by selecting two from the pool of candidate designs for the first
discrete choice given to a decision maker. After the decision maker has responded,
the infeasible weighting vectors are removed from the preference space, and the valid
weighting distributions are updated.
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This is followed by an optional refinement step where, if needed, the discretiza-
tion level is increased for those areas of the preference space that are still valid and
additional weighting vectors are concatenated to the set of feasible weighting vectors.
This refinement step would likely only occur if very few designs or weighting vectors
remain feasible and expanding the preference set is essential for additional discrete
choice experiments.
The genesis or need for a refinement step was only developed after a recognition
of the fact that higher dimensional design spaces required ever increasing weighting
vectors to defined the objective space adequately. With sufficient computing power
and memory available, this step could potentially be skipped but is likely still neces-
sary for any problem of significant scope and with a large number of parameters or
objectives.
Regardless of the refinement step, the stopping criteria will either continue the
loop, where the next iteration of a discrete choice is provided to the decision maker
with the reduced set of possible weighting vectors, or exit the loop, and thus Step 1,
if the distribution of weighting vectors is sufficiently known or if time and resources
will not allow for any additional discrete choice experiments of the particular decision
maker.
Since each decision maker must respond individually to discrete choice experi-
ments, the loop is executed for each agent or stakeholder in the group. Furthermore,
each decision maker will have, potentially, a different stopping criterion. For example,
one decision maker might have time to answer as many as time permits, while another
may only desire to answer 5 or fewer. This is discussed further in later chapters with
experiments to quantify the effects of differing stopping criteria.
Of course, with a different number of discrete choices for each decision maker,
the certainty on the weighting distributions will be expectedly different. Although
the methodology does not require equal amounts of certainty across decision makers,
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performance, measured by the relative “size” of the consensus region, is improved with
less uncertainty. The following chapter will further explain and provide examples and
analysis regarding these differences.
4.3.2 Step 2: Extracting Power Relationships
The second major step in the methodology is to obtain the power relationships from
discrete choice experiments. This step makes use of the weighting distributions from
Step 1 and is presented in an outline form in Figure 16.
Similar methods are available to extract this information as from Step 1 (e.g.
AHP) but with the same limitations and issues. Since the information about the
influence between decision maker can be highly sensitive, a method to extract these
relationships while still allowing each decision maker to be comfortable with the
provided information is requisite. Furthermore, a desire to use similar processes from
before in Step 1, namely discrete choice experiments, such that the decision makers
are not required to learn an additional technique for the current step. This not only
encourages comfort with the process due to familiarity, but can also help in facilitating
the speed at which responses are elicited.
Step 2 commences by defining the relationships which will be extracted from the
set of discrete choices to be responded by the decision makers. Since a decision
maker will possess a power relationship with all other decision makers, the set of
power indices or relationships for all combinations can be defined with various power
constraint equations, expressed in a matrix, A. The solution, x, to the system Ax = b
constitutes the relationships sought within this step.
Defining the right hand side b vector remains as the focus for the remainder of
Step 2. Initially, it assumes large uncertainty, which is reduced after decision makers
respond to various discrete choices about what designs and with whom they are more
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Figure 16: Flow Block Diagram of Step 2: Extracting Power Relationships
a particular element in the b vector and once the range is sufficiently narrow, Step 2
solves the system of equations multiple times to obtain a distribution or range of the
power relationships as the output.
Depending on the maximum desirable b vector range, and on the number of deci-
sion makers, the number of discrete choice experiments necessary to satisfy the system
will vary. However, a sufficient number of repetitions of the loop from one or more
decision makers within Step 2 of Figure 16 is required to make Ax = b solvable such
that A is invertible. If more equations than unknowns are provided, a linear least
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squares approach to solving the system is available as indicated by the dashed line
and block in the bottom left of Figure 16.
4.3.3 Step 3: Reaching Preference Consensus
The last major step of the methodology is obtaining the consensus region within
the preference space and mapping those to the designs space to identify the set of
designs which the group of decision makers are most likely to accept based upon their
individual weighting distributions and power relationships and illustrated in Figure
17.
This step’s origination comes from the requirement that to avoid many of the
negative effects described by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, if all decision makers
are united in their preference structure then no conditions of fairness are broken.
Furthermore, an assumption that consensus is reached intermediately before the final
design or requirements are accepted by all parties. Coalitions are formed between
decision makers and then these coalitions form super coalitions and so on until the
full group consensus.
As explored in the previous chapter, voting techniques were first considered for
consensus reaching but rejected due to a number of limitations, underscored by Ar-
row’s Impossibility Theorem and described in more detail in the appendix. Analysis of
other techniques including game theoretic approaches were more promising with the
sequence of specific cooperative games considered including the Prisoner’s dilemma,
the Snow Drift game and the Ultimatum Game, the latter which offered the best
attributes for the specific problem of bilateral and intermediate consensus reaching
stages.
The two sets of data, individual weighting distributions and power relationships
from steps 1 and 2 respectively, are inputs to a simulation of multiple executions of
the ultimatum game which provides the region of consensus between only between
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Figure 17: Flow Block Diagram of Step 3: Reaching Preference Consensus
those decision makers (or coalitions of decision makers).
This new consensus region becomes the preference or weighting distribution of the
newly form coalition. Similarly, the power relationships are updated between decision
makers and the coalitions.
If there is only one coalition (i.e. the group is now all in agreement), the group
preferences are applied to the design space and Step 3 is complete, with the group
consensus region defined.
If there remain two or more decision makers or coalitions, the process is repeated
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by selecting two of them, and repeating the ultimatum game simulations between the
individuals or coalitions.
Since the order of how coalitions are formed can have some impact in the final con-
sensus region, Step 3 can be repeated multiple times, if desired, to obtain a superset
of designs that could be agreed upon, from a variety of coalition-forming sequences.
Lastly, variations on the simulation parameters are possible such as increasing
one’s propensity to accept proposals in later stages of the overall, simulation, coali-
tion forming process. Likewise, a group themselves could have greater influence over
a smaller group depending on the relative group sizes. The constituent group mem-
bers would still drive the consensus process but a multiplier effect could be enabled
to model other types of pressure such as going along with the majority (but not
necessarily with a majority of the power).
4.3.4 Summary of the MACRO Methodology
The three major steps of the overall MACRO methodology are combined in Figure
18 to show some of the key interfaces between the steps.
These data and other methods will be described in more detail with examples in
following chapters.
As with all model and methodologies, the extent of applicability is limited and
implementing the MACRO methodology is no exception. However, at least three
ways have been identified in which MACRO could be used:
• By an outside analyst attempting to forecast which design requirements a
group of decision makers will select and study the potential outcomes from
such predictions. In this use case, the analyst must make assumptions about
how the various stakeholders will respond to discrete choice experiments on the
design space. This is a possible source of uncertainty but can still reduce the
set of potential designs if assumptions are founded on historical data or other
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Figure 18: Flow Block Diagram of the MACRO Methodology
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reasonable trends.
• By one of the individuals in a group attempting to identify the sensitivity
of the consensus region with or without their cooperation. In this way, MACRO
would be used as a type of meta-decision making tool, allowing an individual
to prepare more for eventual discussion and negotiation which may take place
between parties. Not only understanding the design space, but also exploring
the group dynamics through MACRO can better prepare and individual for
future interactions in decision meetings.
• By the full group willing to implement the methodology to accelerate the
potentially lengthy consensus reaching process. In this use of MACRO, all
decision makers are willing to respond to a sufficient number of discrete choices,
such that preferences structures and influence relationships are defined, and are
willing to work through the entire methodology to, at minimum, observe the
set or region of solutions at which the model predicts high rates of consensus.
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CHAPTER V
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AIRMOD
The current chapter summarizes and describes the first element of the overall method-
ology in response to the first half of the research objective. This element in the
methodology generates the alternatives necessary for design down selection and, in
turn, the requirements definition phase for future air mobility systems. The data
created by this model enables the MACRO methodology, discussed in the following
chapter, for consensus reaching in performing the group goal of defining the require-
ments expeditiously with increased transparency.
5.1 Air Mobility and Operations Design Model (AirMOD)
The Air Mobility and Operations Design Model (AirMOD) makes use of the underly-
ing surrogate models previously developed in 2010 at the Georgia Institute of Tech-
nology as part of the Strategic Airlift Comparison Tool (SACT) project for Lockheed
Martin’s analysis on C-5 fleet logistical comparisons. However, no Lockheed Martin
data from these efforts are included in the following sections and references to C-5
data, trends, and costs are publicly available and cited accordingly.
5.2 Strategic Airlift Comparison Tool (SACT) Description
The Strategic Airlift Comparison Tool (SACT) allows one to make comparisons be-
tween two platforms, namely the C-5A and C-5M, in a variety of scenarios across
logistical and operational output metrics.
A screen shot of the tool at initial start-up, and before the user or decision maker
has entered any scenario or comparative data is shown in Figure 19.
Inputs and assumptions such as Aerial Ports of Embarkation (APOE), Aerial
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Ports of Debarkation (APOD), en route refueling locations and other mission scenarios
parameters are defined on the left hand side of the tool. The right hand side is reserved
for displaying the mapped scenario and feasible airfield locations and mission city-
pair, in addition to the output metrics of interest such as the time to close the mission,
fuel consumption, flight hours, etc.
Figure 19: Screen Shot of Strategic Airlift Comparison Tool After Initial Start-up
In terms of layout, each input or output subgroup is designated by an outline
box and associated blue triangle in the top left corner. Each outline box will contain
particular controls to define the scenarios or other parameters, such as mission payload
or fleet size. Using the JMP R©1 standard toolbar, the SACT layout can be readjusted
1JMP is a statistical software package developed by the SAS Institute with advanced visual
analytics capabilities
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for different users or audiences by resizing, closing, and/or cloning various outline
boxes. As a user or group interacts with SACT, different analyses can be executed or
suppressed depending on preferences and specific perspectives such as performance,
financial or political. Some of these boxes and analyses are further described in detail
in the following sections.
5.2.1 Mission Scenario Inputs
The scenario and associated parameters are entered inside the Mission scenario outline
box. An APOE and APOD is selected through a map or list box interface, followed by
a total mission payload. Many parameters are defaulted at start-up such as the fleet
size of 10 for both platforms. These parameters satisfy the requirements of surrogate
models to calculate the logistic output metrics.
5.2.2 Aerial Ports
A variety of methods are available for entering the APOE or APOD desired locations.
Selecting the airfield directly on the map, filtering based on country or airfield name,
followed by accepting the selected airfield by clicking the button labeled “done,” are
all valid ways to select an aerial port to define the scenario. Similar processes can
be performed for selecting the en route or retro en route locations as well. Figure 20
shows one example of filtering to show only airfields in Germany.
5.2.3 Type of Payload and Loading Curves
An option to select the type of payload, such as Pallets or various Combat teams, is
available within SACT to analyze the operational metrics that would be required for
specific missions. A custom payload option can be adjusted for additional types of
payload not listed in the drop down menu.
Each of the payload types will have an associated loading curves displaying the
efficiency of the total carry capacity for the loads on average. For example, the C-5
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Figure 20: Selecting an APOE in SACT
only has a certain number of tie-down locations such that a limit of 36 pallets can
be carried [175]. Thus, certain payloads will not allow the platform to use the total
payload carrying capacity due to volume, called a “cubed-out” condition. Figure 21
shows the loading for such a payload where the average payload per flight will plateau
even if larger payloads are possible.
Figure 21: Loading Curves in SACT
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5.2.4 En Route Location Selection
Since some scenarios include an APOE-APOD airfield pair with distances too far for
C-5 platforms to reach directly, the option to include en route refueling can be applied.
Also, some scenarios might be valid with very small payloads but at such small values
to suggest infeasible operational modes. A threshold can be set to constrain the
smallest payload possible within a scenario. Stopping over to refuel can open up the
operational space at a cost of maintaining that base and the time lost for refueling.
Thus, the main SACT objective to compare the two assets can include, not just
“what” but “how” the platforms deliver cargo with potentially different flights paths
used.
5.2.5 Payload-Range Curves
The Payload-Range (PR) Curve is the main performance differentiator between the
two platforms, the C-5A and C-5M. Figure 22 illustrates the two notional PR curves
for the two platforms. For the specified APOE-APOD distance around 3700 nmi,
the C-5M has a carrying capacity of about 20000 lbs greater than that of the C-5A.
This will equate to difference in output metrics discussed later. Similarly, at different
scenarios the point at which both platforms will lie on the PR curve will update in
real time when using the tool. Lastly, at different ambient APOE temperatures, the
performance and thus PR curves will change accordingly, which can also be entered
in by the user.
5.2.6 Allocated Fleet Size
Comparing the platforms within a fleet is also available within SACT. Adjusting
dynamically the fleet size of one or both of the platforms will result in an appropriate
increase or decrease in the time to close the mission and the other output logistics
metrics. An interactive bar chart shown in Figure 23 shows the current fleet sizes
used as input parameters to the operational surrogate models. Users can click and
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Figure 22: Notional Payload-Range Curve for the C-5A and C-5M
drag the bars based on potential and expected fleet sizes to analyze the impact of a
larger (or a smaller) number of aircraft on the metrics of interest.
Figure 23: Fleet Size Bar Chart for the C-5A and C-5M
5.2.7 Aircraft Break and Repair Times
The break rate and repair times of the two platforms can likewise be updated in
real-time and the output’s sensitivity to these input parameters can be investigated.
A user specifies the probability, in terms of a percentage, that each aircraft will be
found to be non-mission capable due to a broken part, and the distribution of time
required to repair those parts as shown in Figure 24.
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Figure 24: Break and Repair Rates for the C-5A and C-5M
5.2.8 Global Reach and Airfield Locations
The mission scenario is visualized in a Global Reach outline box (shown in Figure
25) which has a number of useful capabilities as well. Comparing or contrasting
the number of airfields that each platform can reach flying direct with the same or
different payloads can be applied. Furthermore, airfields only with sufficiently long
and wide airfields can be shown by filtering out those runways that are too short and
narrow for C-5 aircraft. Lastly, coloring the airfields with additional meta-data can
be performed within this outline box such as elevation or other airfield attributes.
5.2.9 3D Flight Paths
Comparing different flights paths to identify the benefits of different en route refueling
locations can be performed within the tool and projected on a 3D globe as shown
in Figure 25. This capability allows the user to explore additional dimensions with
the system such as political ramifications from requirements to enter various the
airspaces of foreign nations. In Figure 25, three different ways are compared in
delivering payload to a notional scenario in India from the continental US. The first
employs a direct path while the other two have refueling stops in Europe. Some of the
countries over which the flight paths extend may not allow US aircraft to enter their
airspace, and thus the penalty in terms of the operational metrics can be identified
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Figure 25: Map Display of Scenario and Airfields Reachable by Each Platform at
Specified Payloads
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when selecting those scenarios.
Figure 26: 3D Flight Paths of Three Scenarios
5.2.10 Number of Days to Close and Other Output Metrics
The number of days required to close a particular mission scenario and the uncertainty
in that value (via the standard deviation) is presented as a distribution in the output
metrics outline boxes. For a fleet size of 11 aircraft for both the C-5A and C-5M
respectively, the output metrics are displayed on the right hand side of the tool
shown with an example of notional output, in Figure 27.
The distributions of the time to close indicate the expected, best and worst times
that the surrogate models calculate a scenario mission can be complete. The standard
deviation of the distributions will be functions of the break and repair times as entered
by user. The logistics metrics include the cost and amount of fuel consumed for the
entire mission as well as the total flight hours and the utilization. In the particular
example presented in Figure 27, the C-5M fleet close the mission in about 10 days
faster than the C-5A fleet. Furthermore, employing C-5M’s instead of C-5A would
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Figure 27: Time to Close and Other Output Metrics from SACT
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save about 5$ million in fuel cost and over 300 flight hours. Lastly, the aircraft
themselves would be used more at a higher utilization value due to a more reliable
aircraft platform in terms of both break rates and repair times.
5.3 AirMOD Enhancements to SACT
In developing experiments for testing and investigating Hypothesis #1, the AirMOD
platform builds upon the basic functionality of the SACT tool by allowing for batch
mode capability enabling fast Monte Carlo (MC) simulations across scenarios, fun-
damental design parameters (through the payload-range curve), and reliability con-
ditions. The output metrics, including the mean and standard deviation of the time
to close the mission, total fuel consumption, utilization, and total flight hours, have
been maintained from the original surrogate models with necessary changes to the
underlying assumptions such as the threshold for the minimum payloads and fuel
reserve requirements, which are both variable in AirMOD.
Within this updated platform, the comparative analyses are no longer performed
between the C-5A and C-5M models but between different designs (designated as C-X)
from the combinations of inputs and output metrics. Furthermore, large numbers of
MC simulations can be quickly performed to cover the potential design and operation
space for Pareto frontier extraction and eventual decision-making activities examined
by the other research questions and hypotheses.
5.3.1 AirMOD Scenario Definition
A subset of the thousands of SACT airfields possible was down-selected to provide a
manageable set of city-pair combinations for application within the AirMOD model.
These 25 bases or cities are listed in Table 2.
These airfields were primarily selected based on their relative locations such that
most regions of the earth are considered in the possible city-pair scenarios, with
an accompanying wide range of distances. Many of the locations coincide with an
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Table 2: Subset of Locations Used in AirMOD
1 Al Dhafra Air Base 14 Lima
2 Bombay 15 Manila
3 Cairo 16 Mexico
4 Cape Town 17 Moscow
5 Dover Air Force Base 18 Ramstein Air Base
6 Eielson Air Force Base 19 Rota Naval Base
7 Incirlik Air Base 20 Santiago
8 Jakarta 21 So Paulo
9 Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam 22 Sydney
10 Joint Base San Antonio 23 Transit Center at Manas
11 Kandahar Airfield 24 Travis Air Force Base
12 Kunsan Air Base 25 Yokota Air Base
13 Lagos
existing air base currently shared or used by U.S. military forces. Lastly, some city
centers with large populations were included which often contain a relatively large
airfield (longer than 11000 feet), such that most designs with a TOGW larger than
the maximum TOGW for C-5 aircraft are still feasible. These cities would likely
serve as the main service ports for major humanitarian efforts or as a supply base for
regional conflicts.
The 25 locations are illustrated geographically in Figure 28, overlaid onto a world
map shaded in gray.
Figure 28: 25 Locations Available for Scenario Definitions
With 25 locations, the 600 (i.e. 25x24) city-pair or APOE-APOD combinations
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(Aerial Port of Embarkation -Aerial Port of Debarkation combinations) cover a variety
of distances and latitudes/longitudes for each flight path. The great circle distance
between each city pair is projected onto the same world map in Figure 29.
Figure 29: Great Circle Distance and Flight Paths from all 600 APOE-APOD Com-
binations Projected onto a World Map
With the projected great circle distances, airspace analysis for non-ally countries
is also available within AirMOD with an example presented in Figure 30 where the
countries whose airspace is entered during the great circle flight path are highlighted
in red.
Figure 30: Great Circle Flight Path from Dover Air Force Base to Kandahar Airfield
with highlighted countries with airspaces entered
Lastly, a histogram of the distances between the 600 APOE-APOD combinations
is shown in Figure 31, indicating that for a large percentage (30%) of APOE-APOD
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combinations the range exceeds 7000 nmi (the maximum range for C-5 without cargo
[175]). These combinations, of course, would necessitate stopping over en route for
refueling, and similarly for all shorter distances when sufficiently large payloads are
transported.
Figure 31: Great Circle Flight Path Distances for all 600 APOE-APOD combinations
For these more constraining cases, such as with higher payloads, initial filtering can
be applied to the set of APOE-APOD combinations to investigate possible scenarios
with other cargo weights (or even with other aircraft platforms) as shown in Figure
32 where only distances less than 3250 nmi are indicated.
Figure 32: Great Circle Flight Path Distances for all APOE-APOD combinations
with distances less than 3250 nmi
To account for refueling en route (or “retro” en route) AirMOD has 4 distinct
types of scenarios with which to perform simulations:
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• Type 1: Direct flights, no en route or retro en route refueling
• Type 2: En route and retro en route refueling occurs at the same location
• Type 3: En route refueling occurs with direct return flight from APOD to
APOE
• Type 4: Refueling at en route and retro en route locations occur at different
locations
The four modeling types are visualized in Figure 33. Although numerous addi-
tional types of combinations are possible (e.g. multiple en route refueling locations),
these four types are sufficient in exploring the design space while requiring the given
C-X platform to fly at the extremes of the payload range performance capabilities.
Figure 33: AirMOD Modeling Types: Type 1 (top left), Type 2 (top right), Type 3
(bottom left) and Type 4 (bottom right)
Another key parameter considered part of the scenario definition is the total mis-
sion payload. This is expectedly dependent on the mission type (e.g. humanitarian,
regional conflict) but to test the high carrying capacity of the heavy airlift cargo
aircraft, large total mission payloads are entered. A uniform distribution from 10 to
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30 million pounds of cargo is used in randomly creating the scenarios’ total mission
payload in MC simulations.
Finally, to complete the scenario definition required for model simulation, the
total number of aircraft (i.e. fleet size) can vary in a similar fashion with a random
uniform distribution anywhere from 1 to 60. This maximum value of the range was
selected based on the maximum total mission payload of 30 million, and the expected
maximum C-X cargo per flight (i.e. ≈350000 lbs, larger than the C-5’s 270000 lbs
[175]), for 86 total flights. With more than 60 aircraft, this approaches an impractical
level, where most of the aircraft would fly only one or two trips and be underused (or
unused) a majority of the time.
5.3.2 Payload-Range Curve
A payload-range (PR) curve is used to define the model’s multiple C-X designs from
a capability stand point. AirMOD will then use this design (via a PR curve) to
calculate the expected payload per flight, based on the scenario type, for further use
as inputs to the associated discrete event surrogate models.
Four parameters can be entered (or randomly selected in MC simulation mode) to
characterize the PR curve, namely, 1) the maximum take-off gross weight (MTOGW),
2) the maximum range at MTOGW, 3) the ambient temperature, and 4) the reserve
fuel. A fifth parameter, the minimum or threshold payload at which the model will
not execute or fly the missions, can be likewise set. This input represents the payload
at which it is no longer practical to fly from APOE to APOD due to an extremely
long distance. For example, a C-X may be able to transport a small 10000 lbs payload
per flight a distance of 7000 nmi without refueling, but for any substantial amount
of total mission payload (20 million lbs) the cost of transporting the total amount in
such small “chunks” far outweighs the benefit of not stopping to refuel.
For the scope of this current research, and to make use of the surrogate models,
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the range of possible C-X transport capability is set to generally match that of the
C-5 with slightly larger payloads. The range of the MTOGW is simulated between
a range of 250000 and 350000 lbs (i.e. up to 30% more payload than the C-5). The
distance for the MTOGW condition is similarly sampled but in a range from 2500 to
3500 nmi. Beyond this distance, the payload begins to be traded for longer ranges.
The third parameter, temperature, can negatively impact the capability by reducing
the MTOGW and therefore the payload for a given field length and elevation. The
data and related surrogate model calculating this trend was less accurate and thus
this parameter was defaulted to 10◦C so that comparisons were consistent for all
model runs. The fourth and fifth parameters, reserve fuel and minimum payload,
were similarly defaulted to 10000 lbs and 25000 lbs respectively, since these were
considered policy based decisions (i.e. safety policies and operations practicality) and
need to be consistent across all designs.
Figure 34: One Randomly Generated PR Curve with distance and payload at specified
design point (left), Multiple PR curves from MC simulations (right)
The right hand side of Figure 34 shows 1000 randomly generated PR curves from
the associated MC simulations of the aforementioned parameter distributions. Each
PR curve represents a different design which the operational model will employ to cal-
culate the logistical metrics within the particular scenario. (One such design example
is shown in the left hand side of Figure 34).
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5.3.3 Reliability and Repairability Inputs
The current model incorporates five different reliability and maintainability parame-
ters which impact the availability of the aircraft.
The first, called the break rate (expressed as a percentage), defines the proba-
bility that any one flight will be delayed due to part failure, and will thus require
maintenance crews to investigate and perform repair or part replacement operations.
The break rate is effectively the inverse of reliability in that an aircraft with high
reliability will possess a low break rate. The range from which the MC simulations
generate the break rate values is between 0 and 60%, which covers a wide range of
reliabilities, including a current estimate of the C-5’s mission capability of 55% to
60% [174] (or converted to break rates near 40-45%).
The next four parameters define the likelihood or probability of time required to
repair/replace parts once an aircraft is identified as non-mission capable and together
these four parameters will sum to 100%. Each of these four percentages (p) specifies
the probability that repairs will require one of four time periods (ti, i = 1...4): 0-4
hours when i=1, 4-12 hours when i=2, 12-24 hours when i=3, and 24-72 hours when
i=4. For example, if these four percentages (pi, i = 1...4) are 35%, 25%, 30% and
10%, respectively, on average 35% of the flights that are non-mission capable will
require an additional 0-4 hours of time delay to diagnose the problem, repair/replace
parts, etc. Within the model, a uniform distribution within that time period (e.g.
[0,4] hours) will be sampled for the actual simulated repair time.
These four parameters are further combined into an overall expected time to
repair by calculating the weighted sum of the four categories of time periods. In
the example listed above the expected time to repair would be: te =
∑4
i=1 pit̄i =
0.35(2)+0.25(8)+0.30(18)+0.10(48) = 12.9 hrs. On average, with all else being held
constant, scenarios with identical te can be expected to produced similar responses,
therefore only this expected time will be used to reduce 5 parameters down to 2 for
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design display and discrete choice experiments.
5.3.4 Model Inputs and Outputs Summary
A summary of the AirMOD model inputs and outputs metrics is presented in Table
3. Although the scenario is defined with two (or more) locations, these inputs are
converted to great circle distances which is ultimately used in the model calculations.
In a similar fashion, the AirMOD model will use the PR curve to extract the particular
operations point (based on the most constraining leg and distance of the scenario) to
calculate the intermediate payload per flight variable used in the surrogate models.
The output metrics are also used as intermediate values and processed in various ways
as discussed in more detail in the next sections.





APOE (Scenario) Input (Lat, Long) degrees
APOD (Scenario) Input (Lat, Long) degrees
En Route (Scenario) Input (Lat, Long) degrees
Retro En Route (Scenario) Input (Lat, Long) degrees
Type (Scenario) Input 1, 2, 3, 4 -
Total Mission Payload (Scenario) Input [10,30] lbs (millions)
MTOGW (PR curve) Input [250000,350000] lbs
Range at MTOGW (PR curve) Input [2500,3500] nmi
Break Rate Input [0,60] %
Expected Repair Time Input [2,48] hrs
Number of Aircraft Input [1,60] -
Mean Time to Close Output - days
Std. Dev. Time to Close Output - days
Fuel Consumption Output - lbs
Utilization Output 0-24 hrs/day
Flight Hours Output - hrs
5.4 Tradeoff Analysis
With the input ranges defined in the previous section, investigations into the available
trades are necessary to identify the dimensions or factors across which decision makers
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will have different preferences.
Initially, only 40000 simulations were executed within the AirMOD model, 10000
of each type, to obtain a high level, or cursory summary, of the relationships between
the various inputs and outputs.
Figures 35 and 36 show some of the most important input parameters versus the
output metrics of interest, namely, Mean Time to Close (MTTC), Standard Deviation
of the Time to Close (SDTTC), Total Fuel Consumption, Total Flight Hours, and
Utilization. In Figure 35 all four types (i.e. Type 1, 2, 3, and 4) are included with
Type 1 colored in red, Type 2 in green, Type 3 in blue, and Type 4 in orange.
Since some of the points are occluded by each other in this figure, a filtered data
set (presented in Figure 36) shows the same data but only for Type 1. Many of
the same relationships were observed in each of the four types and thus observations
about Type 1 trends and relationships can often be applied to the other three types
unless otherwise specified. The individual subplots from Figure 36 are discussed in
the succeeding figures in more detail.
Firstly, in Figure 36, the most visible trade is found between the payload per flight
and the two outputs of fuel consumption and total flight hours. This is expected since
flying with smaller payloads (perhaps due to “cubing-out” conditions) still requires the
same flight hours (under the assumption of equal block speeds) and thus operational
flight hours are closely correlated to the fuel consumption. In fact, this particular
relationship is tied to many of the trades discussed in this section. That is, larger
aircraft which can carry larger payloads can potentially decrease the total amount of
fuel consumed for some conditions. On the other hand, many smaller vehicles may
consume more resources (in addition to fuel) since more flight hours, crew members,
hangar locations, etc. are necessary, albeit they are all individually smaller or less
fuel consuming compared to a larger vehicle. This, of course, is the financial and
operational motive behind mass public transportation.
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Figure 35: Scatterplot Matrix of various Input Parameters to Operational Output
Metrics for All Types
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Figure 36: Scatterplot Matrix of various Input Parameters to Operational Output
Metrics for Type 1. Individual subplots are discussed in Figures 37 through 45
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5.4.1 Trades Involving Mean Time to Close
From Figure 36 another trade readily visible after zooming in on the range, is the
Number of Aircraft versus the MTTC. Expectedly, more resources available (i.e. the
number of aircraft) will help complete the mission more rapidly. Figure 37 shows a
MTTC range from 0 to 50 with the full range of Number of Aircraft, 1 to 60, broken
out by the four types, as compared to the equivalent top left subplot in Figure 35.
Figure 37: Number of Aircraft versus the MTTC Subdivided by Type
Operationally, the optimal strategy for this sub-trade is to minimize both the
MTTC and number of aircraft. The minimization of these two objectives is inversely
related. For example, increasing the number of available aircraft would decrease the
MTTC, with the opposite result from decreasing the Number of Aircraft. The set of
non-dominated points, which form the Pareto frontier, are found along the bottom
left side edge in each of the four scatterplots of Figure 37. No points, designs or
solutions exist to the left or below this frontier.
However, since only two of the multiple dimensions are shown in Figure 37, this
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edge is only a local Pareto frontier, and does not consider the influences from ad-
ditional design or scenario variables. For example, focusing only on the Type 1
simulations, with an additional 1 million model runs, the simulations result in the
two graphs of Figure 38 after processing.
Figure 38: Number of Aircraft versus the MTTC for Type 1 with highlight Pareto
frontier (left), Pareto frontiers of the same design space for various Mission Payloads
(right)
The exact same relationship is found between MTTC and Number of Aircraft
with the Pareto frontier designated with the black line as found on the left hand side
of Figure 38. The points have been colored according to the total mission payload
for the particular scenario.
For each integer value for the Number of Aircraft, the time to close increases for
larger mission payloads, with the dark red points representing the largest payloads.
This intuitively satisfying result visually reveals a similarly shaped edge separating the
color bands of mission payloads. These edges represent the “set” of Pareto frontiers
across this dimension and are part of the higher dimensional Pareto frontier which
also includes the mission payload scenario parameter.
These are shown more explicitly in the right hand side of Figure 38, where the
minimum MTTC or minimum Number of Aircraft (when the other is held constant)
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for a given mission payload range is indicated.
Of course, Figure 38 shows only three of the multiple dimensions. The dimensional
space of the true Pareto frontier is much higher. For example, breaking out the points
into the same five categories of Total Mission Payload results in Figure 39. This shows
the thick band of impacts that other variables may have above the Pareto frontier
(black lines) for each mission payload category.
Figure 39: Number of Aircraft versus the MTTC for Type 1 with highlighted Pareto
frontiers for each Mission Payload Category
Coloring the same points, not by Mission Payload, but by the size of the aircraft
(i.e. by Empty Weight or Payload per Flight) as shown in Figure 40 more clearly
shows that not only does the total mission payload affect the time to close but the
carrying capacity of each of the aircraft. Not surprisingly, the MTTC is smaller with
larger fleets of large aircraft.
An interesting feature is also observed in the lowest Mission Payload category
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Figure 40: Number of Aircraft versus the MTTC for Type 1 with highlighted Pareto
frontiers for each Mission Payload Categories and colored by Empty Weight
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of Figure 40. The Mean Time to Close does not continually decrease after about
25 aircraft are employed to transport the cargo. For these cases, an excess number
of aircraft are available. For example, if a fleet consists of 50 aircraft, and each
can transport a payload of 250000 lbs, a 10 million pound total mission payload is
transported with just 40 aircraft with one flight each while 10 aircraft are not used at
all. This effect is, of course, more dramatic with larger aircraft in a large fleet with
a scenario involving a small mission payload, but the shape of the Pareto frontier
is consistent with this expected behavior. The minimum mean time to close is also
readily shown by the lowest point in this same category. Regardless of how many
additional aircraft are used, the time to close a mission cannot be faster than the
actual trip time (with associated loading delays, airfield constraints, etc.) for one
flight for every aircraft required to deliver the full mission payload.
Returning to Figure 37, comparing the local Pareto frontier for each of the four
types shows another observation that could be predicted from the “Type” definitions
above. Across all the combinations of high-level design parameters and scenarios, the
MTTC is lowest for Type 1 followed by Type 3, Type 2 and Type 4, in that order.
Stopping to refuel twice, en route and retro en route, (i.e. for Types 2 and 4)
will clearly take more time than Type 1 or 3 which has no refueling stops on the
return flight and only one stop en route for Type 3. For small distances, Type 1
will dominate Type 3 in terms of time to close especially if distances are below the
maximum range at maximum payload. However, at certain distances, the benefit to
stopping over en route for refueling allows each aircraft to fly at a larger payload
per flight, which may “make up” for the time lost due to refueling and other delays
associated with the en route stop (e.g. delays associated with descending, taxing,
taking-off, ascending, etc.). Furthermore, not every en route location will be directly
along the great circle path between the APOE-APOD combination and therefore time
and fuel are lost in traveling to those “off-direct-path” locations. Still, flying direct
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over a long distance with small payloads may be less efficient, more time consuming,
or more costly depending on the scenario.
This trade is partially shown in Figure 41. The points are colored based on the
distance between the APOE and APOD. For long distances (dark red), only Type 2
and Type 4 are able to achieve the missions since the aircraft would be unable to fly
directly there (for Type 1) or back (for Types 1 and 3).
The MTTC is much better (lower) for Type 1 and 3 but for any specific APOE-
APOD combination with a large great circle distance, these types are not feasible.
However, the general trend, even across all types, that a smaller payload per flight
results in a longer time required to close the mission is evident. Lastly, no points
are seen below the constraint imposed upon the model with a practical limit of a
minimum payload per flight of 25000 lbs.
Figure 41: Payload Per Flight versus MTTC subdivided by Type, colored by Distance
between APOE and APOD
5.4.2 Trades involving the Break Rate
Another interesting trend visible in the scatterplot matrix of Figures 35 of 36 is that
between the break rates and the standard deviation for the time to close (SDTTC).
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The same scatterplot, broken down by type, is shown in Figure 42. The overall behav-
ior is consistent with expectations that when the break rate is higher, the SDTTC is
likewise higher. An increased chance that an aircraft requires repairs for every flight,
and the associated delay for the time to repair, will result in a wider spread in the
distribution of the time to close output metric.
Type 1 performs the best among the 4 types, but with the aforementioned qualifier
that many of these points are for shorter distances. The explanation for Types 2 and
4 performing the worst is found in the large number of take-off and landings for en
route and retro en route refueling stops. This equates to additional chances for a
break to occur, based on the parameter assumptions of the model, and will result in
more delays for the time needed to repair or replace parts.
Figure 42: Break Rate versus SDTTC subdivided by Type
Investigating the impact of break rates and mission payload on the MTTC, is also
interesting. In Figure 43, the points are subdivided by Type and also by Mission
Payload. Each subplot shows an increase in the MTTC as the break rate increases to
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different degrees. A similar trend of Break Rate with SDTTC is seen with the MTTC
metric, in that the larger the payload, the larger the number of flights are needed,
and thus a larger number of chances to break down, resulting in a longer time to
close the mission. As before, Types 1 and 3 are superior to Types 2 and 4 for similar
reasons discussed previously and shown most explicitly in the lower graph of Figure
43 which presents the minimum MTTC for each Type and for each Mission Payload
category.
5.4.3 Trades Involving Fuel Consumption and Flight Hours
The third and fourth rows of Figures 35, fuel consumption and total flight hours, are
quite similar since a key intermediate variable used in the calculation for fuel is the
flight hours for each leg of the mission.
The graph on the left hand side of Figure 44 shows the payload per flight versus
the total flight hours with the points colored by the total mission payload, similar
to the payload per flight versus the MTTC figure earlier (Figure 41). Being able
to visualize all of these relationships for the four types on the same graph without
occlusion (as shown on the right hand side of Figure 44) can be accomplished by
normalizing the total flight hours by the total mission payload. The new output,
“Flight hours per Million Pounds”, is more useful in comparing scenarios that differ
in terms of the mission payload. Since larger mission payloads would clearly require
more flights and thus more flight hours, the ratio between these two metrics allows
one to compare across the types in some situations. For example, the right hand side
illustrates that, in terms of flight hours and payload per flight (i.e. a surrogate for
the size of the aircraft), a Pareto frontier exists upon which decision makers can trade
between these two objectives, independent of the mission payload. It also shows the
similarity between Types 2 and 4 in at least these two dimensions. Of course, fuel,
which is, again, highly correlated with flight hours, can be normalized with respect
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Figure 43: Break Rate versus MTTC subdivided by Type and Mission Payload Cat-
egory (top), Break Rate versus Minimum MTTC for each Mission Payload Category
(bottom)
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to the mission payload to acquire the fuel consumed per pound (or a million pounds)
in like manner.
Figure 44: Payload Per Flight versus Total Flight Hours subdivided by Type (left),
Payload Per Flight versus Total Flight Hours per Million Pounds (right),
5.4.4 Trades Involving Utilization
Utilization, found in the bottom row of the scatterplot matrix of Figure 35 has an
interesting relationship with the Number of Aircraft. The left side of Figure 45
presents this same data with the four Types broken out into subplots.
The trade is again evident by noticing that the smaller the fleet size, the more an
aircraft it needed and used assuming everything else being held constant (to meet a
target date for mission completion, for example).
With this particular metric, Utilization, opinions on the correct amount of usage
can vary significantly. Using the aircraft too much increases degradation rates, low-
ering the life of the aircraft, and potentially reducing reliability. However, a small
number of aircraft may have its advantages by reducing the initial fleet acquisition
cost and other life cycle costs such as maintenance, repair part inventories, and labor.
On the other hand, some may argue that a low utilization value is desirable because
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Figure 45: Number of Aircraft versus Utilization subdivided by Type (left), Number
of Aircraft versus Utilization (only for Type 1), colored by Break Rate (right)
the aircraft are not degrading as quickly, costs for supporting the crew are lower (less
flights equals less operating costs), inherent redundancy allows for a larger absolute
number of aircraft to be down due to maintenance (resulting in higher fleet-wide
reliability), and there is the potential to meet more demanding requirements (such
as supporting two concurrent missions). Of course, these advantages come at a cost
since acquiring, storing, and maintaining a larger fleet is clearly more expensive.
The right hand side of Figure 45 shows the same plot for Type 1 with individual
designs colored by the break rate. In this graph, the dark red points on the bottom
edge indicate simulations with a very large break rate. Since break rate would ef-
fectively increase the down time for each aircraft the utilization is correspondingly
lower for these cases. This confirms that the model, at least in this situation, behaves
correctly.
Another trade involving utilization is that which exists with respect to SDTTC.
Figure 46 illustrates this relationship only for Type 1 with the designs colored by
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break rate (dark red equals higher break rates). In order to reduce the uncertainty
in the time to close (i.e. SDTTC), one would necessarily see a higher utilization rate
likely due to a lower break rate. This is also seen directly from the subplot between
utilization and break rate in Figure 35 much earlier.
Figure 46: Utilization versus SDTTC, colored by Break Rate
5.4.5 Other Operational Trades
Plotting the output metrics with respect to each other underscores additional inter-
esting relationships. In Figure 47, the normalized MTTC is plotted by type against
the SDTTC. Coloring by total mission payload (dark red equals higher mission pay-
loads), reveals that, in general, the larger the mission payload the larger the spread
or uncertainty on the time to close (i.e. higher SDTTC). With more flights required
for a higher mission payload come more chances for maintenance events and the cor-
responding repair time delays, which, in turn, cause wider variances in the time to
close distribution.
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Figure 47: MTTC by Million Pounds versus SDTTC, colored by Mission Payload
Other interesting observations involve the minimum normalized MTTC. As de-
scribed before, the Type 1 performs best for MTTC and SDTTC, but the associated
scenarios and APOE-APOD combinations are nearer to each other with no en route
refueling stops. Type 2’s SDTTC is comparable to Type 3’s, but Type 3 performs
much better in terms of time to close, likely due to the direct return flight. Lastly,
Type 4 has the largest SDTTC of all types but sometimes performs better than Type
2 in terms of MTTC. This can occur when the return flight selects a retro en route lo-
cation more optimally situated along the great circle path than the en route refueling
location.
These relationships often come back to one of the fundamental trades in the
currently discussed operational space. Figure 48 displays this basic trade between
the number of flights (which is highly correlated to the number of flight hours and
therefore the fuel consumed) and the payload per flight (which is in turn highly
correlated with the Maximum Payload, Empty Weight, and MTOGW).
135
For each one of the lines representing the same Mission Payload in Figure 48, the
product of the size of the aircraft (expressed through the payload per flight) and the
number of flights required to reach that payload is similar. Thus, many flights can be
performed with smaller aircraft or fewer flights with larger aircraft. This relationship
is independent of the number of available aircraft, but as shown in previous trades,
the larger the fleet size the shorter the time to close. Figure 48 is created from 1
million simulations of Type 1 where the scenario is held constant, varying all other
parameters as discussed previously.
Figure 48: Payload Per Flight versus the Number of Flights, subdivided by Total
Mission Payload Categories
This trade is made more obvious by investigating two points at the extreme ends
of the 30 million pounds Mission Payload “isoline”2. At one point on this isoline, the
payload per flight was set at 161300 lbs, delivering 30 million pounds in 186 flights.
This selected data point had a MTTC of just over 19 days with a fleet size of 29.
2This “isoline” is in fact a mean line for the particular Mission Payload category indicated
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However, a second point, also situated on the 30 million pounds Mission Payload
isoline, only required 109 flights (41% less than the first), but with a much larger
payload per flight of 277100 lbs. This second simulation had a fleet size of 23 and
closed the mission with a MTTC of 14.3 days. Break rates were 42% and 51%
respectively for these two example points. Other combinations of aircraft size, fleet
sizes and break rates will provide other measures of MTTC and SDTTC that can
satisfy a decision maker’s preference on how quickly and with how many aircraft one
can complete a given mission scenario to deliver a certain amount of payload.
For most of the preceding discussion, few comments have been given describing
the costs associated with some of the data points. A decision maker would ideally seek
to concurrently minimize flight hours (and at the same time total fuel consumption)
while minimizing the time to close, the size (i.e. weight) of the aircraft, the break
rate, etc. However, each of these has an associated cost, which typically increases as
the metric’s value decreases. These additional dimensions must be included in the
list of objectives upon which any decision maker can perform trades.
For example, to decrease the break rate, significant R&D funds would be required
to improve the reliability or life of the individual subsystems or other parts of the
aircraft. To decrease the total flight hours, larger payloads per flight are possible but
at a cost of acquiring generally heavier and costlier aircraft. Minimizing the time to
close is always possible with larger fleets but that comes with increased acquisition and
maintenance costs. Lastly, even minimizing the required stops for en route refueling
(e.g. changing from Type 3 to Type 1 for a given scenario) necessitates a more
capable, but simultaneously more expensive, aircraft.
For purposes of the creation of a Pareto optimal set of points on which a group of
decision makers will reach consensus, three kinds of costs have been identified: 1) the
cost to decrease the Break Rate, 2) the Operating Cost (per flight hour), and 3) the
Acquisition Cost. Many other kinds of costs (e.g. manufacturing, maintenance, etc.)
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are available, but the three listed here are sufficient for the scope of this research and
can capture a large portion of the costs from a high-level operational and logistics
view point.
The cost associated with improving the Break Rate is modeled after the behavior
discussed in [2]. Figure 49 shows the general relationship of the relative cost to im-
prove the reliability (i.e. lower the break rate) in a system. Often the reliability can
be improved drastically for a relatively small cost increase, for example, by moving
from point A to point B. Improving the marginal reliability after point B significantly
increases the cost as a percentage of the total cost. Therefore, a much larger per-
centage of cost increases are required to go from point B to C than from point A to
B.
Figure 49: The General Shape of the Reliability-Cost Curve (From [2])
Since the DoD was initially willing to invest $12 billion into upgrading and im-
proving the reliability of the C-5 fleet through the RERP and AMP Programs from a
mission capable value near 60% to 75% [174] (i.e. improving the break rate from 40%
to 25%), the assumption is made that this represents the “low hanging fruit” of the
reliability-cost curve where the cost per reliability increase is flattest. The break rate,
by investing nothing, would potentially remain at 40% (i.e. mission capable value of
60%) which gives the starting point for the reliability-cost curve used in this model.
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Below break rates of 25% the cost would increases exponentially as the time, effort,
and difficulty increases to cause the break rate to approach lower and lower values.
Lastly, as seen in Figure 50, even small decreases in the break rate would require
some associated RDT&E costs and therefore the cost is concave down in the region
of break rates from 40% to 25%.
Figure 50: Reliability-cost Curve Used in the Current Analysis
The second kind of cost is the acquisition cost, or the unit price. Although a variety
of cost estimating relationships exists from a manufacturing, engineering, tooling, or
flight-test perspective [76], for purposes of this research a very basic relationship
between the empty weight and unit cost will be sufficient.
Nicolai and Carichner [114] estimate that the price for the C-5B falls just above
the $400/lb trend line in FY 1993 dollars for a total near $160 million. An official
military specifications sheet estimates the unit cost of the C-5B at $179 million in FY
1998 dollars [175], which would convert to $252 million in FY 2012 dollars, or around
$630/lb after applying an economic escalation factor (i.e. CPI = 1.59, from 1993 to
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2012). For military aircraft, these values also concur with basic trend lines and ranges
($341/lb - $485/lb) estimated by Roskam [135]. This simple ratio will be applied for a
first order approximation for calculating the cost of the larger aircraft designs whose
empty weight (We) to MTOGW ratio is maintained from the C-5 platform estimate.
Lastly, the operating cost will typically include a variety of different sources such
as fuel, oil, crew, day-to-day maintenance, and training, to name a few [114]. Often
the fuel is considered one of the largest contributors to the operating cost which is
highly correlated with the total number of flight hours. Furthermore, the maintenance
costs can also be expressed in maintenance-man hours per flying hour (MMH/FH)
[24]. Hence, total operating costs are often calculated on a per flight hour basis. The
operating cost per flight hour (CPFH) of the C-5 aircraft has been estimated by one
data analyst as high as $47,819 (or even higher by some models) [185] and as low as
$23,100 [174] by the Governmental Accountability Office, who lowered their estimate
to $20,947 [178] in 2009. This most recent value (based on DoD data) will be used
for calculating the expected operating cost for any new aircraft platform.
With the equations or estimating relationships above, the operational metrics can
be converted to a cost to achieve the particular level of performance. Therefore, the
payload per flight versus the number of flights relationship, such as that shown in
Figure 48 earlier, can be recreated in terms of acquisition cost and operating cost
respectively, as shown in Figure 51.
The payload per flight is associated with a particular aircraft design and a certain
MTOGW. Assuming the fuel consumption rates are consistent with current engine
technology, the fuel and empty weight ratios can be extracted and the acquisition
price can be calculated based on We. The number of flights is similarly translated to
a summation of the total flight hours and then multiplied by the CPFH to obtain the
total operating cost for the particular mission scenario.
In Figure 51, each of the five lines represent a particular mission payload category.
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Figure 51: Acquisition Cost versus Total Operating Cost with Categories for Total
Mission Payload
Thus, any point along a particular line can satisfy the mission requirements in terms
of the cost for the two objectives. For example, more expensive (and thus larger
aircraft) would be cheaper in terms of the total operating cost. Smaller and cheaper
aircraft require more flight hours and thus, a corresponding higher operating cost,
but with a lower unit cost.
Of course, the fleet size or number of aircraft would significantly impact the effec-
tive total mission cost (i.e. the sum of operating and acquisition costs), but too few
aircraft in the fleet results in a much higher mean time to close. Thus, both of these
costs can also be traded with the MTTC in this multi-objective decision space.
Furthermore, the cost to improve (lower) the break rate can be traded against the
MTTC and the SDTTC. If a time constraint to deliver a certain amount of payload is
imposed, one can either purchase more aircraft or make the current ones more reliable
by reducing the break rate. Both of these options come at a cost, but either one may
be less expensive in a particular mission scenario. Finally, the cost associated with
maintaining an overseas base such as an en route location for refueling could also be
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included in these trades but no useful cost estimation was found for base maintenance,
and was eventually deemed unnecessary for the scope of the current research, allowing
it to focus on the group decision-making aspects more than the numerous potential
and specific costs associated with the problem.
5.4.6 Summary of Trades
Some of the obvious and fundamental operational trades available in this data set,
described in the previous sections, are listed below with short summaries. The arrows
indicate the common direction (or target) viewed by decision makers on each of the
objectives.
• Mean Time to Close(↓) versus Number of Aircraft(l): Shortening the time to
close can always be accomplished (to a point) by having a larger fleet, but a
larger fleet comes at a larger cost.
• Mean Time to Close(↓) versus Utilization(target): The MTTC can be reduced
by using the aircraft more frequently over a period of time. However, increased
use accelerates degradation and may reduce the life of the aircraft.
• SDTTC(↓) versus Number of Aircraft(l): Having extra aircraft can compensate
for aircraft down for maintenance and would decrease the uncertainty on com-
pletion times. Again, more aircraft equal higher maintenance and acquisition
costs.
• SDTTC(↓) versus Break Rate(↓): Making aircraft more reliable reduces the
uncertainty in the time to close. Decreasing the break rate, though, will still
require costs originated from RDT&E.
• Total Flight hours(↓) versus Payload per Flight(l): As one increases the other
decreases assuming all other factors are held constant.
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• Payload per flight(l) versus Number of Flights(↓): This is similar to trading
acquisition cost for operating cost, or vice versa.
• MTTC(↓) versus Payload per Flight(l): Having larger aircraft can decrease the
time, but larger aircraft are more expensive.
• Number of Aircraft(l) versus Cost(↓): Increasing the fleet size always comes at
an increased cost.
• Number of Aircraft(l) versus Utilization(target): Having an excess of aircraft
means every individual aircraft is used less, but that increases costs for main-
tenance, storage, and even the initial acquisition cost.
• En Route Refueling(↓) versus MTTC(↓): This trade becomes more interesting
based on the distances and locations for the specific mission scenario. Stopping
over to refuel might be faster but it could also be slower for locations significantly
off the direct path.
Additional trades are clearly possible between these and other various inputs, such
as engine technologies acting on the fuel consumption rate, or different constraints on
the safety assumptions such as the required reserve fuel. These, and other variables
like them, were either defaulted or assumed constant throughout this research to a
tractable, but still sufficiently large, decision space.
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CHAPTER VI
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF MACRO TO
CANONICAL PROBLEM
This chapter describes and tests the second major element in the overall method-
ology on a canonical data set to facilitate experimentation and explanation of the
results. The three steps in the MACRO methodology are analyzed through a variety
of experiments examining the effects of such factors as objective space discretization,
methods to create discrete choices, the number of decision makers, the number of
objectives, sequences of coalitions forming, and influence differences.
6.1 Step 1: Calculating Weighting Distributions
The approach described in this research makes the assumption that a set of points,
designs or solutions are available to the decision maker. This is commonly known as
the decision matrix (D) where each row representing a different design will have a
value in each of the columns representing the objectives or dimensions (e.g. speed,
weight, cost) of the design space. Although objectives can take values qualitative
in nature, a further assumption that a translation or mapping from qualitative to
quantitative values in terms of a utility or value function has occurred. A form of
this process will be implemented for the proof of concept in the next chapter. This
chapter assumes the completion of such a task has been applied to the decision space.
Similarly in the canonical problem developed in the proceeding sections, the use
of normalization for the decision space between lower and upper values of 0 and 1
respectively will be assumed where, unless otherwise specified, the higher the value
the better, or more preferred. Correspondingly, the preference direction would be to
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prefer designs with higher values (i.e. utility scores) in each dimension. Thus, the
best or most preferred choice would be that which maximizes the value function (e.g.
utility function or overall evaluation function).
6.1.1 Creation of a Canonical Decision Space
In order to clearly describe and visualize the process of various steps in the method-
ology tested in later sections a simplified set of candidate design points in three di-
mensions is created. A set of 2000 points were randomly selected on the unit sphere
with the constraints for each of the three dimensions (x1, x2 and x3 test) are be-
tween 0 and 1, inclusive, and defining xj = u(xj), or the utility score for the jth
dimension for increased readability. Although many steps of the algorithm presented
do not depend on the number of initial points or designs, the arbitrarily selected
2000 was considered sufficient to illustrate various features of the algorithm without
significantly complicating the visualizations associated with each step.
With these above constraints applied, each point is considered Pareto-optimal in
that each point could be the optimal design based upon the weightings for each di-
mension (in this case three) and the associated utility function or overall evaluation
criterion used to quantify the utility or value of each design. Research in identify-
ing, classifying, and describing the Pareto frontier and Pareto-optimal points is also
outside the intended scope of this work but the reader is referred to [136] for recent
efforts in this domain. However, the current research will assume that this subset of
Pareto-optimal points is known, and the respective dimension values are available to
the decision makers for application of preferences and ultimate design selection.
The 2000 non-dominated (or Pareto-optimal) points are illustrated in Figure 52.
In the 3D graph on the left, the points are relatively equally distributed across the
design space showing the shape of the Pareto frontier, extending from 0 to 1 in each
dimension, x1, x2, and x3. On the right are the histogram plots of the frequencies
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Figure 52: 2000 Points representing a Pareto set of possible decisions illustrated with
scatterplot and multivariate Plots
of each value for each of the three dimensions. Furthermore, 2D scatterplots are
positioned within the multivariate plot to illustrate the near equal and symmetric
distributions of the points in each of the 2-dimensional combinations.
This data set or design space will be referred to numerous times throughout the
analysis and explanations of future sections. In general, the terms design space,
decision space or candidates will refer to this 2000 multi-dimensional set of points
previously described.
6.1.2 Creation of a Set of All Possible Weights
Since the ultimate decision and selected design for a particular problem is so heavily
dependent on the importance a decision maker gives to the various objectives or
dimensions of a design, care must be taken to truly extract the real decision makers’
preference or weights which will be eventually assigned to each objective. Therefore,
the set of all possible weights as a starting point is required, and this set is further
reduce as additional information is acquired or provided by the decision maker. In
this way, the decision maker is not asked to arbitrarily assign values for the objective’s
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importance but respond to comparisons of final designs that are either attractive and
selected or repulsive and rejected.
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subject to:
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The number of rows, m, of W is dependent on the discretization of the range
available, [0, 1] for the weights, since there is an infinite number of combinations
or weighting vectors that satisfy the constraint
∑n
k=1wjk = 1 and the number of
objectives n. If, for example, it is assumed there are three objectives and the range is
discretized into increments of c = 0.5, such that wmn can take on any of three values
0, 0.5 or 1, all six possible weighting vectors are easily computed and are listed in
Table 4.
Table 4: All possible weighting vectors with n = 3 and c = 1
2
j wj1 wj2 wj3
1 1 0 0
2 0.5 0.5 0
3 0 1 0
4 0.5 0 0.5
5 0 0.5 0.5
6 0 0 1
Every row must satisfy the constraint condition above (
∑n
k=1wjk = 1). An equal
number of each of the individual values (0, 0.5 or 1) will occur in each column of the
table or matrix W .
The effect of halving the increment size and thus increasing the number of discrete
weight levels from three (i.e. 0, 0.5, and 1) to five (i.e. 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1)
increases the number of possible weighting vectors from six to 15, as shown in Figure
53, with the associated histogram for each dimension.
The number of occurrences or frequencies in each of the five bins (or discretization
levels) is equal for each dimension but the number of counts of zero is the highest,
since a large number of combinations of weighting values can exist when one of the
n dimension is at zero. Likewise, at the highest bin or discretization level (i.e. 1)
only one weighting vectors exists with that dimension taking on a weighting value of
1 (e.g. [1, 0, 0]).
By increasing the number of discretization levels from 3 to 20, (or similarly, by
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j wj1 wj2 wj3
1 1 0 0
2 0.75 0.25 0
3 0.5 0.5 0
4 0.25 0.75 0
5 0 1 0
6 0.75 0 0.25
7 0.5 0.25 0.25
8 0.25 0.5 0.25
9 0 0.75 0.25
10 0.5 0 0.5
11 0.25 0.25 0.5
12 0 0.5 0.5
13 0.25 0 0.75
14 0 0.25 0.75
15 0 0 1
Figure 53: All possible weighting vectors with n = 3 and c = 0.25 with associated
histogram




, and so on, to 1
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) the relationship between the increment
c and the number of weighting vectors m can be identified and is presented in the
upper left graph of Figure 54 where n is held constant at 3. As the increment size
decreases, m increases evidently faster than exponentially after converting the y-axis
to a logarithmic scale in the upper right graph.
When holding the number of discretization levels constant at 3 (i.e. c = 0.5) while
increasing the number of dimensions n from 3 to 20, the number of possible weighting
vectors increases rapidly (bottom left), but slightly slower than exponentially, as
shown in the logarithmic y-axis of the bottom right figure.
When varying both n and c over the same ranges (i.e. 3 to 10), the tabulated
results of m in Table 5 shows that the number of possible weightings will be symmetric
about the diagonal of the table or matrix.
Plotting these values shows the increase in m when the number of dimensions
increases and when the increment size decreases shown in Figure 55. The lowest line,
where the number of discretization levels is three, is the same from Figure 54. The
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Figure 54: Number of weighting vectors over a range of c while n = 3 (top), and over
a range of n while c = 0.5 (bottom)









c n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8 n=9 n=10
3 0.5 6 10 15 21 28 36 45 55
4 0.333 10 20 35 56 84 120 165 220
5 0.25 15 35 70 126 210 330 495 715
6 0.2 21 56 126 252 462 792 1287 2002
7 0.167 28 84 210 462 924 1716 3003 5005
8 0.147 36 120 330 792 1716 3432 6435 11440
9 0.125 45 165 495 1287 3003 6435 12870 24310
10 0.111 55 220 715 2002 5005 11440 24310 48620
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Figure 55: Number of possible weighting vectors for n and c (both varied from 3 to
9)
additional lines are for smaller values of c (or a larger number of discretization levels).
The increment value is labeled on the graph for when n=9, and the legend indicates
the color associated with each value for the number of levels.
Lastly, since Table 5 was symmetric about the diagonal for similar ranges, the
current x-axis variable n can be traded with the c (or more specifically with the
number of discretization levels) without changing the exact values in the graph, with
the exception of the labels which would then be applied along the top most line
associated with n = 9.
A recognition of this rapid increase in the size of W is crucial for further steps since
its size has a large impact on the required computational expense. If the set of all
possible weighting vectors is too large, the available memory for computer simulations
can be insufficient and its computational speed can be prohibitively slow.
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Figure 56: Histograms for the frequency of values of discretized levels in W for: n = 5
and c = 0.2 (top), n = 7 and c = 0.2 (middle), and n = 7 and c = 0.1 (bottom)
6.1.3 Visualizing the Set of Possible Weighting Vectors
The histogram introduced in Figure 53 will be one way to visualize W in explaining
how discrete choices affect the decision space through the preference space. The
particular shape of the histogram is likewise dependent on the values for c and n.
A few different combinations are presented in Figure 56. Regardless of the number
of dimensions, the most common value will be zero with only one occurrence of the
value 1 contained within the respective dimension column (i.e. the standard basis
vectors, ei [25], for the axes in a generalized Cartesian coordinate system).
Similarly, a plot visualizing all the individual weighting vectors in n-space will
facilitate the identification of regions or clusters of vectors that approach the true
decision makers preference. Figure 57 created for n=3 at different increment values
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Figure 57: Weighting vectors (from W ) where n=3: c=0.5 (top left), c=0.25 (top
right), c=0.2 (bottom left), c=0.1 (bottom right)
illustrates the effect on the number of possible weighting vectors as m increases (or c
decreases) and where they are located in a 3D graph. For n=2, the weighting vectors
would be distributed equally along a line from [1, 0] to [0, 1] shown by the “lowest
layer” in Figure 57 when wx3 = 0. All but the bottom right plot in Figure 57 have
an equivalent point in Figure 55.
For three dimensions (n=3), all of the weighting vectors will lie on a plane defined
by the three points [1, 0, 0], [0, 1, 0], and [0, 0, 1]. In general, for n-dimensions, the
weighting vectors from columns in the n-dimensional identity matrix (I) will define
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Figure 58: Two views of a discretized preference space of a 4-dimensional design
space, c = 0.1
the hyper-volume within which all rows of W will be contained.
Four dimensions can be visualized since the preference space falls onto a n-1
dimensional space without overlap, as shown from two angles in Figure 58: one from
the front and one from the side (turned 90◦ clockwise as viewed from the top). Also,
the points have been given additional shading and size to help illustrate the depth or
the extent of the volume when filled.
Making use of these visualizations can assist in understanding how a decision
maker converges upon a preference for multi-dimensional design spaces without any
explicit objective comparisons such as that required by other methods (e.g. AHP
[141]).
6.1.4 Design Space Knowledge from a Single Discrete Choice
Under the assumption that a particular decision rule and associated utility function
can be either explicitly or implicitly applied across the decision space, the first step
in identifying a decision maker’s preferences for the objectives themselves (i.e. the
weighting distributions) and thus the more preferred designs, is by eliciting infor-
mation through a discrete choice. This elicitation is described as a discrete choice
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Figure 59: Example of a Discrete Choice Experiment of the Canonical Design Data
Set
experiment summarized in a previous chapter 3.10.
By asking the decision maker to compare two from the 2000 candidate designs
(such as that in Figure 59), and selecting the preferred one, information about the
preferences or weightings can be extracted by eliminating weightings which are not
consistent with the discrete choice. This, in turn, reduces the uncertainty about the
preference structure or importance weighting on any one objective.
After only one discrete choice (between randomly selected designs #1569 and
#946) the possible or feasible weights that correspond with this revealed preference
are reduced by almost half as shown in Figure 60. In this figure (and in similar figures
throughout the following discussion), the solid blue markers (i.e.•) indicate possible
weighting combinations, whereas the red open circle markers (i.e.◦) indicate weights
that are not possible under the assumed discrete choices made, or in other words,
the preferences revealed through these preference decisions between two individual
designs.
For example, the weighting vector w52 = [0.4, 0, 0.6] which is located at the upper
most solid circle in the current orientation of Figure 60, remains a potential weighting
combination which could still represent the decision maker’s true preferences. At this
weighting, w52 = [0.4, 0, 0.6], design #1569 has a utility values of 0.402 and design
#946 has a utility values of 0.398. The response of the discrete choice is consistent
with the possibility that the decision maker’s true preference is [0.4, 0, 0.6]. After
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Figure 60: Feasible Weights (solid blue circle) After One Discrete Choice Comparing
Design #1569 and #946
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all, the vector does result in a higher utility value (i.e. 0.402) and the decision
maker preferred it over design #946 suggesting this vector may yet represent their
true preference. Thus, w52 is kept within the set of possible weighting vectors (and
displayed with a blue solid circle in this and other later figures).








































On the other hand, the weighting vector of [0.3, 0, 0.7] (the red open circle marker
just above and to the right of the previously discussed vector) is not possible in
representing the decision maker’s true preference. At this weighting, the utility values
are 0.375 and 0.420 for design #1569 and design #946, respectively. Since the decision
maker chose design #1569 as better, this weighting vector is inconsistent with the
revealed preference and cannot be used as a potential or possible weighting vector.
Hence, it is removed from the set of possible weightings.
These two particular weighting vectors from W and the related discrete choice
data are shown in Table 6.
If the decision maker instead preferred design #946 over #1569 then the inverse
is true. That is, the weighting vector [0.4, 0, 0.6] is not possible and the weighting
vector [0.3, 0, 0.7] would be. This would of course flip the designations of each of
these points in Table 6 and Figure 60 would be converted to the image on the right
hand side of Figure 61.
Returning to original discrete choice (#1569  #946), an associated plot of the
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Figure 61: Feasible Weighting Vectors (filled in circles) After One Discrete Choice of
Preferring Design #1569 Over #946 (left), and vice versa (right)
design space can now be updated to reflect the preference applied. (See Figure 62 in
which design #1569 is indicated with a black square while design candidate #946 is
a black triangle.)
The designs or points which are likely not to be desirable based on this discrete
choice have been changed to unfilled circles colored in red, similar to the prefer-
ence graph on the left of Figure 62. Since, from the preceding discussion, some of
the weighting vectors cannot represent the decision maker’s true preference they are
eliminated. The corresponding designs which are optimal for those “now infeasible”
weightings are similarly removed from the set of candidate designs. The apparent line
of demarcation separating the feasible and infeasible designs represents the extent of
information gleaned from one discrete choice.
Consider the previous example of investigating the weighting vectors w52 = [0.4, 0,
0.6] and w57 = [0.3, 0, 0.7], where the former w52 was kept as feasible. Two other points
#296 [0.56, 0.047, 0.825] (feasible) and #1968 [0.520, 0.055, 0.853] (rejected) are
relatively close to each other in terms of their objectives’ values. Table 7 summarizes
the utility values at the two weighting vectors for these two points.
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Figure 62: Feasible Weighting Vectors (filled in circles) After One Discrete Choice of
Preferring Design #1569 Over #946 (left), and Preference Mapped to Design Space
(right)





w52 =[0.4, 0, 0.6]
U() with
w57 =[0.3, 0, 0.7]
#269 [0.56, 0.047, 0.825] 0.720 0.746
#1968 [0.520, 0.055, 0.853] 0.719 0.753
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From the utility values from Table 7, if one’s preference was w52 then #269 is
preferred, but if w57 is the true preference then #1968 is preferred. However, since
the discrete choice made previously already ruled out w57 as a possible weighting
vector one can similarly rule out design #1968. The underlying assumption in this is
that one’s preferences must take on the values available to the weighting vectors at
increment of c. In reality, there exists a weighting vector such that the utility values
are identical for any two designs. In this instance, the weighting vector would clearly
fall between the two points [0.4, 0, 0.6] and [0.3, 0, 0.7], and is solved with the system
of equations:
U(d269)− U(d1968) = 0 (8)
dT269(w)− dT1968(w) = 0





w : A weighting vector
n : Total number of objectives.
In this simplified case discussed here, the weighting vector which satisfies the
above equation is approximately [0.3879, 0, 0.6121], which is “between” the two
previous weighting vectors above. If the increment value c was much smaller (as it
is in Figure 63), then the preference space would have shown all weighting vectors
in between [0.3879, 0, 0.6121] and [0.4, 0, 0.6] as feasible and those between [0.3879,
0, 0.6121] and [0.3, 0, 0.7] as infeasible. Not surprisingly, the highest accepted point
and nearest the rejected weighting vector in Figure 63 are [0.4, 0, 0.6] and [0.39, 0,
0.61] respectively. The further refinement of the preference space will be performed
on local regions about which additional discretization will be warranted.
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Figure 63: Feasible Weights (solid blue circles) After One Discrete Choice Comparing
Design #1569 and #946 with c=0.01
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To reduce the whole set of candidate designs, this process amounts conceptually
to identifying the hyperplane normal to the vector between the two designs (from
the discrete choice experiment) which also bisects the same vector. Any design point
closer to the preferred option is still feasible, while any point closer to the rejected
design is similarly rejected. This explains the apparent straight line along the Pareto
frontier in Figure 62 separating blue and red points, or acceptable and rejected de-
signs, respectively.
After one simple discrete choice, a large portion of the feasible design space has
been removed. In fact, the number of feasible designs drops almost by 50% from the
initial 2000 to 1098. Similarly, the number of possible weighting vectors, originally
at 66 when c=0.1, is now reduced to 33, exactly half.
To complement Figure 62 a histogram of the weighting vectors can show this
reduction where the highlighted or darker areas represent when wj is feasible. Based
upon the ranges of the highlighted bins, the data suggests that the first objective (i.e.
x1) could be more important than the others because most vectors with a wx1 value
less than 0.3 has been rejected. The word “could” is essential since there exists the
possibility that the true preference of objective 1 is less than the others but never
can wx1 take on a value less than 0.2 based upon this one discrete choice. In fact, of
the remaining 33 vectors possible, 24 of them have a wx1 greater than the value of
wx2 , and 28 of them greater than wx3 , suggesting that already some useful preference
information is available after one simple discrete choice, in at least a simplified 3-
dimensional design space.
6.1.5 Design Space Knowledge from Multiple Discrete Choices
In the previous sections, the canonical problem introduced has thus far only included
one discrete choice - essentially a judgment about which of two designs is more pre-
ferred. All the preference information was inferred from this decision of a simple
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Figure 64: Histogram of Feasible Weighting Vectors (highlighted)
proposition, “which one is better?” resulting in some very rudimentary findings.
With additional discrete choice experiments, this greater knowledge is expressed
as a reduction in uncertainty about the true preferences of a particular decision maker.
Of course, this added information comes at a cost in terms of additional judgments
or comparisons between designs by the design maker. Thus, the first occasion to
implement a satisficing strategy has arisen. If sufficient certainty about the decision
space has already been acquired, then there is no need for further discrete choices,
and a “good enough” state has already been obtained. An example of this could
be a decision-making technique that only requires the various objectives ordered in
terms of most to least important. Although there remains large uncertainty about the
order a rough estimate may be sufficient. Furthermore, if multiple decision makers are
each asked one discrete choice, the distributions of ordered objectives for all decision
makers might be insightful.
Still, a research question is needed to identify the relationship between how many
discrete choices are needed and what level of accuracy is acceptable.
Research Question: How many discrete choice experiments are needed to reach
a particular level of certainty about the true preferences of a decision maker?
The answer to this question is clearly dependent on some of the factors introduced
in the previous sections including the number of objectives n, the size of the increment
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c, the decision rules and potentially the number of candidate designs and shape of
the Pareto frontier.
Consider for example four random discrete choices on the same design data set
previously described, which are illustrated in Figure 65.
Figure 65: Feasible and Infeasible Designs and Weighting Vectors for four Different
Randomly Selected Discrete Choices (one for each column)
The top row shows the designs which have been rejected (empty circles) and
feasible (solid circles) based on the preferred design. The matching graph directly
below shows the associated preference space for each discrete choice.
These examples all show a different portion of the design space excluded from
further consideration. Furthermore, the number of feasible designs (from the original
2000) are different based upon the two randomly selected choice designs, with some
including a large majority while others include a minority of the points. The choice
represented in the second to last set of graphs has a subset of feasible points completely
“inside” the last set of graphs. This means that no new useful information would have
been acquired had the choices been asked in a left to right order. In other words, all
the feasible vectors remain feasible after the last discrete choice. The assumption is
that effort is wasted, in the form of useless experiments, if purely random discrete
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choices are made without accounting for their capacity (or lack thereof) to provide
more information.
6.1.6 Experiment to Test Effects of Methods on Randomly Selected Dis-
crete Choices
In order to test the above assumption, two methods to establish a sequence of discrete
choices was performed drawing from the pool of 2000 candidate design points.
In the first method, two randomly selected designs are drawn from the full set
of candidate designs in each iteration (i.e. discrete choices from any 2 of the 2000).
The second method is identical to the first except that the pool of candidate designs
decreases with each iteration after applying the filtering process of removing infeasible
designs from previous discrete choices.
Figure 66: Method 1. Sequence of eight discrete choice experiments applied to the
design space. Feasible Designs - filled in blue circles, Infeasible designs - open red
circles. Axes removed for readability.
In Figure 66, method 1 is implemented with two designs randomly selected from
the full set of candidate designs, both feasible and infeasible. Interestingly, after the
first three discrete choices, no improvement in terms of reducing the set of feasible
designs is observed until the 8th discrete choice. Although, the first three discrete
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choice experiments made large reductions in the feasible set, the first method fails
to reduce the set for three iterations in a row, signifying wasted efforts in terms of
unnecessary discrete choices or decisions. For method 1, after eight discrete choice
experiments, the number of feasible designs has been reduced to 37.
Figure 67: Method 2. Sequence of eight discrete choice experiments applied to the
design space. Feasible Designs - filled in blue circles, Infeasible designs - open red
circles. Axes removed for readability.
Figure 67 show a sequence of eight discrete choice experiments also mapped to
the design space where the infeasible designs have been removed as they would not
be preferred based on upon the responses from previous discrete choices. This figure
is a representation of method 2 where randomly selecting designs within the feasible
set is implemented as evident from the dark triangle and square (i.e. the two designs
compared) both falling within the feasible region of the previous iteration. In other
words, the ‘i + 1’th iteration will take feasible designs from the ith iteration to ran-
domly select two designs. For method 2, after eight discrete choice experiments, the
number of feasible designs has been reduced down to 19.
The difference between these two methods is most apparent when comparing the
number of feasible designs for each iteration as shown in Figure 68.
166
Figure 68: Reduction in feasible designs, Method 1 (red) vs. Method 2 (blue)
The lack of improvement from iterations 4 to 7 for method 1 is contrasted against
the guaranteed reduction of method 2. With fewer than 6 iterations, method 1 appears
to be better at reducing the feasible set, but since only one execution will not account
for random effects, multiple repetitions are required to compare the difference more
accurately when investigating this stochastic nature of the two methods.
A set of 1000 repetitions for the same two methods were executed and the results
are shown in Figures 69 and 70. For method 1, after only two discrete choices,
six of the total simulations (i.e. 0.6%) resulted in a feasible number of designs of
just 1, but almost 15% of the simulations (146/1000) still had 100 or more feasible
designs. Method 2 on the other hand required 4 iterations at a minimum to reach
only 1 feasible design but with 10 iterations the greatest number of feasible designs
remaining was 39.
The equivalent statistical figure on the right hand side of Figures 69 and 70 are
more revealing, showing the minimum, maximum and mean number of feasible designs
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per iteration for each method. The approximately straight line in Figure 70 for
iterations less than 8 suggest that on average the number of feasible designs will
be halved, or, in other words decreases exponentially with approximately the decay
constant of ln(2) or 0.693. Fitting the model with such an exponential, results in
a calculated λ of 0.688. Method 1 apparently does not decay exponentially (i.e.
sublinearly) and on average after 20 iterations will still have almost 15 feasible designs.
Figure 69: 1000 Executions of Method 1
Figure 70: 1000 Executions of Method 2
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Figure 71: Comparing Method 1 and Method 2 for n = 3 to 6
An obvious question can be asked if these trends hold for more than three dimen-
sions (n > 3).
Research Question: What is the effect of increasing the number of dimensions
on how discrete choices are selected?
Repeating this same experiment for n = 3 to 6 results in Figure 71 where there is
no increase in performance for method 2, where the three sets of points (i.e. n = 3,
4 and 5) directly overlap the red line (where n = 6). However, method 1 does show
improvement with increased n, in that a fewer number of feasible designs are kept for
a fewer number of discrete choices (or iterations). Still, method 2 is superior for all
dimensions tested and likely only as n approaches very large numbers would method
1 asymptotically approach the behavior for method 2.
The results suggests that with more dimensions the likelihood that two randomly
selected designs from the entire pool or set of designs will reject at least some designs
is higher. That is, the chance that one of four numbers (a 4-dimensional design point)
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for example, is significantly different from the associated objective in a separate 4-
dimensional design is higher than with 3 dimensions. But even this result could vary
with a different Pareto frontier or design space, where grouping of designs and other
concave/convex areas are possible.
6.1.7 Effects of Selection Method on Preference Space
Following the previous section’s discussion on the reduction of feasible designs for
every discrete choice, the equivalent preference space and possible weighting vectors
are similarly reduced.
While considering method 2 as more efficient, as established from the analysis
from the previous section, and applying the same set of discrete choices from before,
results in Figure 72 shown across the preference space. For this set, only one possible
weighting vector has not been rejected after 6 discrete choices. However, on the design
side, 49 candidate designs remain as potentially the “best” design. In this example,
the last remaining weighting vector, w25, is [0.5, 0.3, 0.2]. Applying w25 to the design
space results in the one optimal design point d162 = [0.813 0.485 0.323], which, not
surprisingly, has a fairly large x1 value (i.e. the 83rd percentile) and decreasing in
value for x2 and x3 in that order, for a utility score of 0.616.
To illustrate the same narrowing of the preference space for each of the dimensions,
the histograms of only the feasible weight vectors are shown at the beginning and after
each discrete choice in order from left to right in Figure 73. In this illustration the
x1 objective is set at the top followed by x2 in the middle row and then x3 across the
bottom. For each objective the possible weighting vectors slowly coalesce around the
weighting of w25 = [0.5, 0.3, 0.2].
Of course, one could stop the algorithm at this stage and take d162 as the final
solution but since there are 48 other designs which haven’t been rejected and the
increment value c was only set at 0.1, there remains uncertainty that w25 represents
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Figure 73: Histograms of possible weighting vectors after each discrete choice in order
for x1, x2 and x3
171
the true decision maker’s preference and that d162 is their true optimum.
This leads to the next research question:
Research Question: How can the preference space be further specified to guar-
antee that only one design choice is optimal based upon a set of discrete choices while
minimizing the number of discrete choices?
The initial answer to this question can of course be to decrease c from the very
outset such as that in Figure 63. With c = 0.01 implementing the same of number
discrete choices from the previous example (i.e. 6), m decreases to 49, but 76 possible
weight vectors remain. An additional 7 more discrete choices are needed to reduce
W to keep one valid w and one remaining design (i.e. d877). This last w, with
values [0.44, 0.28, 0.28], is expectedly close to the wc=0.125 = [0.5, 0.3, 0.2], but clearly,
greater precision about the preference space has been obtained (at the cost of more
discrete choices). This results in the optimum design at point d877 which contains
values [0.736, 0.475, 0.482]. Although, only one design remained for one possible w,
a similar situation could arise where even an increment value of 0.01 was too large
to completely specify on optimal design. However, this would unnecessarily increase
the computational requirements for each step and, in addition, increase the number
of discrete choices needed for low uncertainty about the true preference.
An experiment to test these opposing effects of reducing the number of discrete
choices for minimizing the computational load while reaching as rapidly as possible
a narrow distribution for w was performed. This experiment began with a “coarse”
W (i.e. with c = 0.25) and then further refined W (i.e. local c < 0.25) after each
discrete choice.
The series of discrete choices followed by a refining step of the feasible weighting
vectors is show in Figure 74.
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After Discrete Choice #1
⇒
After Refinement #1
After Discrete Choice #2
⇒
After Refinement #2
After Discrete Choice #3
⇒
After Refinement #3
Figure 74: Three discrete choices each followed by a refinement step with c = 0.1,
0.05 and 0.025 respectively from top to bottom. (Marker size is reduced after each
step to show detail.)
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Expectedly, the total number of weighting vectors increase at each refinement
step while the total possible weighting vectors can fluctuate based upon when, in
a series of discrete choices, a refinement step is executed. This is shown in Figure
75 where, for the same set of discrete choices, the first five iterations are followed
by a refinement step as indicated by the red line jumping up to a larger number of
weighting vectors. The blue line represents the number of possible weighting vectors
after the refinement process, which is in agreement with the previous discrete choices.
The difference between these lines directly after the refinement step (i.e. the “vertical”
portions) is equal to the number of weighting vectors before and after the refinement
step which can appears differently on the logarithmic y-scale figure. For example,
before refinement step #5: the number of possible w is 724 while the total number of
w is 2052 (a difference of 1328). After refinement step #5: the number of possible w
is 7195 and the total number of w is 8523 (the difference is again 1328). This confirms
what the refinement algorithm is design to accomplish by only adding valid weighting
vectors, which was also visible before in Figure 74.
Figure 75: Number of iterations versus number of total weighting vectors, possible
weighting vectors and remaining feasible designs with associated scatterplot repre-
sentation
Also, in this example, after 5 refinement steps, the increment c has decreased
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initially from 0.1 to 0.003125 ( 0.1(1
2
)ir , where ir is the number of refinement steps.
Since the refinement algorithm takes into consideration the ranges of the acceptable
weighting vectors in each dimension and with increasingly smaller values of c, the
number of added possible weighting vectors could increase exponentially as well. This
is also evident by the general positive slope of the “stair case” line of the total number
of weighting vectors on a logarithmic y-axis.
Finally, with just over 8500 weighting vectors, only 99 remain possible or valid in
a very small range for wx1 , wx2 , and wx3 as shown by the very small blue region in
the same figure. (Figure 75.)
The equivalent histogram for each iteration is shown in Figure 76 from top left to
bottom right.
Figure 76: Histograms of possible weighting vectors (only for wx1) after each of 10
discrete choices with refinement steps between the first five in the series
Since multiple histograms are difficult to interpret for each iteration, the equivalent
data is presented on the left side in Figure 77 but with all dimensions overlaid for the
same iteration history.
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Figure 77: Number of iterations versus the overlapping range of possible weighting
vectors
The thick colored solid lines in Figure 77 indicate the median value of the weighting
vector for that particular dimension. In this example, each dimension started at a
median value of 0.29 when c = 0.1, or, in other words, the centroid of the histogram
from the full set of initial weighting vectors lies at a value of 0.29. This value will
increase or decrease per iteration based upon the results of the previous discrete
choice experiments and the weighting vectors that will be eventually removed from
the feasible set.
Each dimension also shows the equivalent minimum and maximum value for each
iteration. Therefore, the three points provide some statistical detail as to the shape
of the histogram without recording it at each iteration for each dimension. The solid
black line at the bottom indicates the increment size at each iteration. This values
starts at c = 0.1 and is halved at each refinement step. On the right hand side of
Figure 77, refinement steps are similarly applied after each of the first five discrete
choices (with evidently different preferences responded to the discrete choices, such
that the x2 is most important followed by x1 and then x3). Interestingly, even after
five discrete choices the potential for the x2 objective to be the only objective remains
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possible (i.e. wx2 = 1, when i = 1...5).
6.1.8 Analysis of Stopping Criteria on Preference Extraction
Another key difference between the two simulations in Figure 77 is the total number
of iterations before the algorithm stopped based on the designs currently remaining
and the random selection of those remaining designs. Referring back to Figure 70
(where on average 11 or more iterations are required to reduce the feasible design set
to two or less), in the right hand side of Figure 77, the simulation required exactly 11
for the algorithm to conclude while the left hand side required 13. Since the number
of feasible designs is not influenced by the increment value, this behavior is expected
regardless of the number of refinement steps and at point in the series these steps are
applied. The matrix of simulations in Figure 78 show the variability in the number
of iterations needed for convergence of the weighting ranges and when, in terms of
iterations, refinement steps are executed.
In the plots of Figure 78, the algorithm continued until no more feasible designs
were available for discrete choices. However, the stopping criterion does not neces-
sarily need to be the number of feasible designs remaining. In fact, since the decision
maker’s preference space is the real goal that this step seeks to define in the overall
methodology, a more useful criterion could be a threshold on the ranges of the re-
maining weighting vectors (e.g. when each range per dimension for W is less than
0.1), or when a ranked order of the dimensions is evident (i.e. no overlap between
ranges of dimensions of W ), or, of course, simply setting the total number of discrete
choices (i.e. total number of iterations) at a predetermined value which the decision
maker is willing to consider. For example, if the decision maker has time to only
answer 5 discrete choice experiments then this clearly would be the limiting factor in
reducing the ranges of W .
A research question at this point is posed regarding the stopping criterion for this
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Figure 78: Matrix of 9 sample simulations of Step 1
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step in the methodology.
Research Question: What stopping criterion for discrete choice experiments
should be used to extract the preferences of a decision maker?
As mentioned, the answer for this is of course dependent on the number of dis-
crete choices a decision maker is willing to consider. However, if a decision maker’s
“resources” are effectively unlimited, or in essence, the comparisons are relatively
inexpensive and any number can be performed (within reason), the two other afore-
mentioned possibilities can be subject to comparison (i.e. W ranges are less than x,
or dimension order is identified) in experiments.
Simulating the above discrete choice experiments 1000 times, with the same 2000
candidate designs for each of these two stopping criteria, creates the outputs displayed
in Figure 79. The minimum number of iterations to obtain a determined ordered
preference is shown in a histogram on the left. However, slightly more than 10%
of the simulations never reached sufficient separation in terms of the ranges for W
suggesting that for some preferences, especially if two or more objectives have equal
or near equal importance values, the ranges will be expectedly coincident and thus
no true order can be ascertained. Still, since some decision-making techniques use
preference order as opposed to preference weightings (or importance values for the
objectives), this may be a more useful and efficient way to stop the algorithm.
On the right of Figure 79, the heat map illustrates when the stopping criteria is
set for different range values, showing that the number of iterations required to reach
increased levels of certainty in the ranges must likewise increase. The mean lines for
the range of wx1 , wx2 and wx3 are almost over top of one another indicating that each
of the three dimensions follow similar behavior.
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Figure 79: Number of required iterations for, 1) the preference order to be completely
specified (top), and, 2) certain range values for wxj (bottom)
A related topic is when and how the refinement steps should be applied. Refine-
ment steps come at a cost computationally, but are essential to differentiate prefer-
ences when importance values for two or more objectives are equal or, at least, close
in value (e.g. the left simulation example of Figure 77). In the previous simulations,
a refinement step was executed when the number of possible weighting vectors was
less than the arbitrarily set value of 100 weighting vectors (a number somewhat con-
servative for only 3 dimensions). This allows a trade between setting the increment
c too small early in the simulation and the computation expense required for smaller
values of c.
Further, in the above simulations, to guarantee that a weighting vector is always
possible, the discrete choice experiments are selected based on halving the preference
space in each iteration for the largest range of the n dimensions. Thus, if the range
for wx1 is currently from 0.3 to 0.6, a discrete choice will be given to make the range
from 0.3 to 0.45 or from 0.45 to 0.6 after the decision maker’s response. The range of
180
the other dimensions will also likely be reduced but not to such an extent. If, after
the discrete choice, one of the other ranges are now larger than 0.15, then the next
discrete choice experiment would focus on that dimension to “halve.”
6.1.9 Visualizing N-decision makers’ preferences
Since the overall objective is to facilitate and accelerate group decision making, the
desire is to have each decision maker, in parallel, perform a similar set of responses
to a series of discrete choice experiments. This enables the rapid extraction of the
individual preferences and allows for the execution of future steps (i.e. Steps 2 and
3) in the methodology which will use this information for power relationships and
reaching consensus.
Since each decision maker will in general face a different series of discrete choices
revealing their preferences, a useful graphic indicated which areas of the design space
are more readily accepted or rejected is presented in Figure 80.
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Figure 80: Three decision makers’ revealed preferences and associated acceptable or
rejected designs
The top row of plots in Figure 80 shows the histogram ranges and median weight-
ing vector for each iteration. Decision Maker #2 responded to 10 while #3 responded
to 13 discrete choices respectively. The bottom row illustrates the regions where de-
signs would have been rejected more often based upon the responses of each decision
maker. Therefore, the red regions or patches are designs rejected in a large majority
of the discrete choices (i.e. 8 or more of the discrete choices), while the blue/purple
patches suggest more acceptable or feasible designs according to the given prefer-
ences. (The dark purple markers indicate regions that have never been rejected in
all discrete choices). The lines of demarcation are clearly visible for each additional
discrete choice that removed a particular design from candidacy.
Of course, for consensus reaching in group decisions, investigating the design re-
gions where the group has universally rejected designs can be useful. In Figure 81,
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the preference space applied to the design space is combined to identify design regions
which together the group considered feasible or infeasible. These rejected design re-
gions are again shown in red. In this figure, no decision maker was weighted more
heavily than another. However, it is interesting to note that the random selection of
feasible designs in the discrete choices result in a possible region of feasibility near
the preferred regions of decision makers #1 and #3.
Figure 81: Combination (simple addition) of the three patch plots from Figure 80
and the removing (gray areas) of regions with greater than 10 “rejections” across all
discrete choices for all three decision makers
Furthermore, the “path” each decision maker takes in revealing his or her prefer-
ences can be depicted using the median weighting vectors calculated at each iteration
for each dimension. In Figure 82, this vector for each decision maker at each iteration
is mapped to the design space and connected to the series of “optimal” designs for
each median value of W .
The first decision maker is in blue, followed by the second in green and the third
in red (contrast this to the previous two figures). The final “optimal” design, after
the last discrete choice, is indicated with a large circular marker respectively. The
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intermediate designs are labeled as diamonds and the initial design in black is expect-
edly the “median” design near the point [0.577, 0.577, 0.577], which is initially the
same for each decision maker.
Figure 82: The optimal design for the median weighting vector for each decision
maker after each iteration
Finally, the set of “optimal” or best designs can be calculated from all the remain-
ing possible weighting vectors at a particular iteration and projected onto a Pareto
frontier to compare closeness and potential overlap of designs deemed acceptable by
the revealed preferences for each decision maker.
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Acceptable designs after 4 iterations Acceptable designs after 5 iterations
Acceptable designs after 6 iterations Acceptable designs after 10 iterations
Figure 83: Three decision makers’ revealed preferences and associated acceptable
designs after i = 4, 5, 6, and 10.
In general, this process will hold for more than three dimensions. Figure 84
illustrates the overlap in each dimension for the three decision makers (red, blue and
green) across the scatterplot showing a 4-dimensional design space. Each one of the
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points is Pareto optimal and colored points indicate a design which is potentially the
global optimal design for that particular decision maker based on the responses of the
discrete choice experiments.
Figure 84: A four dimensional representation of possible candidate designs for three
decision makers (red, green and blue) after seven discrete choice experiments.
6.2 Step 2: Extracting Power Relationships
Once the set of weighting vectors or weighting distributions are generally determined
from the previous step for each decision maker, a process to extract the power rela-
tionships or amount of influence between decision makers is necessary.
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The following discussion will make use of the identical set of candidate designs
and the weighting vectors from Step 1 which represent the possible true preferences
for each decision maker as illustrated in figures 80 and 83 in the previous section.
Also, to facilitate discussion, the first decision maker will be designated as DMA
(or A), and similarly, the second and third decision makers as DMB and DMC (or B
and C) respectively. Table 8 summarizes the preferences of all three decision makers
with the mean weighting value for each of the three dimensions after 10 discrete
choices.
Table 8: Mean Values of Weighting Vectors for Each Decision Maker
Decision Maker w̄j1 w̄j2 w̄j3
A 0.092 0.639 0.268
B 0.391 0.205 0.404
C 0.219 0.345 0.436
Decision Maker A has a much larger preference for x2, while DMB prefers x1 and
x3 almost equally and DMC prefers x3 slightly more than x2.
6.2.1 Power Assumptions and Constraints
For each of the three relationships among the three combinations (i.e. A ↔ B,
A ↔ C, and B ↔ C), the total power in each relationship is shared between the
two decision makers. If, for example, DMA has full control or influence on DMB’s
decisions, the power that A has over B is set at 1 or 100% (i.e. PA→B = 1). This, of
course, would require that the power B has over A is zero, or PB→A = 0, If the total
power is shared equally between A and B then PA→B = PB→A = 0.5, suggesting that
A cannot impose their preferences onto B any more than B can onto A. The share
of power between two decision makers can thus take on any split or division of 1 (or
100%).
This results in a set of three power constraints equations:
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PA→B + PB→A = 1
PA→C + PC→A = 1
PB→C + PC→B = 1 (9)
Knowledge about these 6 unknowns could then be used to calculate the power of
any one decision maker over the entire group in aggregate.
Assuming that there is a finite amount of power for the entire group normalized
to 1 and shared across all decision makers (potentially asymmetrically), results in the
simple equation:
PA + PB + PC = 1 (10)
where PA is the power held by DMA, or more generally,
k∑
i=1
Pi = 1 (11)
where k is the total number of decision makers in the group.











, i 6= j, k = 3 (13)
which, if completely defined, would satisfy Step 2 in the overall methodology.
However, with only three equations available for the six unknowns, additional
information must be acquired to solve this system of equations. Research Question
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#4 and its associated hypothesis, repeated below, form the appropriate inquiry at
this point in the analysis.
Research Question #4: How can the influence relationships between decision
makers be identified and quantified?
Hypothesis #4: Discrete choice experiments between designs, and with whom,
an agent will form a coalition in the decision space will identify relationships of influ-
ence between decision makers, under the power constraints equations between decision
makers.
6.2.2 Power Information from one Discrete Choice Experiment
The hypothesis in response to Research Question #4 proposed that discrete choice
experiments can recover the influence of one decision maker over another. These dis-
crete choices must be sufficiently simple so as to not cognitively overload the decision
maker and likewise take a small amount of time so that multiple discrete choices can
be proposes to the same agent over a short time span.
The methodology presented in this research makes use of the preference infor-
mation from the previous step, by establishing discrete choices between sub-optimal
designs but with similar utility scores as established from the preference structures.
For example, starting with DMA’s preferences, which were summarized in Table
8, and calculating A’s utility for each of the 2000 candidate designs using the mean
weighting vector, wmean = [0.092, 0.639, 0.268], A’s preferred region within the design
space can be illustrated in the dark red region on the far right of Figure 85. This
“mean weighting vector” was calculated after 10 discrete choices from Step 1 in the
methodology.
The “best” design, after wmean is applied, results in d462 = [0.12, 0.920, 0.372]
being selected with a total utility score of 0.6995 and indicated in black on Figure 85.
Not surprisingly, since DMA prefers x2 to the other two dimensions a design with a
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Figure 85: Candidate designs colored by utility value from DMA’s mean values of
possible weighting vectors
very large score of x2 is selected. Although there exists multiple weighting vectors
which could represent DMA’s true preferences, the mean vector will serve currently
as a “typical” weighting vector even though it may not even exists in the actual
W matrix. Furthermore, the mean weighting vector would be clearly be different if
i 6= 10, as it does in this example.
Each one of the apparent color bands in Figure 85 represents similar values or
utility scores, informally described as “utility bands” here. The utility scores are in
general continuous from the highest to the lowest utility score, and fall in the interval
[0.1097, 0.6995]. A discrete choice between two designs within the same utility band
for a particular decision maker (in this case DMA) could be expectedly difficult to
select the preferred design since the utility scores are so similar or close to the same
value. That is, d954 (with a utility of 0.6107) and d1592 (with a utility of 0.6105)
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If you had to form a coalition at one of










Figure 86: Example #1 of a Discrete Choice Presented to Decision Maker A
could potentially achieve an indifference response from DMA in a discrete choice
experiment, since for these designs U(d954) ≈ U(d1592). A table of these two designs
is found below:
Table 9: Scores for Two Designs in the Same Utility Band from DMA’s Perspective
Design ID U(d?) x1 x2 x3 wj3 wj3 wj3
954 0.6107 0.5630 0.6719 0.4812 0.092 0.639 0.268
1592 0.6105 0.3896 0.6085 0.6913 0.092 0.639 0.268
Since there remains uncertainty in the true preference, (i.e. DMA mathematically
only slightly prefers d954 with the mean weighting vector as indicated over d1592), the
other design could easily be preferred with a different weighting vector other than the
mean vector, which has not been invalidated from previous discrete choices in Step
1. Therefore, with the assumption that these two designs are approximately equal in
utility from A’s perspective, comparing them side by side should elicit an indifference
preference response. This indifference can be leveraged to identify a hypothetical
difference attached to each design. Thus, if DMB is associated with d954 and DMC
is associated with d1592, a discrete choice can be asked as to which design or, more
precisely, with whom DMA is more likely to join and form a coalition. One potential
layout of the discrete choice presented to DMA is shown in Figure 86.
Since the utility values are approximately equal in the discrete choice presented,
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DMA is “forced” to choose between the decision makers, which, from the utility
based perspective, is the only real difference between these designs. In making this
selection, a decision maker is likely to choose the design, that, in their perspective,
will still somehow benefit them the most. For example, DMA may chose to team
up with DMC as they may think DMC has greater influence over others and will
likely be able to maintain their position, increasing the probability that DMA will
also obtain at relatively high utility. Joining DMB may be less certain in their ability
to maintain the utility score of 0.6107. Also, there may be a historical precedent for
working with DMC based on past agreements, contracts or performance suggesting
to DMA that it is in their best interest to unite with the decision maker with the
“better” record. Furthermore, a personal or private reason such as a desire to impress
someone else, a need to avoid confrontation, or a penchant for risky actions can also
exist. There are clearly a variety of reasons why one decision maker would prefer to
work with, team up with, or form a coalition with someone else. The exact reason
is not necessarily important, nor could it always be identified. Wagner even suggests
that ”[i]ndividuals may, in fact, be unaware of the exact values of these parameters
[of power or influence]” [183]. However, recognizing the existence of such reasons,
and considering the influence over another as an expression of those reasons, can be
useful for improving group decision making.
One can make the assumption that if DMC is preferred from the foregoing dis-
cussion then potentially:
PB→A ≤ PC→A. (14)
Of course, outside of the above causes or reasons, the decision maker is free to
choose based on self-interest and their own preferences on just the objectives, effec-
tively ignoring the associated decision makers. In this case, the two designs presented
would essentially be an additional discrete choice of the type from Step 1.
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To identify if this is the case, additional discrete choices are required to test out
the strength or magnitude of DMA desire to chose based on self-interest or based on
the influence one of the other decision makers may have over DMA.
For example, assume that DMA chose DMB’s point but was too focused on the
higher value of x2 and made the decision based on the values of the design and not
the decision maker. This could be tested by selecting two other designs with similar
utility scores, but different values for the objectives, as shown in Figure 87 assuming
DMA did in fact choose DMB in the first discrete choice.
Would you still form a coalition with












Figure 87: Example #2 of a discrete choice presented to DMA. Utility scores (in-
side parentheses for each design) would not be included or presented in an actual
experiment.
In Figure 87 the utility scores are shown for each one of the designs in a smaller
font and within parentheses, shown here for purposes of discussion but would not be
shown in an actual discrete choice experiment.
If DMA continues to select “DMB’s” design, then perhaps the evidence would
suggest that DMB has some influence over DMA or at least some attractive or ad-
vantageous attribute with which to form a coalition. On the other hand, if DMC
is now chosen, the evidence could suggest that neither decision maker has relatively
more influence or power over DMA. Additional information from discrete choices
would be needed.
193
6.2.3 Power Information from Multiple Discrete Choice Experiments
To further identify or quantify the potential existence of influence over DMA, a third
type of discrete choice is available where the utility scores are different.
Assuming you must choose to form a coalition at
one of the two designs, with whom would you











Figure 88: Example #3 of a discrete choice presented to DMA. Utility scores (in-
side parentheses for each design) would not be included or presented in an actual
experiment.
This type of discrete choice experiment, an example of which is shown in Figure
88, is useful in determining the strength of the influence that one of the decision
makers may have over DMA. If, in previous experiments, it is known that DMA
tends to form coalitions with DMB and therefore likely has some sort of power or
influence over DMA, then a discrete choice can be presented where the utility value
for “DMB’s design” is lower (0.5568) than that of “DMC ’s design” (0.6060) some
value (e.g. 0.05 or 0.6060-0.5568 = 0.0492 ≈ 0.05).
If DMA still chooses to form a coalition with DMB even with a lower utility
value, then the assumption that the relationship between DMB and DMA, and more
specifically that the benefit of agreeing with DMB, must be at least equal to trading or
giving up 0.05 of utility from DMA’s perspective. After another discrete choice, where




uCDMA), but instead DMA chooses DMC ’s design, the amount of influence that B has
over A (i.e. PB→A) is known to fall within 0.05 and 0.1 utils (units of utility). In
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equation form, this results in:
PB→A = PC→A + f(∆uDMA) (15)
where,
f : ∆U → P (16)
and,




for this example. The function f is a transformation of utility difference into an
influence or power.
A valid function could be a proportional transformation across the entire utility
space range. For example, the “best” point when the mean weighting vector is set at
[0.092, 0.639, 0.268] is d462 with utility score, u
462
DMA
= 0.6995, while the “worst” is d889
with u889DMA = 0.1097 (assuming that w = wmean discussed above). The entire utility
range for DMA would then be u
range
DMA
= u462DMA − u
889
DMA
= 0.6995 − 0.1097 = 0.5898.
If a discrete choice was presented to DMA, with DMB’s design at the “worst” point,
and DMC at the “best” point, and DMA still chose DMB as the decision maker to
form a coalition with, then B would clearly have 100% of the influence over A (i.e.
PB→A = 1) and conversely A would have no power over B (i.e. PA→B = 0). Using




= ∆PB∼CDMA . (18)
where ∆PB∼CDMA is the difference in power or influence and is positive since ∆uDMA
is always positive (or can be made positive by reversing DMB and DMC if needed).
This ∆P is only the difference in power of DMB and DMC over A. For example, if
195
∆PB∼CDMA = 0.2 and PB→A = 0.45 then, PC→A = 0.25. Similarly, if PB→A = 0.95, then
PC→A = 0.75, or in general,
PB→A − PC→A = ∆PB∼CDMA . (19)
Since the value of ∆uDMA is actually only known to within a range, 0.05 ≤
∆uDMA ≤ 0.10, the power difference can similarly only be known to within a range,
0.085 ≤ ∆PB∼CDMA ≤ 0.17, unless additional discrete choices are executed. These dis-




The following table show a series of discrete choices and the bounded range of ∆P as
a result of the difference in utility of the two designs and the selected decision maker
with whom DMA forms a coalition.
Table 10: Series of Discrete Choices Between DMB and DMC with Utility Values















1 1292 1481 0.625 0.625 B 0 0 ≤ · ≤ 1
2 442 217 0.69 0.69 B 0 0 ≤ · ≤ 1
3 892 672 0.468 0.568 B 0.1 0.17 ≤ · ≤ 1
4 1055 1575 0.485 0.685 C 0.2 0.17 ≤ · ≤ 0.34
5 10 1911 0.421 0.571 C 0.15 0.17 ≤ · ≤ 0.25
6 1814 1267 0.527 0.652 B 0.125 0.21 ≤ · ≤ 0.25
7 55 48 0.442 0.579 C 0.1375 0.21 ≤ · ≤ 0.23
After the first two discrete choices (#1 and #2 in Table 10), the only information
is that DMA prefers DMB when the utility scores are identical which may suggest
that DMB has influence over A’s decisions, and that DMB has some ∆P greater than
zero relative to DMC over A. To confirm this, the next discrete choice (#3) offers a
considerably lower utility value for B’s design. In this case, DMA again chose B over
C. This means that ∆PB∼CDMA is at least 0.17 and could be greater. The next discrete
choice (#4 in Table 10) tests this possibility, but the difference is too extreme and A
decides to select DMC ’s design. This response places an upper bound on the influence
of B onto A and thus the upper limit of ∆PB∼CDMA becomes 0.34.
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Continuing this process by asking additional discrete choices with appropriately
selected values of ∆uDMA , each successive discrete choice will decrease the range of
the possible difference in power or influence. For instance, after seven discrete choice,
DMA has revealed that B has more influence (over A) than C by about 0.21 to 0.23.
The absolute power relationships are not known from this experiment alone but only
the difference. However, this process provides an additional equation to the previous
three, with all four reproduced below;
PA→B + PB→A = 1
PA→C + PC→A = 1
PB→C + PC→B = 1
PB→A − PC→A = [0.21, 0.23] (20)
6.2.4 Identifying the Required Discrete Choices for Power Information
Since a number of discrete choices will be required to reduce the possible range on
PB→A − PC→A, a related research question was posed to further explore this inquiry:
Research Question: How many discrete choice experiments are needed to ex-
tract the power or influence difference between two decision makers?
To answer this question, a number of experiments were conducted to explore
potential answers.
For each series of discrete choices such as that presented in Table 10, a figure can
be created from the range of possible ∆uDMA over the number of iterations. Figure
89 illustrates the range of possible ∆uDMA over 10 iterations of discrete choices on
a logarithmic y-axis. The blue points and line indicate the upper bound on the
maximum difference possible based on responses. This upper bound starts at 1 since
in this formulation utility scores are normalized to a range of 0 to 1. This is, in
fact, a wider range than necessary since the maximum utility range is only 0.5898,
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found by taking the difference between the largest and smallest utility score for all
2000 candidate designs. The green triangles and line indicate the lower bound on the
utility difference after each successive discrete choice. The red circles indicate the
utility score difference for the current discrete choice.
Figure 89: Range of utility difference versus number of discrete choices when ∆uDMA
= 0.13
The first discrete choice has a current difference in utility score of 0 (not shown
on the logarithmically scaled y-axis) since the first discrete choice asks the decision
maker to make a choice between two designs within the same utility band. However,
for the second discrete choice, two designs with a utility difference of 0.1 are presented
(shown by the first red circle at discrete choice #2 in Figure 89). The range at each
successive discrete choice will contract based on the decision of each discrete choice.
For example, after the decision maker chooses the design suggesting that the influence
difference is larger than a utility difference of 0.1, the minimum value on the range
takes on the previous current value (i.e. the green triangle for discrete choice #3).
Similarly, the maximum value takes on the previous current value when the opposite
design is selected (i.e. the blue line transition from discrete choice #3 to #4). Over
multiple discrete choices the range will narrow in on the true influence difference (i.e.
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utility difference) of the other two decision makers In this example and figure, ∆uDMA
is set to 0.13.
After 6 discrete choices the range in utility scores is quite small (i.e. max ∆uDMA−
min ∆uDMA ≈ 0.01). This range is likely sufficiently narrow, or even excessively
narrow, especially in the view that the uncertainty in the mean weighting vector used
for the above discrete choices in calculating the utility bands and representing the
true weighting could be much larger than 0.01.
To further analyze this relationship, multiple simulations were conducted where
the true utility difference was randomly selected between the values of 0 and 0.5898
(equivalent to an influence difference range of 0 to 1) and the starting difference
for discrete choices was varied with discrete values 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.20. The
simulations are shown in Figure 90 with the minimum and maximum for each first
utility difference connected through the iterations of discrete choices, with a normal
y-axis and logarithmic y-axis for the left and right figures respectively.
Figure 90: Multiple simulations of Step 2 showing the number of discrete choices to
reach specified ranges on the utility score difference
When the first utility difference is set at 0.05, the range shrinks very quickly if
the actual influence difference is very small (i.e. ∆uDMA ≤ 0.05). On the other hand,
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starting with an initial value of 0.05 when the actual influence difference is much
larger results in many more discrete choices required to reach a certain threshold
(i.e. 0.01). For the worst case, it requires 10 or more discrete choices, to reach a
range of 0.01 and in the best case only 5. For the other values of the first utility
difference, the best and worst cases are closer to each other (e.g. when ∆uDMA = 0.1
best case is ≈ 6 and worst case is ≈ 9 discrete choices). In both these cases, the
number of discrete choices approach the same value when the first utility difference
is half the total range, and in this case, 0.5898/2, or ≈ 0.295. This means that each
successive discrete choice can halve the previous range and thus a certain threshold
on the range of ∆uDMA can be defined by the number of discrete choices (when using
this [particular strategy for defining the first utility difference) as:







where, n is the number of discrete choices, ne is the number of discrete choices
with identical utility scores, and urangeDMA is the full range of utility values according
to the mean weighting vector of DMA. The “n − ne” is to account for the first ne
discrete choices being used as to only identify which decision maker may have more
influence, such that the first ne discrete choices do not produce any knowledge on the
range of ∆uDMA . (In the above figures, ne was set at 1 but was previously discussed
with values of greater than 1 if needed.
This equation illustrates another potential use of a satisficing strategy. If time or
resources are not abundantly available, and a relatively wide range about the influence
of one decision maker over another is sufficient, then just a few discrete choices may
allow some indication as to who is more likely to persuade or influence DMA to change
their preference. For example, if time only permits 5 discrete choices, and 2 of those
are used as checks (i.e. ne = 2) then the expected knowledge on the range of ∆uDMA
would be 0.074, and hence ∆PB∼CDMA = 0.125, which could still be useful in determining
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influence relationships in solving equations (20).
6.2.5 Additional Steps to Solve for Power Relationships
Additional information necessary to solve the system in equations (9) or (20) can be
obtained in at least two ways: 1) using discrete choices involving DMA, or, 2) using
power information from other decision makers.
The first strategy involves performing the similar types of discrete choice exper-
iments as above but with the same decision maker making the choice (in this case
DMA) associated to one of the two options, such as in the following discrete choice:
If only these two designs were available, would
you be more able to convince Decision Maker B













Figure 91: Example #4 of a discrete choice presented to DMA, where DMA is asso-
ciated with one of the designs. Utility Scores for each of the decision makers (inside
parentheses for each design) are also shown.
In this example, the utility scores are shown for DMA (who is also presented this
particular choice) and DMB using the mean weighting vector from Step 1 of the
potential valid vectors from DMB’s responses.
Since the utility scores are effectively the same from A’s perspective, the answer
to this discrete choice provides insight as to how A views the power relationship
between A and B. If DMA chooses their own design, then a similar process from
that described above can be initiated with successive discrete choices always involving
Decision Makers A and B until the knowledge about the utility difference and therefore
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the difference in power or influence has reached a sufficiently tight range.




= 0.4642 - 0.3706 = 0.0936, or almost 0.1 utils, if, in fact, DMA was able to convince
B to select A’s design. This is of course viewed as A’s influence or power over B
(from A’s perspective). Since, DMA may not know, however, even an estimate on
the weighting vector of DMB, the opposite possibility can be tested, where B’s utility
score for the design associated with DMA can be larger. Decision Maker A’s choices
for these experiments will suggest the initial view of who potentially maintains greater
power over the other from DMA’s perspective.
This above process when after reaching the stopping criterion, provides the fifth
equation below:




and also, a sixth equation, when a similar process is perform involving Decision
Makers A and C:




Note that the two decision makers involved in the discrete choice are labeled in the
power superscripts where the responding decision maker is located in the subscript.
This results in the full set of equations:
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PA→B + PB→A = 1
PA→C + PC→A = 1
PB→C + PC→B = 1












and in matrix form:

1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 −1 0 0
1 −1 0 0 0 0





























The 6x6 matrix above is not invertible as the 5th and 6th column vectors are not
linearly independent, resulting in a matrix rank of 5 (which is less than the number of


























The fourth row or equation from (25) was never used in the above two solutions.
It can be used as a check for consistency after the above systems have been solved or
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included in the system to solve the first two unknowns (i.e. PB→C and PC→B) have
been excluded resulting in the solvable system:

1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 −1
1 −1 0 0

















where the ranges have been replaced with an arbitrary single value (where the
minimum and maximum values are the same) for purposes of illustration.
This system of equations is overdetermined and thus constitutes a general linear
least squares problem [168]. Performing this operation using the unique solution:
x = (A∗A)−1A∗b (29)
where A is the 5x4 matrix above from equation (28), A∗ is the Hermitian transpose
of A, b is the vector of values on the right hand side and x represents the vector of
unknowns (i.e. the power relationships).









If one of the last three equations is removed from this same system, then the A
























With three different answers (and four with the least squares result), the arbitrary
values for the b vector, are inconsistent. For example, if b =[1, 1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4]
(a consistent answer) then x = [0.6, 0.4, 0.7, 0.3] for all four systems. Although
this inconsistency is not desirable, it is quite likely since a decision maker may be
potentially inconsistent through at least some of the discrete choices presented and
across the various comparisons, such as the difference in influence between A and B,
A and C, etc.
However, with only four unknowns, it is not required to ask at least one of the
series of discrete choices that provided one of the last three equations. In terms of a
satisficing strategy, two would have been sufficient. However, if time and resources
permit additional testing than additional discrete choices can be performed, and
consistency checks or least squares algorithms can be applied.
In fact, the last two unknowns, PB→C and PC→B could be estimated by DMA by
answering similar questions about whose design would win out in a tournament style
decision between those two decision makers, similar to Figure 91 (but with DMB and
DMC involved). This particular type of discrete choice is further removed from the
knowledge of DMA since they may known nothing or little about the relationship
between two other individuals, but it at least can provide an estimate for PB→C and
PC→B from the perspective of DMA.
Similarly, one can ask DMA about the responses that DMB and DMC would
provide in other situations such as that in the initial discrete choice from Figures 87
and 88. These would obviously include a relatively high amount of uncertainty for
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the aforementioned reasons, but could still be useful in analyzing consistency in the
responses of DMA.
Therefore, the full set of possible equations in matrix form, solely from the per-
spective of Decision Maker A can be written as:

1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 1 0 −1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 −1






































where the DM• in the 6th, 8th and 9th elements in the b vector indicates those
equations whereDMA is making an estimate on how the others will respond to discrete
choices, that is, from their perspective. For example, ∆PB∼CDM• is the estimate for how
DMB or DMC will answer a discrete choice when they are given a particular discrete
choice. In other words, DMA acts as if they were DMB or DMC in responding to the
discrete choice to give these equations.
The order in the above matrix has changed slightly from previous equations in
that the first three rows are the constraint equations, the next three involve the
tournament style discrete choices (where the decision maker given the discrete choice
is associated with one of the designs) and the last three are those discrete choices
where a particular decision maker identifies who of the other two decision makers
has more power or influence over themselves. As mentioned above, only a subset of
these nine equations is needed to solve the 6 unknowns, but additional ones could be
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helpful in applying checks or implementing a least squares approach to the solution.
In Figure 92, the power relationships are indicated with arrows and the circled
numbers indicate the equation number (row number) in the above matrix that rep-












Figure 92: Diagram of potential power relationships equations
Since DMA really only has some intimation of knowledge about equations 4©,
5© and 7©, the discrete choices that provide this information would be uncertain.
Equations 1©, 2© and 3© are the known constraints. Next, equations 8© and 9©
could be investigated through discrete choices presented to DMA with even more
uncertainty and lastly equation 6© could be estimated with the most uncertainty
(which only involves the other two decision makers).
Clearly, 9 equations (and even 6 equations) with 6 or more series of discrete choices
to extract the ranges for each of them is significant effort for one decision maker.
Furthermore, the number of equations and effort only increases when more than 3
decision makers are involved. For example, four decision makers would result in 6
constraint equations and 12 other equations available for the 12 power relationship
variables that need to be defined. This would indubitably require even more time
and effort on the part of the decision maker.
To accelerate the process of extracting power relationships, the second method is
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more efficient by using the power information from multiple decision makers simul-
taneously. Up to this point, only DMA’s choices were used to define the 6 unknown
power relationships. Understandably, each of the decision makers would seek to de-
fine their own influence (or perceived influence) over each other. This could result in
additional inconsistencies which would likewise be interesting and useful to analyze
but in order to simply satisfy the required number of equations (i.e. 6), only one
equation provided by each of the three decision makers is necessary.
Since a decision maker is more likely to know the influence that others have on
themselves, equations 7©, 8©, and 9© provided from discrete choices given to Decision
Makers A, B and C respectively are all that are needed. Note that the above process
will make use of the mean weighting vector for the other respective decision makers
and not DMA’s mean weighting vector.
The system of equations, after these series of discrete choices are complete, now
looks like:

1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 −1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 −1





























where the subscripts on the right hand side (e.g. •DMB) indicate from whose
perspective that particular vector element was provided (Decision Maker A, B or C).
Assuming an arbitrary right hand side b vector of [1, 1, 1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.2], the solution is












This is illustrated in Figure 93 where arrows are scaled and shaded by the relative
values for the power associated for each relationship. Reading this figure is done by
considering that the decision maker at the arrow’s tail has power over the decision
maker at the head of the arrow according to the value indicated. In this figure,
Decision Maker B appears to have a significant high amount of power in the entire
group with a power over A set at 0.7 and power over C at 0.8.
Figure 93: Illustration of power relationships between decision makers. Arrow color
and thickness are scaled by power value.
Both the constraints, and similarly, the other equations are satisfied in the above
solution and related figure, and no one decision maker was required to respond to
more than one set of discrete choices for sufficient convergence. If more series of
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discrete choices are provided by one or more decision makers, making the matrix no
longer square, then the strategy for solving the now overdetermined problem using a
least squares method can be implemented.
6.2.6 Distributions of Power Relationships
The preceding discussion, however, ignored the fact that specific values are not given




). Since each decision maker reveals a range of influence differences for each of the
equations, transforming these into the ranges for the actual power relationships is
still needed.
This is done by taking the various combinations of minimum and maximum values
(in this case, 23 = 8) and solving the system of equations multiple times for each one.
































Of the eight solutions these ranges contain, selecting all the minimum values would
clearly not be a valid solution since each set of two rows (with the first row number
of a set being odd) must sum to 1. Furthermore, assigning one to the minimum and
one to the maximum values in each set would also not provide a valid answer since
the values are highly interdependent. For example, if PA→B = 0.15 (minimum) and
PB→A = 0.85 (maximum), the other four values cannot lie at any of the extremes (in
at least this example). Thus, since the ranges displayed above are only the minimum
and maximum values of x, a more precise and useful set of solutions to the system of
equations is through distributions shown in Figure 94.
PA→B PB→A PA→C PC→A PB→C PC→B
Figure 94: Distributions for decision maker power relationships generated by the
execution of 10000 Monte Carlo simulations
These power distributions are created with a histogram of the solutions of x for
10000 randomly selected combinations of values within the appropriate ranges for
the b vector in Equation (35). The distributions approach a normal distribution
shape with a standard deviation close to 0.03, however, the tails are truncated at the
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maximum and minimum possible values listed above.
It is interesting to note that although the ranges are expectedly different (e.g.
[0.15,0.325] vs. [0.675,0.85]), the difference between the maximum and minimum
values for each of the ranges are the same (e.g. 0.325 - 0.15 = 0.175 = 0.85 - 0.675).
This is tied to the size of the range for the values in b. The relative differences in the
range for b in this example are 0.1, 0.1 and 0.15 respectively for the three last elements
of this vector (see Equation (35)). In other words, the discrete choices presented to
and answered by Decision Maker C have greater uncertainty than that of DMA or
DMB.
Research Question: What is the impact on the certainty of power relationships
when decision makers respond to different numbers of discrete choices and provided
different ranges?
The experiment to answer this question involves simulating the above steps for
multiple ranges for b and investigating the sensitivities of these ranges to the certainty
in the power distributions.
The first range sweep will be by holding the range from DMA and DMB constant
as above (i.e. max(b[4])−min(b[4]) = max(b[5])−min(b[5]) = 0.1) and sweeping the
value of max(b[6])−min(b[6]) from 0 to 0.8.
The one highlighted point in Figure 95 indicates the ranges in the b vector
b[4] = 0.1, b[5] = 0.1 and b[6] = 0.15 which result in the power distribution range
of 0.175. Expectedly, a higher uncertainty in b[6] results in higher uncertainty in
the distribution ranges. The same point (b[4] = 0.1, b[5] = 0.1 and b[6] = 0.15) is
highlighted in Figure 96 but with the values for b[5] also varied between 0 and 0.95.
Not surprisingly, the uncertainty increases when two decision makers are uncertain
themselves about influence differences between decision makers. Finally, varying or
sweeping all of the values from the b vector for each of the decision makers would
produce a similar trend where each of the lines from Figure 96 is shifted even higher.
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Figure 95: Range sweep of max(b[6]) − min(b[6]) from 0 to 0.8 while holding
max(b[4])−min(b[4]) = max(b[5])−min(b[5]) = 0.1
Figure 96: Range sweep for b[5] and b[6] while holding b[4] at 0.1
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An interesting result occurs if the sum of the uncertainties from the decision
makers is greater than 2 (i.e. b[4]+b[5]+b[6] > 2). In this case, the ranges for the
distributions of power relationships is always greater than 1, an impossible solution
based upon the implicit constraints that 0 ≤ PA→B ≤ 1, 0 ≤ PB→A ≤ 1, etc. or that
Px is always non-negative and less than 1.
Moreover, when the sum is greater than 1 (but less than 2), solutions can likewise
result with ranges greater than 1 but can also reach ranges as low as 0.5. For example,
if b[4] = 0.677, b[5] = 0.286 and b[6] = 0.038, and therefore b[4] + b[5] + b[6] = 1.001,
the ranges for the distributions are only 0.501 and the solutions for Px are all between
0 and 1. However, if b[4] = 0.869, b[5] = 0.002 and b[6] = 0.166, and therefore b[4] +
b[5]+b[6] = 1.037, the ranges span 0.519 but the values of Px are greater than 1 or less
than 0 such as PC→B = 1.019 and PB→C = −0.019 in this example. This would seem
to indicate that in this particular relationship, DMA holds all the power overDMB. In
these types of outcomes the power relationships are adjusted such that a value greater
than 1 is set at 1 and values less than 0 are set at 0, such that PC→B = 1 and PB→C = 0
for this case. This same result occurs when the last three b vector elements are
normalized such that when b[4] = 0.869, b[5] = 0.002 and b[6] = 0.166, they become
b[4] = 0.869/sum(b[4], b[5], b[6]) = 0.837, b[5] = 0.002/sum(b[4], b[5], b[6]) = 0.0019
and b[6] = 0.166/sum(b[4], b[5], b[6]) = 0.160 which then provides the constrained
values for the power relationships Px to be non-negative as required.
With the normalization applied, the bottom half of Figure 95 will have a number
of simulations which will be normalized due to b[5] + b[6] > 1. Those points will be
normalized and recalculated with the updated values. The result appears in Figure
97 where the top portion with b[5]+b[6] > 1 is shifted or folded back onto the feasible
region. The colors are again set to correspond with the range on b[5], such that the
darkest red point corresponds to a b[5] value of 0.9 and a b[6] value of 0 (b[4] is held
constant at 0.1). As a consequence, any increase in the range of b[6] will result in a
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normalization process with the portion of the triangle shape above 0.5 skewed to the
left and resulting in ranges of the distributions as indicated on the y-axis for PA→B
for example.
Figure 98 shows the aforementioned normalization process when b[4] is swept
across discrete values of 0.1, 0.35, 0.6 and 0.85. The top left section is identical to
the entire top graph discussed above. The other three show increasing values of the
distribution range of the power with increasing amounts of folding as normalization
is required when the sum of the three b vector elements is greater than 1.
Figure 97: Normalized b vector values. Range sweep for b[5] and b[6] while holding
b[4] at 0.1
Under normalization, the power distributions can take on difference ranges. If the
normalization is required, the following b⇔ x pair exist:
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which has different ranges for the six elements of x namely 0.101 for the first two,
0.144 for the next two and 0.025 for the last two. The uncertainty is smallest for
PB→C and its complement due to the large difference in influence that DMA reported
between B and C each had over A (i.e. PB→A > PC→A). With such a large influence
difference, in connection with the other values reported, there is strong evidence that
PB→C may be equal to 1. Of course this can be tempered significantly, if DMC had
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responded with little or no difference between A and B within the b[6] element or
even a reversal of who had a majority of that relationship’s power. For example, if,
instead of [0.2, 0.35], b[6] = [-0.35, -0.2], then PB→C would have a min and max of
[0.68, 0.82], with a range of 0.14 (much greater than 0.025). However, at the same
time, this combination would potentially make PA→C = 1. Thus the uncertainty in Px
is ultimately highly dependent on the absolute values for the ranges but assuming all
the values are relatively small such that the maximum extremes do not sum to greater
than 1, the relationship between the uncertainty on the b vector and the uncertainty
on the range x is linear through the summation of b. Therefore, halving the ranges of
b will halve the range on x as shown in Figure 99 on the bottom (after halving). Since
one more discrete choice will halve the uncertainty in the power difference, the power
distribution uncertainty will halve with each successive discrete choice (assuming one
more for each decision maker).
PA→B PB→A PA→C PC→A PB→C PC→B
Figure 99: Before (top) and after (bottom) halving the uncertainty on the power
distributions by halving the uncertainty on b
Of course, if only one decision maker responds to one more discrete choice, then
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the effect observed on the distribution may or may not be comparably significant.
Ideally the decision maker with the largest uncertainty should be first to apply an
additional discrete choice so as to maximize the benefits of one more experiment.
Lastly, although the range will contract (or expand) with b the overall shape of the
histogram can also vary with the portion of uncertainty between the decision makers.
For example, the left side of Figure 100 shows relatively equally uncertain ranges (r),
rb[4] = 0.165, rb[5] = 0.165 and rb[6] = 0.17, which is generally expected with a similar
number of discrete choices, while the right hand side shows highly dissimilar ranges
such that rb[4] = 0.45, rb[5] = 0.025 and rb[6] = 0.025.
Figure 100: Examples of the effect of range differences on the distribution shape of
power relationships
With this additional step of normalization required (i.e. the values given by the
discrete choices when b[4] + b[5] + b[6] > 1), the full set of ranges for the b vector
with 10000 Monte Carlo simulations can be executed and analyzed. Figure 101 shows
the three power relationships and their complements in the upper 3x3 matrix. The
correlation is exactly -1 for complementary power relationships as shown in the first
three diagonal scatterplots. The last row and column illustrate the sum of the last
three elements in b versus these same power relationships. All points are again colored
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by this same summation value.
Figure 101: Monte Carlo Simulations for Power Relationships
Firstly, all combinations of power relationship are possible, which is to be expected
with a simple MC covering the entire range of power or influence differences. Secondly,
when the sum of the last three elements in b is small, the power relationships are more
similar or at least some of them will be close to equal power (e.g. PA→B = 0.49 and
PB→A = 0.51. Finally, when the sum of the last three elements in b approaches 1,
possible combinations can exist across the entire “power space”.
Technically, this “power space”, is composed of all the possible combinations of
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after the range for the b vector is made such that it is always non-negative, the
power space is divided into these eight regions to which a particular A matrix can
be mapped (through A−1). Figure 102 shows the region or range (in a vector math
sense) of the second type of the A matrix above.
In this figure, the power combinations suggest, for example, that:
PB→C + PC→A ≤ 1 (37)
and thus,
PB→C ≤ 1− PC→A (38)
and finally:
PB→C ≤ PA→C , (39)
as suggested by the last row (sixth equation) from A when b is non-negative. The
other inequalities established from the discrete choices with A would further define
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Figure 102: Type 2 of A matrix used for Monte Carlo Simulations and resultant
power relationships
the other possible regions for power combinations. The total power space is the
union of these spaces, so that the entire space as depicted in Figure 101 can capture
completely all the possible power structures between decision makers.
6.2.7 Application of Vectors Other than the Mean Weighting Vector
Another factor initially overlooked in the above discussion was the use of the mean
weighting vector for all of the comparisons. Extracting the power relationships as-
sumes that this is in fact the weighting by which all comparisons can be referenced.
In reality, it is known only to a certain level based on the set of all possible true
weighting vectors as discussed in the previous section from the discrete choices in
Step 1.
This suggests, therefore, that the ranges on the power relationships are likely
less certain than originally presumed. For example, in Table 11, two designs which
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could be compared in a discrete choice, have a nearly equal utility value when using
the mean weighting vector as above. This set could be used in a discrete choice to
identify the initial power relationship between two decision makers. That is, if DMB
were attached to d35 and DMC were assigned to d1481, the respondent DMA would
likely not cognitively apply the mean weighting vector, but perhaps the wmax from
d35. When this different weighting vector is applied, the comparison is now between
designs in different utility bands, namely between 0.6704 and 0.6197 (see the wmax
for d35 and w35max for d1481), which is significantly different than the expected 0.6257
versus 0.6254.
Table 11: Mean Weighting Vector Contrasted Against Possible Minimum and Maxi-
mum Weighting Vectors
Design #35: [0.3899, 0.9209, 0.0033] U() wj1 wj2 wj3
wmean 0.6257 0.092 0.639 0.268
wmin 0.5925 0.1 0.6 0.3
wmax 0.6704 0.094 0.687 0.219
w1481min 0.6522 0.106 0.662 0.231
w1481max 0.6034 0.069 0.625 0.306
Design #1481: [0.2297, 0.6356, 0.737] U() wj1 wj2 wj3
wmean 0.6254 0.092 0.639 0.268
wmin 0.6388 0.106 0.662 0.231
wmax 0.616 0.069 0.625 0.306
w35min 0.6254 0.1 0.6 0.3
w35max 0.6197 0.094 0.687 0.219
To account for this source of uncertainty, the conservative or worst case for the
upper and lower bounds can be propagated throughout the algorithm. In imple-
menting this consideration, for each discrete choice, the range is now not necessarily
halved but reduced by some amount less than half. For example, as in Figure 89,
which is repeated on the top of Figure 103 but with a larger amount of iterations,
the uncertainty in the utility difference slowly collapses around the particular power
or influence difference (via utility). The bottom of Figure 103 shows the corrected
minimum and maximum values for the difference in utility score implementing this
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conservative approach of only reducing the range down to the worst case.
Figure 103: Accounting for uncertainty in using the mean weighting vector by prop-
agating the worst case upper and lower bound throughout the set of discrete choices
As is visible on the far right of Figure 103, an increase in the number of discrete
choices does not necessarily further reduce this range. This provides a potential
stopping criterion for this step as no additional discrete choices are needed if the range
is no longer reduced with another discrete choice. The reason for this originates in
the random selection of the two designs in a specific utility band based on the mean
weighting vector. If, in Step 1, a decision maker made fewer discrete choices, and
thus the preference uncertainty is higher, the difference in the mean, maximum and
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minimum weighting vectors would also be much higher. An example of this is shown
in Figure 104 when Step 1 only contained 5 discrete choices.
Figure 104: Example of erratic collapsing on the difference in utility score when Step
1 contains only 5 discrete choices
6.2.8 More than Three Decision Makers
To extract power relationships or distributions between more than three decision
makers the above algorithm can be likewise implemented with additional discrete
choice responses from each of the agents.
With four decision makers, 12 unknown power relationships can be identified but
with six constraint equations already defined. The additional six equations can be
acquired in a similar fashion as above by comparing two designs assigned to other
decision makers and then requesting a third decision maker to choose with whom they
are more likely to form a coalition. With four decision makers, two of them would be
required to perform this process twice, while the others only once. However, a variety
of combinations or series of discrete choices are available as discussed previously.
For example, valid equations could be obtained from DMA choosing between 1) B
and C, 2) B and D, or 3) C and D. Only a sufficient number (i.e. 6) are necessary to




1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0
0 1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0



















































As with the case described previously with three decision makers, if more equations
are available than unknowns, such that m > n (i.e. the number of rows (m) is greater
than the number of columns (n)) a linear least squares solution can be implemented.
This process may even be desirable to equalize the contributions of the four decisions
makers since one or more agents may consider it unfair if two of them are fortunate
to define more than one equation. On the other hand, minimizing the effort or time
required to answer multiple discrete choice questions may be an equally valid reason
to answer as little as possible.
6.2.9 Total Power Indices
With the power relationships defined (for three decision makers) in terms of distri-
butions, the overall total power index for each decision maker is readily available.
For three decision makers the simple equation for the power or influence DMA




PA→B + PB→A + PA→C + PC→A + PB→C + PC→B
(41)







, i 6= j (42)
where k is the number of decision makers and i (or j) is the ith (or jth) decision
maker, and Pi is the total power for DMi within the group.
Assuming the ranges from equation (36), in a previous example, the total power
for DMA,DMB, and DMC is:
PA =








[0.325, 0.5] + [0.05, 0.225]
3
= [0.125, 0.242]. (43)
Since PA + PB + PC = 1, only certain combinations of total power indices exist
similar to the previous constraints placed upon the distributions of power for each
relationship. The three maximum values cannot all be simultaneously retained nor
can the three minimum values. The usefulness of these ranges allows for the testing
of various scenarios involving power such as “best and worst outcome with power
pessimism” or “coalition and majority forming” in Step 3 of the methodology de-
scribed next when the decision makers must reach agreement on the preferences and,
ultimately, on the design.
6.3 Step 3: Reaching Preference Consensus
Steps 1 and 2 described in the previous two sections respectively, and applied to the
canonical problem, provided the two essential sets of data required to perform the
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proposed algorithm to calculated the regions where consensus is more likely to be
reached.
In Step 1, the possible weighting vectors that could represent each decision maker’s
true preference was obtained. Each decision maker involved in a particular decision
was required to respond to discrete choices between two designs. After a number of
discrete choices the preference space representing the entire set of preferences was
slowly reduced to a set of possible weighting vectors for each decision maker.
The output of this step, shown in Figure 105, summarizes the responses described
in the previous sections from the canonical problem. Decision Maker A placed a high
weighting on the second dimension (i.e. x2), followed by x3 and lastly by x1. Decision
Maker B’s preference are in the exact opposite, preferring first x1 and x3 (at about the
same weight of 0.4) and then x2 (with wx2 in a distribution grouped closely around
0.2). Lastly, Decision Maker C’s preferences are also different with preferences for










Figure 105: Output from Step 1: Possible Weighting Vectors for each Decision Maker
In Step 2, the power or influence relationships were extracted from between the
decision makers. These relationships were expressed as the difference in influence
that one of two other decision makers could potentially impose upon the responding
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decision maker. After a number of discrete choices, each which would slowly reduce
the range of the power difference until the stopping criterion is reached, the equa-
tion produced from the difference in influence could then be combined with other
constraint equations to solve for the power of each decision maker over the others.
The results of this step are shown in Figure 106, which illustrates, on the top half,
that for each pair of decision makers, the total power sums to 1. Furthermore, on
the bottom, the total power for each individual decision maker or the distribution of
power shared for the entire group, is similarly represented, where DMA likely holds
the most influence with a mean power near 0.45, followed by DMB (P̄B ≈ 0.4) and
then lastly by DMC (P̄C ≈ 0.15).
Since A and B have greater influence than C, the expected set of designs where
consensus is more likely to be reached will be close to the preferred designs of A or B.
However, to what degree this is the case can be determined by the process of Step 3
after reaching consensus through multiple ultimatum games between decision makers.
PA→B PB→A PA→C PC→A PB→C PC→B
Figure 106: Output from Step 2: Distributions for Decision Makers’ Power Relation-
ships
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6.3.1 The Ultimatum Game Between Decision Makers
Conceptually, the ultimatum game is played between two decision makers (or groups
of decision makers) to identify the designs or rather the preferences at which the
decision makers will reach consensus. The utility score or value of a proposed design
will be lower than the “ideal” design for the preferences of both decision makers.
Since both decision makers seek to maximize utility through their own preferences
but recognize the requirement for reaching a compromise, they will trade utility value
for cooperation or consensus, but only up to the amount that they cannot persuade
the other to accept a preference closer to their own. This “willingness” to accept
someone else’s preferences (or a portion thereof) can be expressed in terms of the
power relationships discussed in previous sections.
For example, in a particular encounter or game between A and B, decision maker
A may assume any power from the distributions of P
′
A→B from Figure 106 (where the
prime on P
′
indicates a “perceived” power, which may or may not reflect reality). If
they are optimistic in their ability to persuade, apply their reputation, or any other
reason for exercising greater power, they may assume a value higher than the mean
of 0.55, such as 0.65 for example. On the other hand, DMB can be equally optimistic
about their influence over A and assume a power index of 0.55 for P
′
B→A
Assuming DMA proposes to reach agreement at a design (or preference) 15%
closer (0.65-0.5=0.15) to A’s design (or preference), B will reject the offer because
they would only accept offers at values closer to their preferences by 5% (i.e. 0.55-0.5
= 0.05). After all, they assume that they can negotiate, persuade, hold out for, etc.
a design that at least required A to come slightly more than half way to their own
perspective and preferences. This will be called the over-constrained power condition.
If DMB’s perceived power over A was only 0.3 (again, see Figure 106), then
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B would consider the offer advantageous to themselves, as they were offered some-




B→A is exactly 0.35, as perceived by DMB (while the power index
for A over B remains at 0.65), the offer is likewise accepted since B could not on
average expect a more favorable offer. This is the constrained power condition.
These three situations or conditions are illustrated in Figure 107. In the top or





B→A > 1. They both think that the other will concede more “ground” than
what will occur in reality. In other words, the point proposed by A (small green circle)
is “too far away” from an acceptable location (small blue circle) from B’s perspective.
This is equally true if the proposer and responder are reversed.
Preferred Design 
or Preference of A
Preferred Design 




















Figure 107: Examples of the Three Power Constraint Conditions
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Table 12: Examples of Ultimatum Game Outcomes Between Decision Makers with
Different Perceptions of Power Relationships















Pref. by A 705 [0.125, 0.6, 0.275] 0.672 0.416 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Pref. by B 1038 [0.388, 0.2, 0.412] 0.466 0.600 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Prop. by A 293 [0.217, 0.46, 0.323] 0.649 0.516 0.65 0.35 1 accept
Prop. by A 293 [0.217, 0.46, 0.323] 0.611 0.560 0.65 0.55 1.2 reject
Prop. by A 293 [0.217, 0.46, 0.323] 0.654 0.507 0.65 0.3 0.95 accept
In the middle or under-constrained condition, the inequality describing the total




B→A < 1. They are both willing to give up more “ground”
than what is necessary. Agreement in these situations will be quick or highly prob-
able. The proposed design or preference is closer to the responder’s preferred design
than what would be generally accepted. The outcome of proposed designs in these
situations often results in agreement.




B→A = 1, the proposed de-
sign lies exactly on the point which would satisfy the associated constraint equation.
The responding decision maker could accept the design, since at this power relation-
ship, they cannot expected to obtain a better design more than half the time, under
the situation’s perceived power assumptions.
A more concrete example is show in Table 12, where DMA proposes design #293 to
the responder (DMB) who has assumed different influences onto A (i.e. P
′
B→A). The
first two rows indicate the preferred design and utility scores before any consensus.
The utility score for A’s design is much larger than B’s utility score of the same
design, and vice versa for the other design.





B→A equals 1. In this case, DMB accepts this design since they will not
expect to convince DMA to approach or come closer to their preferred design (i.e.
d1038) any more than the design or preferences listed in row #3. The utility columns
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show that for this design, both decision makers concede some utility value. DMA’s
utility dropped from 0.672 to 0.649 while DMB’s utility dropped from 0.6 to 0.516.
Although both experienced a reduction in utility, the benefits of cooperation might
compensate for the lower utility. In other words, before consensus was reached, both
of their utility values were effectively zero if cooperation is essential (an assumption
throughout this research). That is, without each other and a final agreement, no
design can be selected, and thus no benefit or utility can be achieved for either one.
Although, neither decision maker was able to achieve their own individual best value,
both are able to gain from the relationship by finding at least one consensus point and
by so doing potentially “pooling” their power over other decision makers, discussed
later.
The fourth row in Table 12 shows when the over-constrained condition occurs
and the sum of the powers over each other is greater than 1. DMB expects that
disagreeing will result in DMA moving to a position more closely aligned with DMB’s
preferred point. From the opposite perspective, DMA might take a similar view that
eventually DMB will concede more as well. Regardless of the proposer or responder,
the responder will reject the offer and wait for a new or counter-offer which is more
acceptable.
Lastly, the fifth row shows the under-constrained case where both decision makers




B→A < 1. In this
case the responder will readily accept offers, since they view the proposed design as
much better than they could have expected under the power assumptions made about
relationship.
In all cases, if the utility value is equal or greater compared to the constrained
case’s utility value, the assumption is made that the responder will accept the pro-
posed design or preference. (i.e. 0.56 > 0.516 from the uB column in Table 12).
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6.3.2 Multiple Ultimatum Games Between Decision Makers
The limitation in the one game presented in Table 12 is that the actual preferred de-
sign is unknown, since only a range on the possible valid weighting vectors is known for
each decision maker. Therefore, the above ultimatum game must be played multiple
times from multiple initial weighting vectors.
Furthermore, only three combinations of power relationships were tabulated in
Table 12. In fact, the power indices are also not precisely known with only a distribu-
tion of influence defining the relationships between the various decision makers. For
this reason, the ultimatum game must be played multiple times across the various
weighting vectors and concurrently with all the potential perceived power relationship
combinations.
Consider two decision makers (A and B) both seeking to reach agreement on a
design, with the set of feasible weighting vectors expressed in the design space as
illustrated in Figure 108. Each design labeled with an A or B on the left and right
of Figure 108, respectively, represents a “best” design associated with one or more
of the feasible weighting vectors. These designs represent the mapped set of feasible
weighting vectors onto the design space as the true preference from each of the decision
makers from previous discrete choices in Step 1.
From before, DMA prefers x2 much more than x1 with x3 in between. DMB has
a near opposite perspective from that of DMA. However, under the assumption that
both prefer an agreement over no agreement both are willing, to different degrees, to
reach consensus on some design likely in between their preferred regions.
To analyze at which designs reaching consensus is most likely, the initial prefer-
ence vectors are randomly selected from among the set of weighting vectors whose
corresponding designs are pictured in Figure 108. Concurrently, random values from
the two related distributions of power relationships, namely from PA→B and PB→A in






Figure 108: Feasible weighting vectors mapped to the design space for Decision Mak-
ers A and B
With the perceived power indices, one of the decision makers will propose to the
other a mapped weighting vector (or a design) at which they would be in agreement.
By assumption, the proposing decision maker will only propose a design which they
would accept had the other proposed it. The other decision maker then evaluates the
utility value (or the reduction in utility value) from their initial weighting vector and
corresponding perceived power relationship. If the utility value is greater than what
they can reasonably expect from the relationship (i.e. the offer exactly associated with
the constraining power condition), they will accept the proposition and the consensus
is reached.
This above process is repeated multiple times for randomly selected initial weight-
ing vectors and power relationship indices. The count of how often each design be-
comes the point at which consensus was reached is recorded. Visualize these designs
colored by the occurrences of consensus reached is illustrated in Figure 109. Designs
which were never selected in the consensus reaching process are shown as small dark
points. The designs with the highest number of occurrences where the two decision
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makers reached consensus (“consensus occurrence”) are colored in red, with decreas-
ing occurrences through a gradient of red, green and then blue.
Figure 109: Left: Region of Design Space with consensus reaching. Right: Design
Space Projected onto the x1-x2 plane vs. consensus occurrence number
The set of designs with consensus occurrence greater than one will generally fall
between the designs representing the possible best weighting vector of each decision
maker (compare Figure 108 to the left side of Figure 109). By projecting all the
designs onto the x1-x2 plane, the consensus occurrence can be visualized in a type
of 3-dimensional histogram using the third axis as the occurrence number (right side
of Figure 109). The taller the vertical bars (or “redder”), the higher the probability
that consensus is reached at that design (and thus at the complementary preference
or weighting vector).
The one dimensional bar chart of the same data is shown in Figure 110, ordered
by consensus occurrence. For these two decision makers, 60 designs were reached
during the ultimatum game simulations, but only 30 labels (every other design) are
listed on the x-axis. However, nearly 30% of all agreements are reached on only
5 of the designs. These are expectedly near the middle of the cloud of designs as
shown in Figure 109. Statistics on the associated preferences relating to these designs
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Figure 110: Designs sorted by the percent of all consensus occurrences between DMA
and DMB after 5000 MC simulations
can suggest where preferences are most likely to coincide between these two decision
makers.
As mentioned, these points fall between the initial set of designs preferred by
DMA and DMB, but slightly closer to A’s preferred designs. This is, of course, a
consequence of the difference in power or influence these two decision makers have
over each other. DMA is able to convince or persuade DMB to reach consensus on
designs slightly closer to A’s initial preferences. Although both must “give up” some
utility in order to reach agreement, DMA evidently will sacrifice less utility in terms
of percentage compared to B.
If the ultimatum game was played between DMA and DMC , the shift would be
even more skewed towards A’s designs, since the influence of A over C is greater
than that over B. The graph on the bottom of Figure 111 shows the output between
these two decision makers. The top side of Figure 111 shows the respective regions
that DMA (top left) and DMC (bottom left) preferred before reaching consensus is
attempted.
The previous few figures only show the consensus region in terms of the design
space. In the preference space, similar and additional observations can be made about
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Figure 111: Region of design space with consensus reached between DMA and DMC
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regions where consensus is most likely to occur. Figure 112 illustrates an example
of the consensus region in the preference space. The original weighting vectors used
for discrete choices from Step 1 in the methodology are shown as a reference plane.
The two red regions on this plane indicate the set of weighting vectors that could
represent the true preference of DMA (right) and DMB (left). The black cloud in
the middle represent the set of weighting vectors at which decision makers reached
agreement for at least one of the ultimatum games. As expected this cloud of points
is close to the middle but slightly shifted towards A’s preference weighting vectors. A
magnified view of the same three regions with the reference plane removed is shown on
the right of Figure 112. The discrete levels in the weighting vectors are visible along
with the more random consensus region between them showing the lower density of
points on the outer edges of the region. As mentioned, this set of 5000 weighting
vectors converts to only 60 designs in the design space above. This is a consequence
of multiple weighting vectors resulting in the same design point, since the resolution
on the preference space can be much higher than the “resolution” ore density of the
design space. If more than 2000 points existed in the design space or on the Pareto-
front, then likely more than 60 designs would share in the points at which consensus
occurred.
For the current example with three decision makers, the potential to form a coali-
tion between any two decision makers is possible. Thus, the ultimatum game can
be played between A and C or between B and C with different resultant regions of
consensus. In Figure 113, these two other combinations are illustrated. Since both
DMA and DMB have significantly more influence than DMC the consensus region is
much closer to A’s (left hand side) or B’s (right hand side) preferred region.
Comparing Figure 113 to the left hand side of figure 112, the three possible re-
gions of consensus between any two of the decision makers take on different shapes
and locations. As discussed previously, the power relationships will heavily influence
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Figure 112: Consensus region in the preference space between decision makers A and
B, with magnified view on the right.
Figure 113: Region of consensus between DMA and DMC (left) and between DMB
and DMC (right)
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the relative “distance” between the initially preferred regions, but the shape and ex-
tent (or “size”) of the consensus region is dependent on the range or uncertainty of
the weighting vectors, which is in turn dependent on the number of discrete choices
that each decision maker responded to within Step 1. If the randomly selected initial
weighting vector comes from a smaller range, the consensus region will be expectedly
smaller as well. In the current example the number of discrete choices presented to
DMA, DMB and DMC were 7, 5 and 8 respectively, which in part explains the dif-
ferences in the “size” of the preferred regions but also the discretization or resolution
of the set of weighting vector. However, the 7 randomly generated discrete choices
for DMA seemed to be, by chance, less effective in reducing the range of the weight-
ing vectors compared to the 5 for DMB when comparing the number of potential
weighting vectors.
6.3.3 Sequence of N-player Consensus Reaching
The previous section discussed the points or rather the weighting vectors at which
two decision makers will reach consensus. Although, only one weighting vector will be
ultimately assumed and applied to a particular decision-making problem, identifying
the range of these possible vectors allows one to analyze which vectors and thus which
designs are more likely to be selected. This would not only potentially facilitate and
accelerate decision making but also allow one to develop strategies for negotiating,
cooperate more effectively or more precisely manage expectations.
After two decision makers have reached consensus, they have effectively traded
utility for cooperation. In essence, they have become a unified decision maker with
an updated set of vectors which represent their (now) new preferences. In other
words, the consensus region between DMA and DMB becomes the preferences of the
coalition DMAB which now must reach consensus with the last decision maker DMC .
Figure 114 shows this sequence pictorially where the consensus region between A
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Figure 114: Pictorial example of sequence of regions through a consensus reaching
process
With only three decision makers, there are only three sequences (with two con-
sensus reaching stages) possible, namely: 1) A and B first reach consensus followed
by AB with C, 2) A and C reach consensus followed by AC with B, and 3) B and C
first reach consensus followed by BC with A.
Table 13: All Possible Sequences with Four Decision Makers
Sequence # Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
1 A—B AB—C ABC—D
2 A—B AB—D ABD—C
3 A—B C—D AB—CD
4 A—C AC—B ACB—D
5 A—C AC—D ACD—B
6 A—C B—D AC—BD
7 A—D AD—C ADC—B
8 A—D AD—B ADB—C
9 A—D B—C AD—BC
10 B—C BC—A BCA—D
11 B—C BC—D BCD—A
12 B—C A—D BC—AD
13 B—D BD—A BDA—C
14 B—D BD—C BDC—A
15 B—D A—C BD—AC
16 C—D CD—A CDA—B
17 C—D CD—B CDB—A
18 C—D A—B CD—AB
With four decision makers involved the number of sequences expands to 15 as
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many more combinations of coalitions are possible with additional sequences from the
various orders. Table 13 shows the 15 sequences, each with three stages of consensus
reaching. The symbol “—” separates the two decision makers or coalitions in each
stage. Sequences 12, 15 and 18 are crossed off as they are repeated sequences of
respective rows 9, 6 and 3. Therefore the 18-3 possible sequences accounts for the 15
unique sequences. Regardless of the number of decision makers, the number of stages
is always k − 1, where k is the number of decision makers. The number of sequences
increases much more quickly as a result of the various ways that 2, 3, ... k−1 decision
makers can form coalitions in various orders.
Returning to the case with three decision makers, Figure 115 illustrates on the
top one sequence (with stages B—C and then BC—A) within the preference space.
The black consensus region of the upper left graph (representing the stage B—C)
becomes the preference region (in red) in the upper right graph (representing the
stage BC—A).
On the bottom of Figure 115, the final set of design points upon which the entire
group has reached agreement, is indicated on the bottom left, and the consensus
occurrence is shown in the projected design space on the bottom right.
Assuming this “B—C, BC—A” sequence was in fact executed by the decision
makers, the resultant design points of the final consensus region provide a set of
designs from which these decision makers will “eventually” select. As mentioned
above, this can potentially reduce the time needed to reach a decision as individuals
realize that after multiple iterations, discussions, or negotiations, they still may “end
up” in this region and so efforts may be more fruitful by only considering this smaller
subset of designs, beginning at the designs most often reached during the consensus
reaching simulation process.
Overlaying this consensus region with the mapped initial weighting vectors onto
the design space of all of the decision makers results in Figure 116. Similar to previous
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Figure 115: Consensus reaching sequence for “B—C, BC—A”. Preference space of
initial weighting vectors and consensus regions (top). Design space consensus region
and number of occurrences onto projected design space (bottom).
243
Figure 116: Consensus Region of sequence “B—C, BC—A”, overlaid with initial
weighting vectors of all three decision makers
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figures, the points that are most red are those designs at which consensus was reached
most often.
This figure is contrasted against the other two consensus sequences in Figure 117
(i.e. “A—C, AC—B” and “A—B, AB—C”).
Figure 117: Consensus Region of sequences “A—C, AC—B” (left) and “A—B,
AB—C” (right), overlaid with initial weighting vectors of all three decision makers
There are slight differences between the three sequences on account of the pooling
and/or loss of power or influence over other decision makers through the appropriate
consensus stages. Up until this point, the benefit of forming a coalition has been
discussed only in terms of a requirement to eventually cooperate. However, combin-
ing a group’s collective power to influence another decision maker is an even more
motivating reason to cooperate and form coalitions.
In the first sequence (i.e. “B—C, BC—A”), DMB and DMC decide to form a
coalition before either one of them does so with DMA. If this is not in either of their
best interests they would likely wait or seek some other combination (perhaps with
A) resulting in a benefit to themselves individually. Since the desire for the overall
methodology is to encourage cooperation and accelerate the decision-making processes
through facilitating consensus reaching, the requirement that forming coalitions is
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desirable is needed. The appropriate research question follows:
Research Question: How should power or influence be combined during the
consensus reaching stage such that forming coalitions are advantageous to the indi-
viduals?
The reversed question would be how to avoid penalizing a group for forming
a coalition? Ideally, a reduction in influence of the group (or coalition) over the
individual should not be possible. Similarly, some benefit of an increase in power
over others should come as a result of, or an incentive for, forming a coalition.
In this current example, when DMB and DMC are unified and form a coalition, the
power or influence relationships between them becomes irrelevant and are effectively
removed from any further analysis. Assume that the power relationships for this
example take on the values listed in Table 14.








If DMB joined DMC , together they would look to DMB to influence DMA since
the influence that DMC has over DMA is minimal (0.215). The power relationship
of B over A is PB→A = 0.528 which is much greater than 0.215. Therefore, after the
stage one consensus, the relationships becomes PBC→A = 0.528 and PA→BC = 0.472.
DMA loses their opportunity to influence DMC , by remaining outside the coali-
tion. DMC reaps the benefits of joining DMA which is having more influence over
DMA (through DMB). Lastly, DMB is able to express their entire influence onto
DMC (PB→C = 0.679) while removing the influence that DMA would have on DMB.
If DMB failed to form a coalition with DMC , and instead DMA and DMC united,
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DMA would have been able to persuade DMC to a region closer to DMA than DMB.
Thus the consensus reaching in stage 2 would favor DMA. The last sequence pools
the influence of DMA and DMB, which together they would apply DMA’s influence




































Figure 118: Three sequences with the power relationships indicated after stage 1.
Left: “B—C, BC—A”, Middle: “A—C, AC—B”, Right: “A—B, AB—C”
6.3.4 Sequences with More than Three Decision Makers
More interesting combinations exist with more than three decision makers, since many
more orders and coalitions can be formed. An experiment testing the impact of the
order or sequence of forming coalitions with more than three decisions makers was
performed.
While keeping the power relationships in Table 15 constant for more than one
sequence, the consensus region was evaluated and visualized.
Even with the same power structure, based on the sequence the decision makers
executed, the consensus region can be in significantly different areas. For example,
if the sequences follow row 3 from Table 13 (i.e. “A—B , C—D , AB—CD”) then
the final consensus region for the group falls near DMD’s initially preferred region
as shown in the left side of Figure 119. If the sequence executed is that from row 1
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(i.e. “A—B , AB—C , ABC—D”) of Table 13, then the consensus region touches and
even overlaps some of the designs that DMC initially preferred, as shown on the right
hand side of Figure 119. As before the decision makers initially preferred regions or
designs are labeled with the respective letter and colored accordingly.
Figure 119: Consensus region of sequences “A—B , C—D , AB—CD” (left) and
“A—B , AB—C , ABC—D” (right), overlaid with initial weighting vectors of all four
decision makers
This experiment illustrates how the order of forming coalitions can result in dif-
ferent final consensus regions. Furthermore, analyzing the intermediate interactions
is useful in understanding the dynamics within the group.
In the first sequence, DMA and DMB formed a coalition with DMA having sig-
nificant influence over B (PA→B = 0.890). The other two decision makers, DMC and
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DMD formed a coalition with DMD dominating the relationship (PD→C = 0.891).
The benefit to DMB in forming the coalition is the removal of both DMC and DMD
influences over them. DMB is relatively weak over all, but uniting with another de-
cision maker early may help the final decision fall closer to their preferences and give
them a little more “say” within their coalition. DMC is the next weakest and formed
a coalition with DMD even though in this example DMD’s preferred region was the
“furthest” away. The advantage in this relationship is more towards DMD since DMC
holds a majority of the power between A and C. Since DMD seeks this benefit, they
quickly form a coalition (perhaps as a result of the influence D has over C) and then as-
sume a power together over A of 0.620 (i.e. since, PC→A = 0.620 => PCD→A = 0.620).
The final consensus stage has DMAB with only 38% of the power over DMCD and
therefore the final consensus region is near DMD’s initially preferred region.
However, DMC could have refused to form a coalition with D and instead unite
with A, whose preference region is much “closer” to its own. This would have severe
implications for the relationship between DMAC and DMD since PA→D = 0.871. No
longer would DMD have power over DMC and therefore they would be required to
concede significantly in the final consensus stage. This is in fact seen in the second
sequence (right side of 119. As mentioned, DMB is effectively a non-player in that
their power over each of the others is less than 0.33 and thus they would likely
join either A during stage 1 or AC during stage 2 without significantly altering the
final result (which was shown to be true upon further experimentation). Since, the
final consensus region lies very close to the initial preferred region of DMC with the
second sequence, and DMC is aware of this, they will more readily form a coalition
with DMA before DMD. Still, there are clearly reasons, events or additional factors
for incentivizing DMC to join D, but they would need to be significantly stronger
than the benefits from joining A.
In general, however, coalitions are more likely to be formed with decision makers
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closer in terms of preferences (but not always) and with deceasing probabilities as the
differences in the mean weighting vectors, and thus the difference in utility between
decision makers, increases. The consequence of this assumption is that the above
sequences will have different probabilities of being executed. For example, DMC may
be more likely to form a coalition with A than with D.
In the Step 3 algorithm for this methodology, the probability to initiate a coalition,
or in other words to propose (in an ultimatum game) a design or preference to one
of the other decision makers, is dependent on the utility of the designs of the others’
mean weighting vectors, such that the probability:





, i 6= m (44)
where k is the number of decision makers, and i and j are the ith and jth decision
maker respectively. In the above example, with four decision makers, the probability
that C would propose to, and potentially form a coalition with D, evaluates to:
P (DMC proposes to DMD) =
U(w̄D)




0.585 + 0.454 + 0.416
= 0.286.
A variety of other formulations are possible when defining a probability of selecting
another decision maker such as a probability dependent on 1) the distance between
weighting vectors, 2) the distance between the nearest design points of two preferred
regions, or 3) the total group power at each consensus stage.
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6.3.5 Effects of Power Relationship Changes on Consensus Reaching
Holding the power distributions constant and changing the sequence from above
can also be reversed by investigating the effect when power distributions themselves
change. This can occur when a decision maker is replaced by someone at some point
during the decision-making process, who may have a different reputation, skill set,
resource, etc. which changes the balance of power between decision makers.
For example, decision maker B was considered weak in terms of power over the
other three decision makers in the previous section. If DMB is replaced with DM
′
B
whose individual influence (for some reason) is greater than DMB over the others, the
results will be expectantly different even if the sequence executed is kept the same.
The two graphs in Figure 120 show the same sequence but with different power
relationships for the four decision makers. On the left, DMB is considered very weak
and does not influence any decision maker more than 0.33 as described above. On the
right, DMB has significantly more influence only over DMA but little on DMC and
DMD. However, since the sequence under consideration has DMA and DMB forming
a coalition in stage 1, the remaining stages are dominated by this partnership and
therefore influence that DMA has on the other two.
A recent example of changing decision makers and therefore changing power net-
works or relationships, in the middle of a decision process is the delay of the “se-
questration” until March 2013 as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012
passed on January 1, 2013 to avoid the so called “fiscal cliff” [161]. Since 33% of
the US Senate and all 435 seats from the US House of Representatives were up for
reelection in November 2012 many new individuals will became a part of the 113th
United States Congress. Since the 112th United States Congress passed the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 2012 two days before it ended, a new set of decision makers were put in
place to grapple with major parts of the act currently used as negotiation tactics. A
high chance exists that the influence or power relationships between individuals and
251
Figure 120: Consensus region of sequences “A—B , C—D , AB—CD” with DMB
“weak” (left) and “strong” (right)
across parties collectively had been altered significantly from 2012 to 2013.
Similar changes in power occur often on companies’ board of directors or on en-
gineering project teams. Therefore accounting for changes in group decision making
methodologies is requisite.
6.3.6 Multi-Dimensional Decisions with N-Players
Of course, in reality, problems will sometimes much larger than N-players or decision
makers and the potential for many more dimensions than three. Both of these problem
characteristics have the potential to change the accuracy and/or suitability of the
methodology.
Research Question: What is the impact of higher dimensional data sets with
larger numbers of decision makers?
In response to this question, and to support the overall hypothesis that this
methodology is a valid process to facilitate decision making for multi-agents multi-
objective decision making, the final set of experiments involves testing a similar
canonical problem with 1) more than four decision makers and 2) more than a three
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dimensions.
Results from the first of these experiments are shown in the two figures on the
next page. Figure 121 shows two simulation results with 10 different decision makers.
Although the sequence executed by the collective decision makers is identical (i.e. the
simple sequence “A—B , AB—C , ABC—D ...”) the power relationships between the
two simulations have been shuffled. The distribution means of the power relationships
vary over a range from 0.5 to 0.95 in both simulations, but the assignments of these
distributions to decision makers have been shuffled relative to each other.
In the first simulation (top of Figure 121), DMI maintains a relatively high amount
of influence despite the large group of 8 decision makers (A through H) with whom
DMI participates in a consensus stage close to the end of the sequence. In the
second simulation (bottom of Figure 121), DMI has significantly lower influence on
the group DMA−H at the second to last consensus stage and impacts very little the
final consensus region. A similar situation is found for DMJ who has little influence
at the end of the same sequence.
The last experiments explore higher dimensional data sets or design spaces. Most
likely a real decision problem will include more than three objectives and thus testing
if the methodology scales with dimensions or objectives is required.
Initially, the set of designs on the Pareto frontier assume points on a four dimen-
sional hypersphere, where x1...x4 > 0. For the 4D case, the initial preferred regions
along with the consensus region can still be partially visible in some visualizations of
the design space. In Figure 122, three decision makers (A,B and C) reach consensus
as indicated in the central region highlighted in dark blue. The other three initially
preferred regions are similarly highlighted, with points as indicated from before. The
graph in the top left shows the 4-dimensional design space in the x1 − x2 − x3 coor-
dinate system. The other three graphs show the same data and regions from three
additional perspectives, namely, the top (along the x3 axis), the left (along the x1
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Figure 121: Consensus Reaching Examples with 10 Decision Makers (A-J). Power
relationships for the two above simulations are the same relative values between the
range of 0.5 and 0.95 but are shuffled with respect to each other.
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Figure 122: Consensus reaching examples with four dimensions in a 3-view visualiza-
tion.
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axis and the right (along the x2 axis) as indicated. Since all points lie on the 4D
Pareto frontier, the consensus region will not lie on the 3D Pareto frontier of only x1,
x2 and x3 as illustrated by a difference or offset from the “apparent 3D frontier” to
the consensus region.
In general, more than 4 objectives could be included in the decision problems and
therefore the application of a scatterplot matrix illustrating the same features but
from a full set of 2D scatterplots as shown in Figure 123 is often more insightful.
(Decision maker labels but not colors have been removed for clarity).
Similar to the apparent offset in Figure 122, in every individual scatterplot, the
consensus region lies away from the local 2D Pareto frontier. If the consensus region
falls onto a local lower level Pareto frontier the region would suggest that potentially
one of the objectives is sufficiently insignificant and can be removed from the analysis
with an effective weight of 0.
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CASE STUDY: IMPLEMENTATION OF MACRO TO AIR
MOBILITY FUTURE SYSTEMS
This chapter implements and applies the MACRO methodology to a data set of future
air mobility solutions generated by AirMOD. A case study is used to demonstrate
and test the methodology on a notional example with five decision makers seeking
to reach consensus on the requirements for a large future air mobility system. Each
decision maker possesses differing views and preferences on the objective space and
each hold varying levels of power or influence over the others.
7.1 Converting AirMOD Metrics to Utilities
In preparation for the application of the MACRO methodology, an essential step
of processing the AirMOD simulation data involves converting the various metrics
to a common or commensurate unit such that they can be combined for an overall
evaluation or utility function.
The simplest approach involves non-dimensionalizing each metric of interest after
which a simple additive function can be formulated. Equation (47) below shows one
such method for non-dimensionalizing the variables and combining them into an OEC.
OECi = α[
MTTCi




max(TFH)−min(TFH) ] + ...
where i is the ith design or solution point, the coefficients α, β, γ... are the weight-
ings for each dimensions and sum to 1, MTTCi, SDTTCi, ... etc. are the ith values
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for that dimension, and the denominators in each term represent the range from
the lowest to the highest value of that dimension. Dividing by the same units as
the numerator will non-dimensionalize each term such that the addition becomes a
commensurate operation.
If a decision maker prefers reducing the time to close more than reducing the total
flight hours, they would set α > γ in the above OEC. Since, for the three dimensions
shown above, a decision maker would likely seek to minimize all of them, the operation
design with the lowest OEC would be the best. If the decision maker sought to
maximize one of the objectives, say payload per flight, then the ratio would be inverted
such that another term in the equation would be ... + δmax(PPF )−min(PPF )
PPFi
+ ... and
the OEC could continue to function as a minimization problem.
The full OEC minimization problem becomes:
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max(UT )−min(UT ) ] +
wER[F (ERi)]},
where, MTTC is the Mean Time to Close, SDTTC is the Standard Deviation on
the Time to Close, TFH is the Total Flight Hours F is the Fuel Consumption, BR is
the Break Rate, PPF is the Payload Per Flight, NA is the Number of Aircraft, MP is
the Maximum Payload, OC is the Operating Cost, AC is the Acquisition Cost, BRC
is the Cost to Reduce the Break Rate, UT is the Utilization, and ER is the En Route
Type Selection.
Of the 13 objectives, only one, PPF, is inverted such that the larger the PPF the
better. This may not necessarily be true since one may prefer smaller aircraft (i.e.
perhaps because of the smaller unit cost). This objective illustrates that some of the
potential objectives are not completely independent since PPF is clearly correlated
with AC.
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In fact, many of the objectives are dependent on another dimension. Although,
an OEC can arbitrarily keep correlated objectives at the same time it is desirable
to minimize the set of objectives to the least number while still capturing the most
significant trades in the decision space. This can keep the problems manageable,
especially when human decision makers involved who struggle to process multiple
dimensions at the same time [108].
A correlation matrix was analyzed and PPF was found to be highly correlated
to MP with ρ = 0.85. Furthermore, AC was correlated exactly with both PPF and
MP since this CER uses the weight ratios directly. TFH was also highly correlated
to OC and fuel consumption (ρ = 0.94) so only one of these three is really essential
for a comprehensive equation. This reduces the equation by 4 terms to a set of
8 which include all costs, namely, MTTC, SDTTC, BR, OC, AC, BRC, UT, and
ER. Although, these dimensions can be considered from one perspective unessential
in calculating the OEC, the display of this information will be significantly more
important within discrete choice experiments given to decision makers discussed later.
The term which includes Utilization (second to last) illustrates a slight difference
in comparison to the other terms. A target utilization is established (i.e. UT = 8)
and any solution which varies significantly away from the target value is considered
a worse design (within that dimension).
Another problem from Equation (48) is found in the last term which can be
understood as some mapping function that converts the selection of En Route Type
used (i.e. no refueling, en route refueling, retro en route refueling) to some value
based on the preferences of the decision maker. For example, if a decision maker
prefers longer hauls, (i.e. a preference for Type 1) then the function output for a
Type 2 or Type 4 design would be higher:
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F (ERi) = A, if ERi = 1, (48)
B, if ERi = 2,
C, if ERi = 3,
D, if ERi = 4,
where, A < C < B < D and 0 ≥ A,B,C,D ≥ 1.
Lastly, the normalization itself is somewhat unsatisfying. For example, completing
the mission in a time to close of 20 days may be good whereas a time to close of 40
is unacceptable. On the other hand, reducing the time to close by 5 (i.e. reducing
MTTC to 15) is much better but reducing it another 5 days may not be as useful
compared to the first “5 day reduction.” In the equation discussed above, a “5 day”
reduction will contribute to the OEC in equal amounts regardless of the initial MTTC.
Whether it is from 65 to 60 days or from 10 to 5 days, the OEC will decrease by the
same absolute amount. However, often those two situations are drastically different,
the former may be unacceptable before and after the reduction, while the latter is
unnecessary or perhaps even too optimistic.
Many of these problems can be solved by converting the various objective ranges
into utility curves which can capture other effects such as the law of diminishing
returns or utility along some of the objectives.
For a particular mission payload, a constraint can be assumed that any time to
close greater than 30 days is unacceptable. Consider, for example, a situation where
significant amounts of supplies are needed in the few weeks after a major natural
disaster in a highly populated area and that supplies (after 30 days) will be too late
to help. From this perspective the utility is maximized (i.e. 1) at the minimum
amount of time to close. The utility will likewise be 0 for MTTC of 30 days and later.
In between these extremes the utility curve for MTTC will likely take on a concave
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shape as shown in Figure 124, where a decrease in the same amount of MTTC maps
to a decreasing rate of utility increases (e.g. for 30 days to 20 days the utility may
jump from 0 to 0.7, but from 20 days to 10 days, utility would increase from 0.7 to
0.8). The straight diagonal line would represent the utility of implementing the OEC
equation described above with a constant slope between MTTC and the OEC value
(utility).




Figure 124: Notional Utility Function for the MTTC Objective
The details for this process to define utility functions are not included here but
are documented in other sources such as [86]. However, a summary of the functions
used to transform the above objectives into utility curves for this research is found in
Table 16 and in the subplots of Figure 125.
Uncertainty in the time to close (SDTTC) would likely exhibit the same trend as
the utility function for MTTC. That is, the marginal utility after the first improve-
ments for the same change in SDTTC may not be as valuable. Furthermore, if the
MTTC has already decreased by a significant amount, say by a full standard devi-
ation lower, the decision maker may become less concerned about meeting the time
constraint regardless of any improvements in SDTTC, resulting in a less amplified
utility curve (in terms of concavity) for SDTTC.
For the cost objectives, utility (U()) will surely decrease as cost increases with the
263
Figure 125: Utility Curve/Functions for the Operational Objectives
264
Table 16: Operational Objective Utility Functions
Variable Variable Name Utility Function
MTTC Mean Time to Close 1− ( MTTC−min(MTTC)
max(MTTC)−min(MTTC))
2.5
SDTTC Std. Dev. of Time to Close 1− ( SDTTC−min(SDTTC)
max(SDTTC)−min(SDTTC))
2
BR Break Rate 1− ( BR−min(BR)
max(BR)−min(BR))
2.5
OC Operational Cost 1− ( OC−min(OC)
max(OC)−min(OC))
3
AC Acquisition Cost 1− ( AC−min(AC)
max(AC)−min(AC))
1.4
BRC Cost to Reduce Break Rate 1− ( BRC−min(BRC)
max(BRC)−min(BRC))
2.5
UT Utilization 1− 0.015625(UT − 8)2
ER En Route Selection Type 1 if Type = 1,
0.8 if Type = 2,
0.9 if Type = 3,
0.7 if Type = 4
similar concave shape again but to a different degree. Since AC (acquisition cost) is
so large compared to OC (Operating Cost) in absolute terms, the concavity is likely
to be less than that of U(OC). Regardless of the current price, reducing it by a million
dollars translates to an almost equal marginal utility since the unit price is so large
(e.g. $250 million). Operating Cost, on the other hand, has significant impacts
throughout the life of the aircraft beyond the mission operating cost considered in
this model. Therefore, a small decrease in OC, would have large benefits into the
future over many years, resulting in a utility curve with high concavity. The cost to
reduce the break rate also has long term benefits but likely not as extensive as the
operating cost.
The break rate will follow this established pattern as well, but the utility for
utilization will differ in that a target utilization may be preferred over simple mini-
mization. In this case, the utility is maximized at the target utilization and falls off
quickly at UT values greater than 16 or less than 1 (underused and overused condi-
tions respectively). The utility function for the en route selection type is even more
unique. With the assumption that less flights, more direct paths, and less stops are
preferred over the other options, the general utility function will take on particular
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values for each of the 4 types.
These equations will be applied to calculate the utility for each design, by combin-
ing the individual objectives (transformed into utilities) in an additive weighted sum
similar to the example problem from the previous chapter. The equation becomes:








where, in this formulation, the decision maker seeks to maximize their utility (Ui).
7.2 Step 0: Decision Maker Definition
With the final utility maximization problem established in the previous section, the
final step before implementation of the consensus reaching methodology is to define
the decision makers themselves by designating the truth model of their individual
preferences across the 8 objectives.
In selecting a program or solution to replace or enhance the current heavy airlift
US military fleet of aircraft, a variety of key stakeholders would be heavily involved
in the process to make decision worth billions of dollars over the life of the program.
In creating this scenario, an arbitrary number of five individual players or agents
have been identified that would need to agree upon the ultimate solution and reach
consensus. Although more decision makers could be included within the analysis,
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the approach itself is not limited in this regard and these five represent a sufficiently
diverse set of backgrounds, desires, expertise, and view points within the context of
the problem to demonstrate the methodology.
The five agents or decision makers are as follows:
1. Chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
2. Representative of the Government (GOV)
3. Operations Director from USTRANCOM (OPS)
4. Industry Partner/Prime Contractor(IND)
5. Chief Technology Officer of the Prime Contractor(CTO)
Other stakeholders are clearly involved in the process, albeit in different roles,
of selecting a design or defining requirements for such a program but some of these
could be understandably grouped with one of the five “individuals” listed above, and
would act in concert with them to a large degree.
The following descriptions summarize some of the backgrounds and perspectives
these individuals may possess and thus what might be preferred by these five decision
makers. These descriptions are purely for illustrative purposes only and should be
considered notional, but have been established to provide a sense of reality to the
problem. Similarly, the preference model they provide, (i.e. weighting vectors repre-
senting their true preferences), will be assumed, by mapping the subjective goals and
ideals of each decision maker to the weights in each of the 8 objectives required by
the analysis performed in the succeeding sections.
1. Council Members of JROC, (Vice Chiefs, Generals, etc.) from the various mil-
itary services would likely take a mission-focused view in comparing various
solutions. Completing the mission proficiently and following commands from
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the commander-in-chief would dominate their preferences. As a result, time to
close (mapped to MTTC importance) and the certainty that the mission could
be achieved (SDTTC becomes important) within a particular time constraint
would be of the utmost importance from their perspective. Clearly, doing so
efficiently and inexpensively (i.e. cost metrics are important) would be accom-
panying goals to the capability priorities. Safety of the service men and women
would also be high on the list of objectives which would translate to secure
flights paths of various missions (i.e. ER metric) to avoid non-allied airspaces.
2. A representative from the government (GOV) , such as a congressman sitting on
the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense or even the Secretary
of the State, would potentially have a much wider set of objectives as compared
to the JROC or other military officers. Since they represent the people of
the United States, a more intense cost to benefit analysis would be required.
Careful accounting of how tax dollar brought in are spent on defense spending
has ramifications on other social programs and even on individual political ca-
reers, and therefore the costs (i.e. Acquisition Cost - AC and Operating Cost
- OC become important) would likely be the most important objectives from
a governmental point of view. Sensitivity to this bottom line will therefore be
high, but the details about how the mission is accomplished may be less impor-
tant to the public sector (lower important on Utilization, Break Rate, Repair
Times). Lastly, supporting the troops during wartime and responding quickly
(importance mapped to MTTC and SDTTC metrics) to natural disasters with
strategic airlift capabilities is not only philanthropic but also politically wise.
3. An Operations Director (OPS) at USTRACOM or AMC would be in charge
of the logistics surrounding the completion of a mission - where the aircraft
are stationed, how quickly they can respond and how many are needed for each
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mission. Fulfilling these goals requires properly using aircraft which have a high
availability and reliability (importance mapped to UT and BR). In performing
their duties, having extra aircraft can act as a safety net with low reliability
aircraft. Not only can inherent redundancy improve with larger fleet sizes,
but under extreme shortages cannibalization of parts can be less detrimental.
Furthermore, larger aircraft might also be preferred. Reducing the flights and
the flight hours, the associated crew costs, maintenance costs and in general,
the operating cost without sacrificing throughput capacity would certainly be
one goal for an operations planner or analyst. These ideals translate to setting
a high importance on objectives related to completing the mission (importance
mapped to MTTD and ER) and keeping the operating costs down (importance
of OC).
4. In industry (IND), where shareholders ultimately defining the one governing
objective of a company, profit, maximizing the objectives aligned with that one
goal are likely to be heavily weighted, namely, the acquisition cost (AC) and
the number of aircraft (This equates to a high cost/profit, which is mapped to
a high capacity and throughput, and thus low importance on the price). Since
the company will design, build, upgrade, manufacture, maintain, etc. the new
C-X platform, the desire to maximize both revenue and profits can be expected.
This type of preference structure would, of course, favors large purchase orders
(i.e. high number of aircraft) with an ideally accompanying as high a unit price
as possible (mapped to AC). Furthermore, training, maintenance and other
life cycle contracts (mapped to OC) could be sought which would also help the
bottom line if a desire existed on the side of the government to outsource some or
many of these operating costs. Finally, since carrying capacity and performance
is the ultimate product offered by the company, the weighting on the activities
of research and development mapped through improving the reliability would
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be high, such that the importance on the BR metric is also high.
5. Finally, the CTO, Chief Scientist or some other technologist from within the
company or another subcontractor may prefer the challenge of designing, build-
ing and flying a new, larger and more reliable aircraft. Likely the design would
require research and technological breakthroughs, and provide security to a
plethora of other engineering, scientific and research jobs for the near future.
From this technologist standpoint, the RDT&E funds which invest in reliabil-
ity research and subsystem improvements would be most attractive (i.e. im-
portance mapped to Break Rate - BR and the cost to improve reliability -
BRC). Furthermore, implementing these new technologies without significantly
increasing the unit price would also be of importance (importance mapped to
AC).
Taking the above descriptions into consideration, and translating goals and desires
into weights of the 8 objectives, the preference structure for each of the decision
makers can be defined as shown in Table 17.
Table 17: Decision Makers’ Preference Truth Model
The above table will be assumed to represent the preference truth model required
from a simulation perspective for Step 1. The responses to discrete choices will be
in accordance with these weightings even though the agents would not necessarily be
able to reproduce these themselves without considerable difficulties or uncertainty. If
Step 1 were to be performed in reality, the preferences would, of course, be derived
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from the discrete choices themselves and there would be no need for a simulation
truth model.
The MC simulations for the 8 dimensional decision space are shown in Figure 126,
with the solutions colored by the total utility using the function coefficients with the
truth weights of DMGOV . The point with the highest utility is selected and colored in
black with decreasing utility values colored across a gradient from dark red to blue.
Figure 126: AirMOD Decision Space colored by utility from truth weights of DMGOV
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Figure 126 actually only shows 7 dimensions since the 8th (i.e. Type) was de-
faulted or filtered to only Type 1 mission scenarios. Also, the individual metric
ranges have been normalized to a range of 0 to 1 within the particular APOE-APOD
Type 1 mission scenario which includes post-processing and removal of all MTTC
designs with values greater than 40 days to close. Since DMGOV has a relatively
uniform preference structure (i.e. [0.15 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.15]) compared
to the other decision makers, the solutions or designs with the highest utility are not
generally found on the edges of the 8D space.
An example of this occurs when the preference structure or weighting vector favors
one, or just a few, of the objectives. For example, if “money was no object” and the
decision maker only cared about completing the mission as quickly as possible (low
MTTC) and with as little uncertainty as possible (low SDTTC), the weighting vector
would be [0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0]. This would result in Figure 127 where the 8D utility
space is shown and the U(MTTC) is almost 1 and the U(SDTTC) = 1. Interestingly,
this also results in a very low break rate (i.e. high U(BR)) but an associated very
expensive cost to improve this Break Rate. (In fact, the point selected has a BRC
of $46 billion dollars!) Of course, spending a lot of money on increasing reliability
has a direct impact on reducing MTTC and SDTTC, so those output metrics are
consistent. In terms of the other costs, they take on extreme values as well. Having
a larger and more expensive aircraft (made even more expensive with a larger fleet
size) also helps with completing the mission more quickly. Again, costs are high for
exceptional performance. This is acceptable if one was not to weight AC or OC very
important, but those, in reality, drive or often constrain the performance metrics.
Turning now to the requirements of Step 2, additional inputs are needed only
within the simulation mode of this methodology. Or, in other words, computer sim-
ulation requires these inputs whereas actual human responses to the Step 2 discrete
choice experiments would provide this data.
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Figure 127: AirMOD Decision Space colored by utility for equal importance only on
MTTC and SDTTC
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Since universal cooperation is a key assumption for any solution in the current
scope of this research, if any one of the players disagree with the final decision the
program would not be considered “selected”. That is, agreement must be reached
by all parties to adequately define the region or points of consensus. For example,
it is unlikely the CEO of the prime contractor will agree to a requirement if internal
experts (e.g. CTO) do not think a particular requirement is possible at the negotiated
price. Similarly, a congressman is unlikely to allocate funds if a military general or
other JROC official does not approve of, or will not use, a specific design.
These relationships between the decision makers are an essential component to
quantifying the power or influence that one may have on another in Step 2 of the
approach. Since the decision makers and thus their perceived influence on each other
must be modeled as inputs to the simulation, the following table. (Table 18 will serve
as the perceived influence truth model in the methodology.)
Table 18: Decision Makers’ Perceived Influence Truth Model
The table is read by selecting a decision maker down the rows, and then identifying
the perceived influence they think they have over each of the other four in the table
columns. Therefore, DMJROC (military decision makers) has a perceived influence
over the government official. DMJROC may rationalize that since they with the
services are the actual users of the asset and may know more about what level of
capacity is truly needed, DMGOV would be more willing to listen to their opinions.
On the other hand, DMGOV considers themselves as in control of the budget and
may expect DMJROC to “fall in line” as the defense arm (i.e. an appendage) of the
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government.
The other indices of power or influence could be defended with other notional
explanations: Considering themselves as the customer, DMGOV would perceive a
high level of influence over DMIND, but perhaps not so much over the contractor
technical employees DMCTO. DMCTO might view themselves as able to persuade
their CEO or DMIND to consider things their way, but probably none of the other
three. Lastly, DMOPS would likely be able to persuade, remind, or convince the
DMJROC regarding their own military logistics and operations preferences but would
not necessarily have as much influence over the others.
Table 18 contains examples for all three of the “constrained” (e.g. POPS→GOV +
PGOV→OPS = 1, “over-constrained” (e.g. PJROC→GOV +PGOV→JROC > 1) and “under-
constrained” (e.g. PIND→OPS + POPS→IND < 1) power conditions established in the
previous chapter.
7.3 Step 1 Results: Calculating Weighting Distributions
The notional decision makers defined in the previous section are now given a set
of discrete choices and required to designate which one they prefer to extract the
weighting distributions. An example discrete choice experiment for this test problem
is found in Figure 128.
In general, some of the same scenario parameters will be similar for a valid discrete
choice such that a decision maker can more easily make a comparison and select a
preferred design. Therefore, in the discrete choice of Figure 128, the Mission payload
is set to 20 million pounds for each and the APOE-APOD combination is the same as
well. However, the types between two discrete choices need not be identical. In order
to compare one’s preferences for types across mission and the example in Figure 128
shows a discrete choice comparing a Type 1 solution to a Type 4 solution.
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Which design do you prefer? A or B?
Solution/Design A Solution/Design B
Metric Design A Design B Units
Mission Payload 20 20 million lbs
Mean Time to Close (MTTC) 35.75 8.95 days
Std. Dev. TTC 7.8 8.1 days
Utilization 11.2 5.6 hours/day
Break Rate 21.3 20.7 %
Cost to Reduce Break Rate 13.2 13.5 $billion
Flight Hours 6027.3 2066 hours
Total Operating Cost 126.3 43.3 $million
Payload per Flight 47602 271628 lbs
Empty Weight 444758 386803 lbs
Fleet Size 15 41
Acquisition Cost (per unit) 282.9 246 $million
Total Acquisition Cost 4.24 10.09 $billion
Design A? Design B?
Preferred Design? X  
Figure 128: Air Mobility Example of a Discrete Choice from Step 1
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If the mission payload is not similar, additional adjustments to the metrics them-
selves are required. For example, if the mission payload was 30 million pounds for
one and 20 million pounds for the other, some of the metrics would have to normal-
ized based on these different mission payloads. Thus, the time to close would be
expressed in a “time to close per million pounds” or the flights hours would need to
be expressed in “flight hours per million pounds,” etc. This could cause unnecessary
cognitive burden on decision makers trying to balance and make trades across these
normalized or ratio-based metrics.
Thus, for any one discrete choice the scenario will be identical for the APOE-
APOD combination and the mission payload. However, it is still valid to vary those
parameters from discrete choice to discrete choice since extraction of weighting dis-
tributions is the intermediate objective for Step 1, and not necessarily to identify the
precise solution.
The design parameters at the bottom illustrate some of the trades discussed in
previous sections. The fleet size is 15 to 41 for Design A and B respectively and so
total acquisition price is almost $6 billion greater for design B.
In fact, for Design A the aircraft individually are much larger and more expensive
by about $37 million. They also carry much less payload per flight (almost one sixth
that of Design B) as a result of an extremely long mission leg with no refueling stops.
Since the flight hours are almost triple, the operating costs are correspondingly about
three times as much. The break rate is approximately the same with the same level
of investment for higher reliability. The SDTTC is also about the same on account of
the comparable break rate, but the MTTC is much longer for Design A (36 days vs.
9 days). If time to close does not matter, then saving money with a smaller fleet size
is attractive. But if a time constraint does exist, and funds are available to reduce
meet this time target, then a larger fleet is an valid option. Of course, one major
down side to Design B is the multiple stops in two other countries. Although Design
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Figure 129: Reduction in Weighting Vector Ranges for all Objectives through a Series
of Discrete Choices in Step 1
B closes the mission much more quickly, the cost associated with maintaining bases
overseas may further add to the already more expensive design of the two solutions.
The general trade is relatively clear: increased performance is more expensive. By
responding to a set of these discrete choices, however, the preference of the decision
maker between performance and cost can be obtained.
The outputs from Step 1 when the decision makers have responded to a set of
discrete choices are the distributions of the weightings for each of the 8 objectives.
When simulating Step 1 with a set of discrete choices with DMJROC the weighting
distributions are summarized in Figure 129.
The range for each of the 8 objectives starts from 0 to 1 as in the canonical
problem from the previous chapter. The increment value starts very large (0.5) but
immediately after the first iteration a refinement step is executed with four more
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throughout the full set of 25 discrete choice experiments. Although wx1 is clearly the
most important objective as discovered by the simulation with a median weighting
value near 0.45 after 25 discrete choices, the other 7 objectives occlude each other,
and in particular the ones which end with lower weightings. To remedy this problem,
these range histories are translated along the y-axis for easier comparison in Figure
130 on the following page. The objectives from x1 to x8 follow the same order as
above such that x1 = MTTC, x2 = SDTTC, x3 = BR, x4 = OC, x5 = AC, x6 =
BRC, x7 = UT, and x8 = ER.
Step 1 in the methodology appears to accurately predict the weighting distri-
butions of JROC decision maker, DMJROC , where the median of wx1 (wMTTC) is
the largest of the 8 objectives (≈0.45), followed by a relatively wide range for wx2
(wSDTTC), wx4 (wOC) and wx8 (wER). This generally coincides with the largest values
for DMJROC ’s preference truth model. However, the median value for wx1 (≈0.45)
appears larger than that expected (0.3) while the other three are lower.
To aid in analyzing these findings, for any particular simulation, the maximum,
median and minimum values for each objective are contrasted with the preference
truth model used to model the decision maker. Figure 131 illustrates how the weight-
ing distribution range spans the truth model for all objectives. The predicted (P)
range on the left hand side of each objective in Figure 131 contains the three values,
maximum, median and minimum in a boxplot with the mean for only those three
points designated with the horizontal line. On the truth (T) side for each objec-
tive, the boxplot is compressed down to the one data point with the mean value
designated as well. Comparing the median values to the truth data point with a
correlation value provides a ρ = 0.8, suggesting that for at least this decision maker,
Step 1 of the methodology functions reasonably well in predicting their preference
structure.
To confirm this, Step 1 was executed multiple times for DMJROC . A similar
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Figure 130: Reduction in Weighting Vector Ranges for all Objectives through a Series
of Discrete Choices in Step 1 (separated by objective)
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Figure 131: Variability Chart of Predictive accuracy of Step 1 from simulation using
DMJROC model with minimum, maximum and median values for each objective,
compared to truth model
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variability chart was created by showing the distribution of the median values from
the 25 simulations as shown in Figure 132. The boxplots again show the range of the
median values while the diamond plots span the 95% confidence interval of the mean.
Figure 132: Variability Chart of 25 simulations of Step 1 for DMJROC showing the
median values for each weighting distribution
Plotting the possible weighting vectors for all the decision makers is shown in
Figure 133 rotated 90 degrees counterclockwise. The 8-dimensional preference space
is shown along the x-axis for each of the 5 decision makers DMJROC , DMGOV , etc.
along the y-axis.
The top row (i.e. DMJROC) shows a preference for good performance where the
mean weighting vectors are higher for U(MTTC), U(SDTTC), and to a lesser extent
U(ER) which is consistent with the preference truth model above for DMJROC . The
5th objective for DMGOV in the second row also appears shifted to higher importance
values than the others and this too is consistent with DMGOV ’s preference for a lower
cost followed by a preference for good performance for the weights of U(MTTC)
and U(SDTTC). DMOPS, according to the simulation, values U(ER) and U(UT) but
does not set the weight for U(OC) as high as expected as defined in the truth model.
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Figure 133: Possible Weighting Vectors (8-dimensional space along columns) for each
of the 5 decisions maker (along rows)
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DMIND and DMCTO show relative consistency in weighting heavily a more expensive
but more capable design, with DMCTO also valuing a more reliable design, which
closely resembles the truth preference model for these last two decision makers.
The three tables (Tables 19, 20 and 21) assist in comparing the results of the
simulation to the preference truth model. Table 19 is repeated from above with
the preferences from the truth model used for the simulation of the discrete choice
experiments. Table 20 is the predictive mean value of the weighting vectors for all 8
dimensions for each of the five decision makers. Comparing Tables 19 and 19 visually
shows fairly good predictive capabilities for Step 1 in the methodology. To analyze
this difference more fully, Table 21 shows the difference between the truth model
and the predicted values. The various cells for each decision maker’s preference on
each of the 8 objectives are colored based on the absolute difference between the
truth and simulation preference models. For a majority of the weighting values, the
mean weighting vector is within 0.1 of the true preference. However, there are four
weighting values where the absolute difference are larger than 0.1, namely DMJROC ’s
mean value for U(ER), DMGOV ’s mean value for U(SDTTC), DMIND’s mean value
for U(MTTC), and DMOPS’s mean value for U(OC).
Table 19: Decision Makers’ Preference Truth Model (repeated)
This last value in particular is the largest error with a difference of more than 0.2
between the truth and simulation preference models. A possible cause of this large
error, is supported by the correlation matrix between the 8 objectives of the design
space presented in Table 22. The U(OC) objective is correlated with U(MTTC). This
means that by placing a high weighting on the mean time to close (which DMOPS
284
Table 20: Simulation Preference Model - Mean Weighting Value
Table 21: Difference Between Preference Truth Model and Simulation Preference
Model
does with a value of 0.15), one also values a lower operating cost, and vice versa
with a correlation value of almost 0.4. Even more interestingly is the correlation
between U(SDTTC) and both U(MTTC) and U(BR). As mentioned before, a more
reliable aircraft (i.e. with low BR) directly relates to faster close times and less time
uncertainty. Since these three are also correlated with each other, placing impor-
tance on one of them, also places importance on the others. With DMOPS weighing
all three “performance” objectives U(MTTC), U(SDTTC), and U(BR) with a total
importance of 0.35 and U(OC) at 0.3, the model seems to result in favor of the perfor-
mance objectives, and this is further suggested by the over-estimation of weights for
U(MTTC), U(SDTTC), and U(BR) of 0.059, 0.05 and 0.096 respectively for DMOPS.
Table 22: Correlation Matrix Between Objectives
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Furthermore, Table 22 also suggests a high correlation between U(UT) and U(AC).
The higher the total cost of the fleet, the better one can match a desirable utilization
value. With a fleet size which is too low, the utilization would be undesirably high
since over taxing one’s aircraft would be the only way to meet a target time to close.
Lastly, this correlation matrix provides evidence that the 8 dimensions or objectives
are not all completely orthogonal or independent one from another. Thus, the mean
time to close, MTTC, or the variance on the time to close, SDTTC, might be beneficial
to reduce the dimensionality without sacrificing too much fidelity in terms of design
space coverage.
7.4 Step 2 Results: Extracting Power Relationships
In Step 2 of the methodology the discrete choice experiments are provided to allow
the responding decision maker to quantify the difference in power than two other
decision makers may have over the former.
A set of two designs are presented and the responding decision maker is required
to make a choice with whom they are more willing to form a coalition. For example,
Figure 134 illustrates one possible format for the discrete choice given to DMJROC
with scenario parameters (i.e. mapped flight paths) removed as compared to Figure
128. With most of the various parameters or objectives close to one another and
assuming an almost comparable total utility score for each design, DMJROC would
potentially consider with which decision maker they would want to form a coalition.
This in turn would provide information about the difference in influence between
DMGOV and DMOPS have over DMJROC .
A similar set of output graphs showing the converging process of the perceived
influence difference of PGOV→JROC − PIND→JROC is presented in Figure 135.
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With whose design would you chose to form a







Mission Payload 20 20 million lbs
Time to Close (TTC) 27.69 24.19 days
Std. Dev. TTC 11.8 11.4 days
Utilization 9.8 9.9 hours/day
Break Rate 28 27 %
Cost to Reduce Break Rate 11.4 11.8 $billion
Flight Hours 3251.4 2876.5 hours
Total Operating Cost 68.1 60.3 $million
Payload per Flight 173897 194210 lbs
Empty Weight 352975 397452 lbs
Fleet Size 12 12
Acquisition Cost (per unit) 224.5 252.8 $million
Total Acquisition Cost 2.69 3.03 $billion
DMGOV ? DMIND?
Form a Coalition With? X  
Figure 134: Air Mobility Example of a Discrete Choice from Step 2
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Figure 135: Converging Process of DMJROC ’s Perceived Influence difference between
two other Decision Makers (DMGOV and DMIND)
The expected perceived influence difference of PGOV→JROC − PIND→JROC is 0.1,
(i.e. 0.6 - 0.5 = 0.1, taken from the “...on JROC” column from Table 18). This
is converted to the utility difference of 0.065 in Figure 135 since the range of u is
≈ 0.65. In other words, DMJROC is willing to form a coalition with DMGOV with
utility scores 0.065 less than a design potentially offered by DMIND. In reality,
DMIND might never position themselves at a design that much better than DMGOV
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from DMJROC perspective, but the influence or power difference between these two
decision makers is the sole goal of this step.
As described in previous sections, since a range of possible weighting vectors exists,
one of which will represent the true DMJROC weighting vector, the additional bounds
are added above and below the range for the perceive influence difference as depicted
on the bottom of Figure 135. This, of course, is dependent on the certainty in the
ranges of weighting vectors from Step 1. If little or no certainty exists in predicting
the weighting distributions, the corrections to the perceived influence differences will
be minimized.
To quantify the methodology’s ability to predict the power or influence differences,
comparisons between the perceived influence truth model and the simulations outputs
can be performed. Figure 136 shows the range of the perceived influence difference
as calculated by the algorithm in step 2 of the methodology and the discrete choices
(labeled as a P for predicted) and the true value (labeled with a T) taken from the
perceived influence truth model from Table 18. In all of the discrete choices (i.e.
two per decision maker), the model is able to bound the true perceived influence
difference. However, there is significant uncertainty in some of the discrete choices.
The next substep is creating the A matrix and b vector to solve the system of
equations, Ax = b, for Pi→j, where i 6= j and i, j = DMJROC , DMGOV , DMOPS,
DMIND, or DMCTO. The upper half of the b vector is defined by the power con-
straint equations for the 10 relationships, which each taking on the value of 1. The
bottom half of the b vector assumes the ranges from the outputs of the 10 perceived
influence discrete choices, two from each decision maker. These ranges are shown in
the variability chart from Figure 136. For example, DMJROC provides a response of
the relative influence difference that DMGOV and DMCTO has on DMJROC in the
first discrete choice resulting in a range of influence difference between 0.049 and
0.105. This range is used in the ‘10+1’th element in the b vector and similarly for
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Figure 136: Variability Chart of Methodology’s ability to Predict Perceived Influence
Differences
the next 9 discrete choice output ranges. The set of discrete choices also define the A
matrix with a 1 for the more influential decision maker and a -1 for the less influen-
tial decision maker for each row depending on who responded to the discrete choice
experiments. Although two sets of discrete choices are given to each decision maker,
unequal numbers of discrete choice per decision maker are possible but the A Matrix
must be full rank or invertible in order to solve for x the power relationships. (Of
course, more equations than unknowns are permissible, and in such cases, a linear
least squares approximation is used, as described in the previous chapter.) For this
particular example problem, the system of equations Ax = b is defined as:
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
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 − 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 − 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 − 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 − 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 − 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 − 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 − 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

































































































A more useful graphic depicting additional information is found in the histograms
of Figure 137 with the possible power relationships for each decision maker pair and its
inverse directly beside it. The power that DMJROC has over DMGOV is near 0.50 and
thus similarly for DMGOV over DMJROC . In fact, this first histogram suggests that
neither DMJROC or DMGOV has significant influence over the other. The variance of
these to mirrored distributions is also quite small suggesting that this state of nearly
equal power between these two decision makers seems to be quite certain. On the
other hand, the influence or power between DMJROC or DMOPS is less certain (top
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right histograms of Figure 137). Although the mean values are near 0.5, the potential
for one (or the other) to be persuaded or influenced by the other decision maker is
clearly possible.
Figure 137: Step 2 Output Summarizing All 10 Decision Maker Power Relationships
Placing the mean influence values for each of the 10 relationships into a matrix, as
in Table 23, illustrates additional results. The “row” decision maker, has an influence
on the “column” decision maker at the value specified. For example, DMJROC has
a slight influence over DMGOV of 0.502, and slightly more than that over DMIND of
0.511. The cells are shaded based on the relative value from 0.5, such that 0 is red,
0.5 is white and 1 is green.
The most prominent relationship is that between DMGOV and DMIND. DMGOV
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has significant influence over the preferences of DMIND. This is expected since “the
customer” often drives the requirements or product’s design and the ultimate choice
whereas the “producer” is willing to concede some objectives to maximize profits or
revenue. Interestingly, the DMCTO has some influence over all other decision makers.
Of course, the largest influence is over the DMIND who would clearly seek approval or
agreement on technical feasibility with their own technical experts. The other three
might also be persuade by the assumed expertise about aircraft design or on other
technical objectives, albeit at a significantly lower value compared to DMIND. Lastly,
DMIND has power or influence of less than 0.5 over all the others. This again shows
how the demand in any market (in this case the preferences of DMGOV or DMJROC)
more or less “defining the agenda” or product requirements and designs.
Table 23: Actual Influence Relationships from Step 2
Comparing this to the perceived influence model results in Table 24.
Table 24: Difference Between Evaluated and Perceived Influence Relationships
The color scheme in Table 24 is similar in that a lower value compared to the
perceived influence is in red while the opposite is in green. In other words, over
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estimating one’s influence is highlighted in red and underestimate one’s influence is
in green. DMIND appears to over-estimate their influence while DMCTO was much
more humble in estimating their influence over others. Likewise, DMJROC slightly
overestimated and DMOPS underestimated their own power over others.
7.5 Step 3 Results: Reaching Preference Consensus
The final step in the overall methodology is identifying the region of consensus and
evaluating where the group is likely to reach agreement in the preference space, and
then mapped this to the consensus region or designs in the design space.
Using the weighting vector distributions from Step 1 as initial preferences, and
then the power relationship distributions from Step 2, the ultimatum game can be
played multiple times to identify the regions of consensus between two decision mak-
ers, after which that region becomes the preference structure of the coalition for later
agreement with the other decision makers.
Although the sequence of coalitions formed can take on a variety of possible paths,
the particular consensus sequence applied to the current simulations follows DMIND
with DMCTO, then DMJROC with DMGOV , then DMJROC−GOV with DMOPS, then
finally, DMJROC−GOV−OPS with DMIND−CTO.
This is depicted in Figure 138 where for each objective the sequence is repeated
in the aforementioned order. The consensus at each stage is represent when two
decision makers reach agreement about their preference structure as a coalition, and
the lines will coincide for the remainder of the process. Only the mean weighting
vector for the set of all potential consensus weighting vectors is shown. The degree to
which one influences another in forming a coalition is represent by how “far away” a
coalition weight vector is from one’s initial preferred weighting vector. For example,
the output from Step 2 revealed that DMCTO had more than half the influence over
DMIND and as a result, the red line (the path for IND) reaches consensus with the
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blue line (the path for CTO) much closer to CTO’s preferred weights. This is seen
most strongly in the BR objective sequence at the top right of Figure 138. Different
power relationships would result in a different final consensus mean weight vector as
would a different sequence of coalitions.
Figure 138: Mean weighting vector for each consensus sequence broken out by objec-
tive
The final consensus preference region after agreement of DMJROC−GOV−OPS and
DMIND−CTO is of course in 8 dimensional space but illustrating a subset of those
dimensions (i.e. 3 or less) can assist in visualizing this region. In Figure 139 shows
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the final group consensus region for the three dimensions wMTTC , wSDTTC , and wBR.
This is consistent with the previous figure where the dimension requiring the most
compromise is wBR. The weighting vectors for wMTTC and wSDTTC were already
relatively in agreement as indicated by both Figures 138 and 139 by the last step in
the coalition forming sequence. The small gray points show the original discretized
preference space used for the first discrete choice in Step 1 of the methodology and
is shown only for reference purposes.
Figure 139: Final Group Consensus Region (black) with initial preference regions
for DMJROC−GOV−OPS (blue) and DMIND−CTO (red) for only 3 dimensions wMTTC ,
wSDTTC , and wBR
To visualize all the dimensions, a scatterplot such as that found in Figure 140
shows the 2D projections for all objective pair combinations. As in the previous
figures, the objective with the greatest difference between the two coalitions for the
297
fourth consensus step was wBR. This is also shown by the relatively large separation
of the blue and red preference clouds in the second row and third column of Figure
140.
Figure 140: Final Group Consensus Region (black) with initial preference regions for
DMJROC−GOV−OPS (blue) and DMIND−CTO (red) for all 8 objectives
The statistics on the final consensus region (the black points) are shown in Table
25. Interestingly, wBR takes on the largest mean value of 0.245. Since, performance
wMTTC was heavily weighed by DMJROC and DMIND, and since wMTTC is further
correlated with a low break rate (i.e. high wBR), these two objectives were likely
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Table 25: Statistics on Objective Weighting Values for Final Group Consensus Region









amplified in the final result. Furthermore, this high value in wBR is also likely due to
the influence DMCTO has over DMIND at the first consensus reaching stage but also
over the others at the last stage (see Figure 138).
The final action in the overall methodology is applying or mapping the group
preference consensus region to the design space to identify the design parameters
most likely to be preferred by the group. Analyzing the “best” design for each one of
the weighting vectors in the final consensus preference space, results in only 19 designs
that would potentially be selected from the full feasible set of 518000 designs. These
are summarized in Table 26. Interestingly, all 19 designs were of Type 3 which made
use of the fact that the Dover to Kandahar APOE-APOD combination was less than
6100 nmi and thus was in the range for the direct return flights for large aircraft
with no payload. These designs dominated the Type 2 and Type 4 simulations since
stopping over retro en route, to refuel penalized the time to close and other output
metrics. Type 1 simulations are feasible, but for such a far distance, a low payload
per weight would be required and thus many more flights and therefore flight hours
would be needed. Furthermore, a large fleet size would be required to make up for
a lower throughput capacity for long distances. The en route location, Ramstein Air
Base, was also identical for all of the 19 “best” designs. Of the 23 candidate en route
locations, Ramstein Air Base was closest to the midpoint on the great circle path
from Dover to Kandahar Airfield, resulting in shorter flight times while maximizing
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Table 26: Summary of the 19 “Best” Designs After Mapping the Group Preference
Consensus Region to the Design Space
# ID We MTTC SDTTC BR OC AC BRC UT
- lbs days days % $M $M $B /24hrs
1 137046 433139 10.94 5.64 15.4 29.16 3856.67 20.09 9.09
2 171131 424680 10.47 5.59 15.23 29.6 4051.44 20.55 8.99
3 154610 407377 11.41 5.71 15.59 30.93 3627.28 19.61 9.24
4 88967 490360 10.66 5.6 16.02 25.63 4054.3 18.63 8.83
5 145856 490131 11.25 5.57 14.43 25.63 3740.68 23.05 9.06
6 92207 432824 11.53 5.64 14.83 29.16 3578.59 21.72 9.29
7 166303 474406 10.18 5.5 15.05 26.51 4224.11 21.06 8.88
8 102926 380144 11.38 5.72 15.23 33.14 3626.57 20.54 9.27
9 130590 418850 11.81 5.7 15.07 30.04 3463.05 21 9.34
10 151019 457009 11.2 5.63 15.14 27.83 3778.55 20.79 9.13
11 99299 401989 10.85 5.61 14.64 31.37 3834.98 22.32 9.2
12 97768 431580 10.4 5.6 15.65 29.16 4117.27 19.47 8.92
13 91327 356491 10.38 5.72 15.23 35.35 4307.83 20.55 8.56
14 114164 361664 11.29 5.72 14.95 34.9 3680.3 21.34 9.23
15 93417 463154 11.84 5.69 15.02 27.39 3534.79 21.15 9.21
16 116317 420073 10.61 5.63 15.48 30.04 4007.5 19.89 9.01
17 126094 415202 11.19 5.62 14.6 30.49 3696.96 22.46 9.29
18 133637 356873 11.86 5.74 14.7 35.35 3404.57 22.14 9.48
19 145961 415343 11.15 5.59 14.38 30.49 3698.21 23.23 9.32
µ: n/a 422699 11.07 5.64 15.1 30.11 3804.40 21.03 9.12
the payload capacity for each leg of the flight, which in turn translates to higher
utility scores for those designs.
The mean aircraft empty weight was slightly larger than the C-5 (just over 422000
pounds vs. 380000), but the reliability was much higher compared to current mission
capable rates of the C-5 (15% vs. 40% in terms of break rates). Although obtaining
the lower break rates were significant, averaging just over 21 $billion, the benefits
in a low time to close were nevertheless considered substantial. In fact, relatively
small fleet sizes were common in the 19 solutions, with the mean number of aircraft
employed of 14.26 with the minimum and maximum of 12 and 19 respectively. With
a worse break rate, the number of aircraft required to meet the same MTTC would
be expectedly larger resulting in a higher acquisition cost, but a compensating lower
cost for the higher break rate. The utilization values (mean of 9.12) are all close to
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the target of 8 hours per day established in this example. The acquisition cost per
aircraft for the 19 designs had a mean value of just under $269 million. Since the
average number of aircraft used in the 19 simulations was slightly greater than 14,
the product of these two results in the average total acquisitions cost of slightly over
$3.8 Billion.
Figure 141: Design Space of Model Simulations with the 19 Final Group Consensus
Designs shown in red (MTTC vs. AC vs. SDTTC)
These same 19 designs can be visualized in a similar manner as the preference
space weighting vectors. In 3D graphs as in Figure 141, the designs (colored in red)
can be shown to lie on the Pareto frontier of a cloud of points of MTTC, SDTTC and
AC. As discussed previously, some solutions may close more quickly but would cost
more (i.e. larger fleet size and AC).
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In Figure 142, the designs are against displayed in the 3D graph but with axes
replaced by the mean time to close, the utilization and the total operating cost.
The cloud of designs representing the “best” designs as evaluated from the consensus
preference region are located near the utilization values of 9 (i.e. 8 was the target
value) and lower operating costs as expected. Lower MTTC values are possible (as
shown in the previous figure as well), and might even lower the operating costs due
to fewer flight hours, but the real trade is not visible in this graphic, since MTTC
can be traded with AC or BRC more directly.
Figure 142: Design Space of Model Simulations with the 19 Final Group Consensus
Designs shown in red (UT vs. OC vs. MTTC)
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Figure 143: Design Space of Model Simulations with the 19 Final Group Consensus
Designs shown in red. (All objectives shown except En Route Type Selection))
To help with these additional trades and to investigate more easily the designs
in the multi-dimensional solution space, employing a scatterplot matrix as shown in
Figure 143 is useful. The en route Type selection or U(ER) objective is not shown,
resulting in only 7 of 8 objectives represented. The trade between MTTC and AC are
again shown in the fourth row from the top and the explicitly defined trade between
cost to lower BR and the break rate itself are also clearly visible. The cost to lowering
the break rate is particularly interesting because the importance weighting on U(BR)
was relatively high. Even though the cost increases exponentially below BR values
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of 25% the sequence taken by the decision makers and the influence relationships
established by the step 2 discrete choices results in a higher break rate cost than
the flat part of the curve. At some point the marginal improvement in break rate
reduction is no longer attractive past this point in the curve for this group of decision
makers. The other subplots show values in the middle of their ranges, suggesting and
coinciding with the Step 3 results that these objectives have lower relative importance
compared to the most important three objectives from Table 25, wMTTC , wSDTTC ,
and wBR.
The final analysis of these solutions can be the percentage or number of occur-
rences for each of the 19 designs. Since two (similar) weighting vectors applied to the
design space can be mapped to the same “best” design, the number of occurrences
that the weighting vectors from the consensus reaching process is mapped to each
design can be insightful. This metric is important because it can suggest that from a
range of importance weighting vectors the same design will be ultimately considered
the “best”. It may also mean that the design space is not “saturated” enough to
discriminate between two almost equal weighting vectors. However, this problem can
be readily overcome by executing additional model simulations within the appropri-
ate range of inputs, a process which may be computationally expensive without the
implementation of surrogate model techniques.
The number of occurrences of the 19 designs is shown in the vertical axis of
Figure 144. The other two dimensions are the mean time to close and the total
acquisition cost similar to Figure 141 above. As shown, two designs, in particular,
have a consensus occurrence number of more than 200 (i.e. d137046 has 214 and d171131
has 205) and together they make up 40% of the entire consensus occurrences. This
means that to properly predict the expected design parameters such as that from
Table 26, the mean values should be weighted by the number of occurrences.
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Figure 144: Design Space Projected onto MTTC-AC plane versus the consensus
occurrence number. (Designs colored by number of occurrences)
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Table 27 considers the effects of the occurrences of consensus on each the objec-
tives for each of the 19 designs, which provide a more likely expected design across
the consensus region. The difference between the “mean” and “weighted mean” val-
ues suggests a slightly larger (3.53% heavier) aircraft than originally predicted, but
slightly less expensive in terms of operational cost (-3.89%). The cost associated
with improving the break rate also goes down slightly because of a higher break rate
accepted for the “weighted means” design.
Table 27: Weighted Mean Summary of the 19 “Best” Designs After Mapping the
Group Preference Consensus Region to the Design Space
We MTTC SDTTC BR OC AC BRC UT
Units: lbs days days % $M $M $B /24hrs
Mean: 422699 11.07 5.64 15.1 30.11 3804.4 21.03 9.12
Weighted
Mean:
437615 10.95 5.62 15.24 28.94 3856.5 20.58 9.08
% Differ-
ence
3.53% -1.08% -0.35% 0.93% -3.89% 1.37% -2.14% -0.44%
In predicting or forecasting how a group of decision makers will decide, the se-
quence of consensus stages can have a large impact on which design or solution the
group will ultimately select. However, since the sequence cannot be determined a
priori, all or at least many of the combinations of sequences can be executed with the
distributions and power relationships from Step 1 and 2 respectively. The union of all
the sets of designs at which consensus could be made (i.e. not just for one sequence
but for all possible sequences) results in the superset of solutions at which the group
could reach consensus. This combined set, much fewer than the original number of
candidate designs, become the condensed list of candidates solutions from which the
decision makers can collectively select.
In the above examples, the Step 3 sequence executed results in the 19 designs
described previously. When focusing on only the Type 1, 2, and 3 solutions (177173
designs) all making use of the Ramstein Air Base (for Type 2 and 3), by repeating this
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process 100 times and allowing the sequence to be randomly assigned, the superset of
designs will expand with the union of designs from each successive consensus sequence.
For example, as shown in Figure 145, in a series of consensus sequences, the first
sequence resulted in 15 different designs from the mapped grouped preference region.
The second sequence resulted in 23 different designs but only 12 of them were unique
as compared to the first sequence and thus the cumulative number of consensus
designs is 27. The third sequence produced 20 designs but only two of those are
unique. Thus, after three consensus designs, the cumulative number of consensus
designs is 29. This process is repeated 100 times representing 100 randomly selected
sequences for a total cumulative number of consensus designs of 71. The trend line
approaches some absolute number of designs that could be possibly reached from
an exhaustive combination of all weighting vectors, for all power relationships with
all possible sequences. With additional computation time and resources, this upper
limit could be calculated but reaching that point becomes too time-consuming as the
additional consensus designs requires an increasing number of sequence simulations.
An example of this is shown from sequences 69 to 90 in Figure 145 where no additional
unique designs were reached. The 91st sequence reached one unique design and the
92nd reached three, but in general the trend where the number of sequences will
exponentially increase per new unique design reached is evident.
Furthermore, discovering this upper limit is unnecessary from a practical stand-
point. Since most of the later sequence are reaching the same designs, the cumulative
number consensus at each of the designs will also increase, and the few designs which
are reached in almost every sequence is of most interest.
Figure 146 projects the number of consensus occurrences for each of the 71 different
designs from the 100 sequences. The design number is sorted by the total number
of consensus occurrences after the 100 sequences. Therefore, design #157931 (in
the current set of designs) was reached almost 7000 times across all sequences, more
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Figure 145: Cumulative number of unique designs at which consensus was reached
for 100 randomly defined sequences
than any other design. The next highest was design #88967 with just under 5200
occurrences. Each successive design has a lower number of occurrences after the 100th
sequence. The individual points and bars are colored by the cumulative number of
occurrences. Interestingly, every sequence reached design #157931 at least once.
For comparison, six different sequences never reached design #88967 in a consensus.
The number of sequences that did not reach the various designs increases along the
nominal axis of “Design Number” from left to right. Furthermore, 12 different unique
designs are only reached once by one sequence (located at the far right of “Design
Number’” axis, such as design #172980. These designs, of course, do not represent a
high probability at which the group of design makers will reach agreement.
Lastly, Figure 146 shows that three designs #157931, #88967 and #154610 were
most likely to be reached across all simulations. These same three account for over
60% of all simulations. In terms of predicting a design which is most likely to be
collectively agreed upon, choosing one of these three, (and more specifically design
#157931 which is reached by 27% of the simulations) would be the best strategy.
Having decision makers discuss and contemplate this specific design (or similar ones)
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could then result in significant time savings from the reduction in less useful negoti-
ations, deliberations, etc.
Figure 146: Cumulative number of occurrences at each of the 71 designs in Figure
145 for the 100 randomly defined sequences, sorted by total occurrence
These three particular designs are shown in Table 28 sorted by the cumulative
occurrence number. As before, the decision makers as a group tend to prefer a slightly
heavier and more capable aircraft, are willing to invest substantial amounts to make
the fleet reliable so as to reduce the number or aircraft needed for a given level of
performance with relatively low operation cost. However, with multiple sequences
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Table 28: Summary of the 3 “Best” Designs After Mapping the Group Preference
Consensus Region to the Design Space from Multiple Sequence Simulations
ID We MTTC SDTTC BR OC AC BRC UT
Units: lbs days days % $M $M $B /24hrs
1 157931 482152 12.55 5.87 16.02 26.07 3373.14 18.65 9.02
2 88967 490360 10.66 5.6 16.02 25.63 4054.3 18.63 8.83
3 154610 407376 11.41 5.71 15.59 30.93 3627.28 19.61 9.24
confirming similar results, the confidence one can have that one of these three designs




8.1 Summary of Findings
The MACRO methodology was found overall to function properly and was able to
demonstrate in the proof of concept or air mobility problem from the previous chapter,
that the original candidate design space was reduced from more than 500000 designs
or solutions down to just 19. These 19 designs reflect the consensus region where the 5
stakeholders or decision makers would be expected to cooperate in reaching agreement
for design selection. Since this consensus region depends on a specific sequence of
coalition forming stages, multiple simulations were executed, covering a majority of
the possible sequences. This analysis found that only 71 possible candidate designs
exist in the superset of designs where consensus is possible. Furthermore, 3 specific
designs were found to occur most often in the consensus regions from all simulations,
suggesting an even smaller subset of designs at which the decision makers would likely
reach consensus. (See Figure 143.)
The ratio of the number of designs in the consensus region to the initial design
space (the metric for evaluating Hypothesis #2) is much less than 1% (in fact less than
0.1% in the proof of concept problem) suggesting that Hypothesis #2 should not be
rejected. Since Step 3 in the methodology was directly related to testing Hypothesis
1, and Step 3 required the inputs from the other two steps, the successful results lends
support that those proposed hypotheses (related to Steps 1 and 2) should also not be
rejected.
More specifically, the difference between the truth model and predicted means of
the weighting distributions (metric for evaluating Hypothesis #3) was found to be
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low, with the worse case difference calculated at 0.2 (the predicted weight for OC
for DMOPS). It was predicted that this discrepancy was due to a high correlation
of OC with MTTC, which suggests, in general, that the methodology is likely more
accurate for orthogonal and non-correlated objectives. (See Table 21.)
Comparing the perceived influence truth model to the predicted power relation-
ships (metric for Hypothesis #4) also shows relatively good closeness. The few large
differences were likely due to the original perceived influence truth model which con-
tained over- and under- constrained power conditions. This resulted in the surprising
results that the influence of DMCTO was found to be larger than that expected, and
that DMIND significantly overestimated their own influence over DMGOV . (See Table
24.)
The methodology, at least in part, and within the scope of the analyzed problems,
fulfills the research objective in that it can significantly reduce the set of designs which
a group of decisions makers should consider as most likely to ultimately be selected.
This, of course, has the potential to reduce the time required to reach consensus by
showing all decision makers where potential future actions, discussions, negotiations,
and compromises will eventually bring the group to collectively agree within the
decision space. Concurrently, the development of AirMOD was a successful response
to the need of better defining the operational design space with more design solutions
in shorter time frames. Almost 1 million points were generated across the design
space in approximately 50 minutes. This not only facilitates additional analysis in
bulk of the design space, but increases the decision makers’ confidence that sufficient
solutions have been modeled and are available for down selection and other decision-
making activities.
The overall hypothesis that such a model and methodology will be able to assist
a group of decision makers in reaching agreement about the requirements of a future
air mobility system is promising. Compared to a “business as usual” approach, which
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often is lengthy and costly (in terms of opportunity costs, delayed implementation,
etc.), together AirMOD and MACRO methodology offer a significantly better way
of achieving cooperation between group members than simply waiting for the ex-
ternal pressure and forced “11th hour” decision making before finally beginning to
concede in reaching a compromised solution. Furthermore, increased transparency is
offered as a complementary benefit. Recording how the decision makers responded
to discrete choices in revealing their preferences can be archived and used later on to
contrast again current preferences, analyze requirements creep (and prepare action if
observed), or provide guidance when new decision makers enter the group who may
have their own agenda but are too late in being part of the initial decision making
and requirements definition phases.
8.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses Revisited
Table 29 summarizes the research questions and how they were addressed throughout
this dissertation. During the methodology development, additional research questions
were posed and also addressed with various experimental tests and other investiga-
tions. These questions were posed during the development of the various methodology
steps and are thus related and categorized accordingly in Table 29.
The related hypotheses at the highest level research questions are summarized in
Table 30 with the key experimental observation supporting them.
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8.3 Suitability and Limitations of the MACRO Methodol-
ogy
As with all models, their sphere of applicability is always finite and the MACRO
methodology from this research is no exception. A number of inherit limitations have
been observed over the course of the research which need to be reviewed and under-
scored at this point in the dissertation. Not all of these limitations are insurmountable
but some require actions performed before execution of the MACRO methodology as
a whole.
First of all, the model assumption that cooperation by all agents is a necessary
requirement is in fact relatively limiting. If cooperation is not a key aspect of the
problem, or even desirable in the group decision-making process, determining the
consensus region is clearly unsuitable. When competition is the driver, there is often
no longer a state where all agents can benefit (i.e. zero-sum game). In such situations,
both decision makers cannot simultaneously increase their levels of utility to the same
amount (i.e. from 0 to x > 0) and one’s reduction in utility could be the other increase.
These competitive situations require a different set of game theoretic or simulation
techniques, and are likely not facilitated by the MACRO methodology.
Second, in group decision making if an individual is replaceable in the sense that
some other individual, company or entity could likely satisfy the particular expertise,
skill, or resource, possessed by the first individual, the first individual could have
little or no influence on decisions or over others. When this occurs in a group of two,
and the replaceable individual is removed, the situation falls back to single-agent
decision making and many of the techniques presented in this dissertation are no
longer necessary. However, many supposed “single-agent decision making situations”
have, in reality, more than one stakeholder or “decision maker.” Consider a manager
with a team of assistants and other coworkers trying to decide which strategy to
implement in a company. Although, the decision-making power may reside in just
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Table 29: Summary of How Research Questions were Addressed
Research Question Answer, Response or How Addressed
1.0 How can the number of operational design solu-
tions originally considered increase to include a
greater portion of the potential design space?
Surrogate models with Monte Carlo
simulations enables fast operational de-
sign space characterization
2.0 How can the feasible decision space be reduced to
facilitate decision makers in reaching consensus?
Step 3 in the MACRO Methodology
2.1 How should power or influence be combined dur-
ing the consensus reaching stage such that form-
ing coalitions are advantageous to the individu-
als?
A coalition assumes the highest power
index value of all members over another
decision maker (or coalition).
2.2 What is the impact of higher dimensional data
sets with larger numbers of decision makers?
Methodology is slower and requires
more work by individual decision mak-
ers but is still valid.
3.0 How can a decision maker’s preference informa-
tion, including the potential for changing pref-
erences, across all objectives be acquired more
quickly and accurately?
Step 1 in the MACRO Methodology
3.1 How many discrete choice experiments are
needed to reach a particular level of certainty
about the true preferences of a decision maker?
Depends on the number of dimensions
or objectives.
3.2 What is the effect of increasing the number of
dimensions on how discrete choices are selected?
Random selection (Selection method 1)
approaches selection method 2 as num-
ber of dimensions increases.
3.3 How can the preference space be further specified
to guarantee that only one design choice is op-
timal based upon a set of discrete choices while
minimizing the number of discrete choices?
Refining the total preference space
when necessary reduces the computa-
tional requirements and allows greater
precision on weighting distributions.
3.4 What stopping criterion for discrete choice ex-
periments should be used to extract the prefer-
ences of a decision maker?
Various, such as time available, vari-
ance of maximum distribution, estab-
lished rank order, etc., depends on par-
ticular problem requirements.
4.0 How can the influence relationships between de-
cision makers be identified and quantified?
Step 2 in the MACRO Methodology
4.1 How many discrete choice experiments are
needed to extract the power or influence differ-
ence between two decision makers?
Depends on the uncertainty on weight-
ing distributions, typically less than 10.
4.2 What is the impact on the certainty of power
relationships when decision makers respond to
different numbers of discrete choices and provide
different ranges?
Range on the power relationships de-
crease with discrete choices up to a
point related to the uncertainty in
weighting distributions from Step 1.
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Table 30: Summary of Experimental Results from Testing Hypotheses
Hypothesis Experimental Results
#1 Monte Carlo simulations of sur-
rogate models developed around
time-consuming operational mod-
els will provide capability to more
rapidly define the design space
by generating greater numbers of
candidate solutions in the same
time period.
The tested speed at which Air-
MOD can generate candidate so-
lutions was measured at 1 mil-
lion design solutions in 49.7 min-
utes or 2.98 ms/execution (on an
Intel R©CoreTM Duo CPU @2.20
Ghz). Individual SimPy model
runs required from one to more
than 30 seconds.
#2 Simulating the multi-agent
decision-making process with
an iterated ultimatum game
across all objectives, with the
application of the preference
distributions of, and power rela-
tionships between, agents, will
significantly reduce the decision
space and identify regions with
high probabilities of reaching
consensus.
In the experimental case study,
the methodology reduced the
500,000 designs down to 19 likely
designs at which consensus is
most probable. Further experi-
mentation reduced those down to
just 3 when the experiment in-
cluded multiple sequences.
#3 Infeasible design or preference fil-
tering on the range of possible
weightings combinations, from a
set of discrete choices employing
candidate solutions, will identify
a decision maker’s preferences by
providing feasible weighting dis-
tributions for each criterion or ob-
jective.
In the experimental case study,
MACRO predicted 40 (5x8)
weighting values within 0.041
on average (4% error) with two
outliers of 0.21 and 0.12.
#4 Discrete choice experiments be-
tween designs, and with whom an
agent will form a coalition in the
decision space, will identify rela-
tionships of influence, under the
power constraints equations, be-
tween decision makers.
In the experimental case study,
MACRO was able to predict
power relationships between all
decision makers with a certainty,
in terms of a maximum range,
near 0.3.
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one individual (the manager), power and influence reside in the others as well in
the form of persuasion from expertise, experience, or information. The MACRO
methodology is clearly applicable in these situations where power is more broadly
defined.
Third, extremely high-dimensional design spaces would likely be impossible to use
in such a methodology. Not only would the discrete choices be more challenging to
respond to with so many trades to contemplate by decision makers, but the range on
all preferences or the weighting distributions may all tightly hover near zero since so
many weights sum to the constraint value of 1. However, most design spaces likely
have a subset of objectives which capture a majority, if not all, of the key dimensions
necessary for decision makers to evaluate the designs. Initial discrete choices could
be used as tests to filter out objectives which have little or no impact on the utility
score (i.e. objectives are removed that are found to be weighted with a value of zero).
Fourth, a high number of candidate designs require large computer memory and
computational speed for storing and computing respectively the utility scores, inter-
mediate regions, etc. If the number of designs becomes too large, implementing the
methodology can be limited by external computer hardware or software constraints.
For example, in the proof of concept problem discussed previously, 0.5 million designs
were considered the maximum number of allowable designs that could be simultane-
ous processed in a reasonable amount of time without stalling or suspending the
methodology on available computer resources.
Fifth, large numbers of decision makers in a group would also slow down the
methodology and would require each to respond to a large number of discrete choices
of pairwise comparisons, which is an unacceptable requirement. In the extreme ex-
ample, every individual (i.e. citizen) could be modeled as agents (i.e. voter) in a
group decision-making activity (i.e. federal election) to pick the design or solution
(i.e. President), but many discrete choice experiments would be required to solve for
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the individual power relationships between each one. In such a case, the numerous
agents would be “categorized” or “grouped together” and would be expected to de-
cide (or vote) with similar preferences as a unit. This is essentially what the MACRO
methodology does more formally, but with specific data from which to increase the
confidence and accuracy of the output.
8.4 Summary of Contributions
The first major contribution of this research is the ability to more fully described and
define the entire design space of an operational model. The AirMOD model enables
rapid evaluation of the design space, extending the SACT tool for MC simulations,
additional operational metrics including costs, and improved visualization of the sce-
nario and logistical and operational metrics of interest. The analysis of such a design
space was performed and observations and findings about the design space were only
possible with a sufficient number of solutions compared and contrasted in a variety
of visualizations.
The second major contribution is the MACRO methodology, a process to facili-
tate cooperative decision making within groups by identifying the candidate designs
or solution and thus the region at which consensus is more likely to occur. The
methodology itself was broken down into three major steps, each which offer unique
contributions to the field of group decision making.
In Step 1, the application of discrete choices to extract preferences across the
objective space was introduced, reflecting more realistic decisions as opposed to unre-
alistic objective comparisons out of context. This contribution allows one to identify
the distributions of the preferences instead of deterministic weights of the objective
space. It accounts for the fact that decision makers are likely to change preferences
over time due to internal and external factors and are willing to concede their own
preferences, to some degree, if cooperation is incentivized, either through time savings
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or benefits from forming coalitions with others.
The contributions from Step 2 provide a process to obtain the power indices,
scaling factors or strength of the decision makers themselves using the same discrete
choice technique as in Step 1 but with hypothetical design point associations to the
other decision makers. The result from sufficient responses enables the evaluation of
the power or influence relationships between decision makers. These indices can then
be used to various consensus reaching algorithms to calculate the various willingness
of decision makers to concede on the objective space with each other. As with Step 1,
the power relationships are expressed as distributions between each pair of decision
makers to account for the uncertainty and dynamic influence levels possible between
them.
Step 3 contributions offer a unique consensus reaching algorithm implementing
ultimatum game theoretic principles. Furthermore, the analysis of sequences in how
decision makers form coalitions was conducted allowing one to compute the region
in which the group is most likely to reach consensus across many sequences. Playing
out the combination of sequences with the Step 1 distributions of weighting vectors
and Step 2 influence relationships provides insight into candidate design points which
should be initially considered as the subset of solutions for additional analysis and
more formal negotiation.
Overall, the overall methodology with the two elements, AirMOD and MACRO,
contribute to the conflicting requirements in air mobility operational problems of
increasing the number of candidate designs more quickly and determining the set of
design points at which consensus is probable for group decisions, thereby allowing a
more expeditious and transparent requirements definition phase.
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8.5 Future Research
A number of extensions to the research discussed in this dissertation have been iden-
tified as areas of potential future research.
Additional and alternative methods for the Design of Experiments, in particular
for choice designs, could be explored and tested to evaluate their performance against
the methods explored in this dissertation. This would be most applicable if the
decision makers knew in advance how many discrete choices to which they are willing
to respond or have time to complete. Knowing this constraint, the set of discrete
choice experiments to maximize the information gained could then be designed.
A more detailed look into the sources of influence and in particular the influence
differences among the objectives for different decision makers could be explored. For
example, one decision maker may only have more influence over another in a subset
of the objective space. In other words, their influence might extend to only 2 or 3
objectives and not across the whole space. Such an algorithm would potentially offer
intermediate consensus regions on objective subsets with more complicated processes
for reaching agreement. Furthermore, testing the methodology with real human sub-
jects in group settings to evaluate the predictive capability of the methodology based
on different influence relationships could also be investigated.
Reciprocity could also be explored in more detail, by analyzing the change in
willingness of one decision maker to concede based on action or inaction of other
decision makers. Similarly, metrics to track this willingness to concede over time as
the “moment of decision” approaches, could reveal the impacts, both positive and
negative, of constraining decision times. Penalty functions for not cooperating (or
rewards for cooperating) could likewise be analyzed to identify strategies to accelerate
decision making. These would be compared to studies into how the quality of the
decision changes based on the level of reward or punishment.
The bilateral consensus reaching explored in this research could be expanded to
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account for trilateral, quadrilateral, etc. decision making or intermediate agreements
throughout the sequence. In such a situation, the proposing decision maker might
propose a design point or preference weighting vector somewhere between the 3 or
more decision makers and any one of them can reject the proposal. As the inter-
mediate coalition size approached the full group size the benefits would potentially
decrease or at least take longer to reach consensus. However, coalitions with just a
few more than two might be able to cooperate in more interesting ways than studied
in this research.
Lastly, the effect of team or group structure could also be further investigated,
especially on engineering project teams where managers may have more decisional
power based on position but less expertise power. The ramifications between these
and other factors for groups involved in decision making for system engineering ap-
plications would be similarly interesting.
8.6 Final Thoughts
It is important to note in the final analysis that this dissertation and the research
herein never explicitly decides for the group of decision makers. No computer model
ever “makes the decision.” The best it can do is rank order, evaluate, suggest, or
list the “best” designs or solutions according to specified assumptions and an objec-
tive function, provided by a human or other external source. However, simulating
group decision-making with the appropriate data and assumptions, can make large
advancements in assisting a group of decision makers in accelerating and facilitating
the process saving both time and resources. Whether early in a system’s life cycle,
such as in the requirements definition phase, or in later phases, such as final design
selection, this research is relevant by reducing the uncertainty about how a group
of decision makers, seeking to cooperate, will act, by providing a design space or




A common implementation of group decision making is voting, most often associated
with political elections. Many different voting methods have been proposed for vari-
ous situations such as plurality voting, Borda count, the Condorcet Method, instant
runoff, etc. In describing and explaining the limitations of this partial list of voting
methods, an example presented in [162] will be used.
Four cities are physically situated as shown in Figure 147 and will share one
hospital. A vote is established to decide in which town the hospital should be located.
Each town, and all individuals in each town, would prefer the hospital to be located
as close as possible.
Figure 147: City Locations and Populations for a Vote (from [162])
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A.1 Plurality Voting
With plurality voting, each individual in each town gets one vote and as a result
Southville will win the vote since it has the largest population of 65 individuals. The
other 135 people, however, would prefer a location other than Southville. Therefore,
more than 2/3 of the towns combined population would receive their last choice.
This simple example quickly shows one weakness of plurality voting when there
are more than two alternatives: a third alternative can change the ultimate winner.
In terms of elections, suppose one candidate has 40% of the plural vote, a second has
35% and a third has 25%. If everyone who supports the third candidate also prefers
the second candidate to the first, they would actually be indirectly supporting the
candidate they least prefer, by taking “votes” away from a candidate (i.e. the second
place winner) that would have won the election had the third candidate not run [106].
A.2 Borda Count
The Borda Count, named after Jean-Charles de Borda, is also vulnerable to manipu-
lation [139]. Using a Borda mechanism, voters rank all the candidates or alternatives.
The least desirable candidate receives 0 points, the next to last 1 point, the second to
last 2 points, and so on. The scores for each candidate are added up and the winner
is the one with the most points. The winner in the hospital example above would be
Easton with 375 points followed by Westlake, Northview and Southville, with 365,
265, and 195 points, respectively, as summarized in Table 31.
Table 31: Borda Count for Each of the Four Candidate Hospital Locations
Candidate Location and Borda rank
City Pop. Northview Easton Southville Westlake
Northview 45 3 2 0 1
Easton 40 2 3 0 1
Southville 65 0 1 3 2
Westlake 50 1 2 0 3
Total - 265 375 195 365
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Interestingly, if the exact Borda count process were repeated after removing
Northview as one of the candidates (knowing a priori that it would not win any-
way), Westlake wins with 250 points, followed by Easton at 220 and Southville with
130. The results are tabulated in Table 32.
Table 32: Borda Count for Each of the Three Remaining Candidate Hospital Loca-
tions After Northview Drops Out
Candidate Location and Borda rank
City Pop. Northview Easton Southville Westlake
Northview 45 - 2 0 1
Easton 40 - 2 0 1
Southville 65 - 0 2 1
Westlake 50 - 1 0 2
Total - - 220 130 250
This illustrates a flaw in the Borda method. When a candidate considered an
irrelevant alternative is removed, the actual winner can change. This is problematic
since who wins is dependent on irrelevant alternatives that no one prefers. Fixes to
this problem using “measure of dissimilarity” have been proposed but do not always
work to remove the manipulation [54].
A.3 Condorcet Method
The Condorcet method applies the plurality voting method to each combination of
candidates. Thus, Northview faces off head to head against all the other three candi-
dates; Easton faces off against the remaining two as well, and so on. The candidate
that wins head to head against all the other candidates is the winner.
The issue with this method is that there does not have to be a Condorcet win-
ner. For example, applying the Condorcet method in a vote with three alternative,
if the total population prefers candidate X to Y, Y to Z and Z to X, the preferences
are cyclical resulting in the Condorcet Paradox [93]. In the example in Figure 147,
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Weston is the Condorcet winner, but with different populations, a cyclical popula-
tion preference could be possible, especially with voters acting strategically. This
Condorcet Paradox is more likely to occur with few voters as identified by [67].
A.4 Instant Runoff
In an instant runoff voting (IRV) method, the candidates with the fewest votes is
eliminated and then the vote is recounted with n − 1 candidates. This process is
repeated until a certain threshold (e.g. a majority) of the votes support one candidate,
is reached. In the hospital example above, Northview will win the IRV method.
As with the other methods, IRV has interesting characteristics as well, such as
a candidate losing the vote even though the popular opinion has moved closer to
his or her position [162]. Similarly, paradoxes and other problems can arise in some
situations of preferential voting discussed in [58].
A.5 Voting methods summary
From the foregoing sections, with Southville winning with plurality voting, Easton
winning the Borda count method, Westlake winning the Condorcet method, and
Northview taking the instant runoff election, voting methods clearly have serious lim-
itations to unravel. Many attempts to avoid some of these issues have been proposed
and currently two methods “approval voting” and “range voting” may be found to
be better options to reduce gaming and manipulation of the voting systems [23].
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APPENDIX B
COMPARING A SET OF THREE COMMON
DECISION-MAKING TECHNIQUES
B.1 Decision Making Using the Overall Evaluation Crite-
rion
Perhaps the most easy to understood and commonly used decision-making technique
is when simple attributes or objectives are combined mathematically with weightings
attached to each dimension as indicative of the importance or preferences of the
various criteria [7]. This type of decision-making technique is called by various names
including “parametric method”, “simple additive weighting method (SAW)”, “multi-
attribute value” or “weighted sum model (WSM)” [17]. A related technique called
the “weighted product model” (WPM) is very similar but the weighted objectives are
multiplied instead of summed as in WSM [27]. Regardless of the name, the problem
will seek to minimize (or maximize from the opposite perspective) the objectives
based on the weightings of the objectives or criteria.








where wj is the weight for criterion j and xij is the value or score of alternative i
on criterion j, j = 1, ..., n.
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where, fj(x) is the jth objective (i.e. criteria) and F (x) = [f1(x)f2(x) . . . fn(x)]
T .
The optimization view is sometimes beneficial as the application of constraints, both
equality and inequality, can be readily applied to identify feasibility of particular
alternatives or designs [40].
The SAW formulation makes sense when the various criteria are of the same
units. For example, if every criterion (i.e. speed, cost, performance) is transformed
to constant units (i.e. “utils”) through decision maker defined utility functions, then
the above equation is valid.













where x∗j is “best” value for the jth criteria, dimension or attribute. By employing
these “best” values the upper-bound is established so that mapping all alternatives
to the interval [0,1] can be performed [9].
A combination of the aforementioned ideas and approaches is developed through
another weighted sum technique called the overall evaluation criterion (OEC), where
the criteria are added (as in SAW) but are normalized against a baseline design (as
in WPM), or other process, to established non-dimensional criteria. Equation 55
illustrates how the value in each criterion 1 through n for each alternative i is first
divided by the baseline value of that particular criterion and then multiplied by the
respective weighting factor wj, j = 1, ..., n before summation in the OEC. The best














Equation 55 assumes that it is more desirable to maximize all criteria 1 through n
such that OEC scores of designs or alternatives with values greater than the baselines
values will be proportionally larger. If minimizing certain criteria is better, the OEC
formulation can be adjusted accordingly by inverting the fraction of the alternative’s













Therefore, an example OEC with a combination of criteria from Equations 55 and










assuming one desires to minimize cost and maximize speed.
One of the limitations of the weighted sums is described proficiently in [40]. For
non-convex Pareto frontiers, certain points of the Pareto set cannot be solved for, and
thus no combinations of weightings will ever identify those points as optimal based
on a decision maker’s preference.
Other issues of using decision matrices and OEC type analyses “...suffers from two
major drawbacks; (i) some potentially optimal concepts may appear to be undesirable,
because they never receive the highest total score, and (ii) the typical construction
requires that the decision maker specify physically meaningless weights and ratings”
[112]. These weights and ratings are the manifestations of human decision makers’
preferences. In answer to these concerns, other methods have been developed to
addressed these limitations.
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The following sections will consider other techniques that are somewhat compara-
ble to, and potentially improve upon, the simple OEC model. Although, this research
is not intended to be a detailed analysis of different decision-making techniques, these
sections are presented to help justify why the methodology presented is valid for an
OEC model and could be applied to other decision-making techniques such as AHP
and TOPSIS described next. In general, the same steps in reaching consensus could
be technique independent under the assumption that preferences are an essential
part of the technique and that the agents within the system are permitted to change
preferences throughout the decision process.
B.2 AHP Compared to an OEC
In the AHP formulation [141], the weighting for each criterion (xj) is established with
a priority matrix which quantifies and tabulates pairwise comparisons of importance
between the different criteria (x1 to xn) shown below. A decision maker will designate
a value which represents the importance of one criterion with respect to another. For
example, if criterion i is considered fives time more important than criterion j, then
the aij element in the priority matrix will have a value of 5. Correspondingly, the






ji . This reduces the number of importance pairwise comparisons in half.
However, this can leave ambiguous actions if the values of importance ratios are not
consistent. (If aij = 5 and ajk = 3, does this necessarily mean that aik = 15 or can
a pairwise comparison be valid for criteria i and k if it is different than 15? This is
one of the short comings of AHP.) All diagonal elements of the priority matrix aii are
intuitively given a value of one.
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x1 x2 · · · xn
x1 1 a12 · · · a1n






xn an1 an2 · · · 1
(58)
Once the above matrix has been filled, the priority vector for criteria x1 through




































This equation is effectively an average of normalized pairwise comparisons between
each criterion. The above vector only provides the importance weightings of the
criteria (i.e. w1). A similar process can now be applied to the actual attributes of
each design, solution or choice for each criterion. Therefore, a matrix which contains


































where, the superscript (x1) for each element designates the criterion to which
it corresponds. (Note, that there are ‘m’ designs, points or solutions that require
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pairwise comparison.)
Using the same format for the criteria importance vector above, the attribute

















































After performing this calculation for each criterion, the number of attribute impor-
tance vectors can be calculated and combined into the attribute importance matrix






























where m is the number of design points to compare and n is the number of criteria.
This process can be quite lengthy if the m and n are large and if the attributes
are qualitative in nature, which requires a translation to a quantitative scale. (AHP
also suffers from other limitations such as not being able to identify if some designs
are infeasible due to constraints or other requirements [4].) Still, this process can be
accelerated if all of the attributes have been quantified and simple equations to make
these pairwise comparisons are implemented. (For example, if the range of a certain
attribute for all the designs is from 40 to 90, and larger values are always preferred,
linear comparisons are readily apparent (i.e. 90/40 = 2.25). However, if 80 is twice as
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good as 40 but 90 is twice as good as 80, more sophisticated nonlinear comparisons
are required.)
Once the attribute and criteria importance vectors are calculated, the evaluation
process for all the designs takes the form of a simple matrix-vector product:
[
~dx1










= w1~dx1 + w2
~dx2 + · · ·+ wn~dxn , (63)
which takes the familiar form of a simple OEC calculation,
−−−→
OECm×1 = w1~dx1 + w2
~dx2 + · · ·+ wn~dxn (64)
or, separate OEC’s for each m design points:
OEC1 = w1d1x1 + w2d1x2 + · · ·+ wnd1xn (65)
OEC2 = w1d2x1 + w2d2x2 + · · ·+ wnd2xn
...
OECm = w1dmx1 + w2dmx2 + · · ·+ wndmxn
B.3 TOPSIS Compared to an OEC
The Technique for Ordered Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) is
similar to AHP in that a process is used to quantify the score of a particular alternative
by applying weights to the various criteria and comparing the alternatives to two
idealize alternatives. Thus, the actual design points or alternatives are ordered in
terms of preference with respect to each other, not by pairwise comparison, as in
AHP, but by their relative distance to the absolute best (or worst) in each dimension
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or for each criterion [77]. These values are then multiplied by the weighting factors
(just like in basic OEC or AHP) and ordered based on a cardinal scale.
Since TOPSIS requires the n-dimensional Euclidean distance(s) to a positive ideal
and/or negative ideal solution, the first step in any TOPSIS algorithm is to define
the ideal solution or design. This is accomplished by normalizing the best value for
each criterion across all the solutions.
Starting with the decision matrix, D, defined as:
D =







x11 x12 x13 . . . x1n
x21 x22 x23 . . . x2n
x31 x32 x33 . . . x3n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xm1 xm2 xm3 . . . xmn

(66)
where Ai is the alternative with xij as the values for alternative i in criteria j,
j = 1, ..., n. For this general decision matrixD, there are n criteria andm alternatives.


































j1 in each column to non-dimensionalize the criteria. Since no indication
of whether the decision maker seeks to minimize or maximize the particular criteria,
the “best” value from each column will be the largest or smallest if he or she seeks
to maximize or minimize the appropriate criterion, respectively. For example, the
decision maker will take the lowest value for the cost criterion but the highest value
for a performance criterion (such as fuel efficiency) to compose the positive ideal
solution. Note that this positive ideal solution may not be itself a feasible solution
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within the design space.




























The weighted Euclidean distance between each design alternative Ai and positive




(wjxij − wjA+j )2 =
√√√√ n∑
j=1
w2j (xij − A+j )2 (69)
where wj is the weight for criteria j, with j = 1, ..., n. The distance to the negative




(wjxij − wjA−j )2 =
√√√√ n∑
j=1
w2j (xij − A−j )2 (70)
TOPSIS will typically use both distances (i.e. the distance to both the positive and
negative ideal solutions) to further differentiate between designs as shown in Figure
148. This is to maximize the distance to the negative ideal and, at the same time,
minimize the distance to the positive ideal. Furthermore, in general, if two designs
have the same distance to the positive ideal they will not have the same distance to
the negative ideal, thus including both in a relative closeness parameter is beneficial.
This relative closeness parameter, Ri is calculated as the fraction of the distance
to the negative ideal over the difference of the distances to the positive and negative






Figure 148: Euclidean Distances to Positive and Negative Ideals from Two Alterna-
tives [77]





























which is a function with the weights and elements from the original decision matrix
xij and more simply:
Ri = f(wj, xij), i = 1, ...,m, j = 1, ..., n (73)
What the above equation illustrates is that the TOPSIS technique is just an
additional combination of the same values and weights included in an OEC. Re-
gardless of the decision-making technique selected as the process for evaluating the
various alternatives, many of them can be compared to a process of weighting the
various dimensions or criteria and then combining them in some simple (or compli-
cated) form to extract the scores. The assumption that the OEC is representative of
what other decision-making techniques use is thus made. Thus, although the group
decision-making process, the MACRO methodology, proposed in this research can
335
use potentially any preference-based decision-making technique, only a simple OEC
in the proof of concept has been demonstrated.
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